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Emerging Markets and Innovation in 
the ICT and Pharmaceutical Sector: 
Role of Competition Policy
It is widely accepted that innovation is a key factor to growth and 
development. Consequently, a sustained effort has been made in the Western 
scholarship to promote innovation through various means, including 
law. As part of jurisdiction specific public policy, law strikes a balance 
between incentives to innovators that undertake risky R&D, and ensuring 
easy access for the ones who cannot pay high prices for innovative goods. 
This dilemma also arises in competition law. In developing countries, 
where competition law is relatively new, not much research has been 
done to determine the optimum role of competition law that can ensures 
cheap prices, while also fostering innovative activities through adequate 
incentives, to the extent it is possible in the peculiar socio-economic 
environment. This research is aimed at bridging this gap. This work makes 
an investigation into the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
and the Pharmaceutical sector– both are characterized with rapid innovation 
and have huge implication for social welfare– and shows that how, even while 
ensuring price competition and cheap access, developing countries can 
still successfully support innovative activities through competition policy.
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Whence this creation has arisen perhaps it formed itself, or 
perhaps it did not – the one who looks on it, in the highest 
heaven, only he knows or perhaps he does not know.1 
Innovation that we generally associate with new products 
or process is ubiquitous in its different forms.2 The rising 
standards of physical comfort, improvement in health 
care, ever-changing ways of communication, and on a 
broader level material evolution of human species are all 
due to innovation. At the country level, innovation is a key 
deriver of economic development.3 There is little doubt 
about the role innovation played in buoying the US to 
reach the levels of economic prosperity it exhibits today.4 
For this reason, on the other side of the Atlantic as well, 
innovation figures prominently in the policy agenda.5 
                                                          
1 NasadiyaSukta (hymn of creation), Rigveda (10:129); for a 
commentary see, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, The Rig Veda: An 
Anthology (London: Penguin, 1986) 25-26. 
2  See ©OECD (2005), Oslo Manual (3rd edition) 9. 
3  RM Solow, ―Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function‖ (1957) 39(3) Review of Economics and Statistics 312–
320; GM Grossman and E Helpman, ―Endogenous Innovation in 
the Theory of Growth‖ (1994) 8(1) J of Economic Perspectives 23–
44; D B Audretsch, W J Baumol and A E Burke, ―Competition 
Policy in Dynamic Markets‖, (2001) 19(5) International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 613–634. 
4  Solow (n 3), Robert Solow, who is known for his path-breaking 
work in the growth theory that won him the Nobel Prize, showed 
that 90 per cent of the increase in per capita output between the 
years 1909 and 1949 in the US was due to the technological change 
which averaged 1.5 per cent per year.  
5  See Innovation Union: A Europe 2020 Initiative <http:// ec. europa. 





Developing countries too realize the potential of 
innovation as a tool to lift the masses out of poverty.6 
If innovation has such great potential to alter human life 
and experience, the question arises how to achieve it? 
Innovation is a complex phenomenon that is guided by a 
whole ecosystem such as R&D, absorption capability, firm 
culture, trade openness, access to finance, level of 
competition in the market, and legal framework. The R&D 
investment in innovation requires incentives in the form of 
prices that are higher than marginal cost. This means 
consumers pay high prices in the short run for a new 
product, or to support an innovative activity that would 
result in a new product in the future. The perennial 
challenge in such cases is to balance dynamic efficiency7 
gains (including innovation) that transpire in the long run, 
against static efficiency losses that materialize in the short 
run. This is the trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency. The problem is more pronounced considering 
dynamic efficiency is difficult to quantify.8 Nonetheless, 
mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the US have 
increasingly started considering dynamic efficiency gains 
in policy-making including legal assessment. For instance, 
the European Commission mentions dynamic efficiency 
                                                          
6  For a good perusal, see The Global Innovation Index 2015: 
Effective Innovation Policies for Development<https://www. 
globalinnovationindex.org/userfiles/file/reportpdf/gii-full-report-
2015-v6.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2016). 
7  The first paper of this thesis, A Conceptual Framework to Identify 
Dynamic Efficiency, explores the meaning of dynamic efficiency in 
detail. At this stage it can be understood that dynamic efficiency is 
a broad term that includes innovation. 
8  IK Gotts and CS Goldman, ―The Role of Efficiencies in M&A 
Global Antitrust in Review: Still in Flux?‖ in BE Hawk (ed.), 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Annual Proceedings of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Juris Publishing Inc., 
Huntington 2003), 230–242. 
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gains in its several guidelines.9 Dynamic efficiency gains 
in the US have altered the conventional antitrust analysis.10 
Several emerging markets as well mention efficiencies 
(including dynamic efficiency) in their competition 
legislation in the overall assessment of mergers.11 But, so 
far dynamic efficiency has not been relied upon in the 
competition assessment in emerging markets. 
One strand of evolutionary economics literature points out 
that innovation is the result of several institutions 
interacting with each other.12 These institutions can be 
private and public firms (either large or small), 
universities, government agencies, government policies 
etc. Arguably, such institutions are missing or not fully 
developed in emerging economies. For example, capital 
markets are weak in emerging markets and cannot fund 
cutting edge innovation that requires massive R&D 
expenditures. The public funding to support innovation is 
also inhibited, as there are other immediate needs such as 
health, education, and sanitation. Notwithstanding this, 
                                                          
9  See Guidelines (EC) OJ C31/03 of 5 February 2004 on the 
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (Guidelines); 
Art 2(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the 
ECMR) [2004] OJ L24/1. 
10  Federal Trade Commission, ―FTC Closes its Investigation of 
Genzyme Corporation‘s 2001 
Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals‖, Federal Trade Commi
ssion <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/genzyme.htm>  (accessed 9 
May 2016). 
11  For example, Section 12A(1)(a)(i) of the South African 
Competition Act provides for efficiency defense in 
merger. Similarly Section 20(4) of the Indian Competition Act, 
2002 mentions efficiency in evaluating the net effect of mergers. 
12  See Bengt-ÅkeLundvall, National Innovation Systems: Towards a 
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning (Pinter, London, 
1992); Richard R. Nelson, National Innovation Systems: A 




developing countries still innovate. However, the nature of 
innovation in developing countries largely differs from 
developed countries. Most of the innovation in developing 
countries is small or incremental rather than path breaking 
or radical. That does not mean that the value of such 
innovation is less than the innovation that takes place in 
developed world. On the contrary, such innovation can be 
low on budget but high on social value. For example, M-
PESA is a famous mobile-money system originated in 
Kenya that is allowing the people in developing countries 
to transfer cash by using their mobile phones.13 M-PESA is 
an example of innovation that is leading to financial 
inclusion in developing world where banking has not 
penetrated adequately. This is grassroots or inclusive 
innovation based on the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). This form of innovation leads to social 
inclusion of people and helps overcome social challenges. 
There are several examples of ICT based innovation such 
as M-Farm14, i Cow15 and Mimbo Bora16. The Honey Bee 
Network in India promotes low-cost inclusive innovation 
by supporting innovative ideas.17 
In addition to grassroots innovation, some more advanced 
form of innovation is also happening in developing 
countries. This form of innovation, which is basically 
minor and cumulative in nature, requires better skills and 
expertise than required for the low-cost innovation. The 
example of improvements made on the products of Delphi 
                                                          
13  William Jack and TavneetSuri, ―Mobile Money: The Economics of 
M-pesa‖ (2011) NBER Working Paper No. 16721. 
14  Provides price input to farmers. < https://www.mfarm.co.ke/> 
(accessed 9 May 2016). 
15  Assists farmers in dairy production by supplying relevant 
information. <http://icow.co.ke/>(accessed 9 May 2016). 
16  Assists pregnant women during pregnancy. < 
http://www.mimbabora.com/> (accessed 9 May 2016) 
17 The Honey Bee Network.<http://www.sristi.org/hbnew/> (accessed 
9 May 2016). 
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Technologies in Mexico is illustrious in explaining this 
kind of innovation. Delphi is a multinational company with 
its headquarter in Troy, US. Mexican shop-floor engineers 
made minor changes over a period of time that cut down 
the product defect rates of the products of auto parts giant 
Delphi Technologies.18 From simple assembly of a few 
components of sensors and actuators, the local engineers 
advanced to the level of making improvements in the 
equipment.19 This is an example of incremental innovation, 
which in emerging markets is mostly adaptive in nature, 
and remains the dominant model of innovation.  
The above examples show that innovation need not always 
be high-tech and high-value-added, which very often 
demands enormous amounts of R&D and skills. Innovation 
can also be low-cost and high on social value. There is one 
very interesting fact about innovation in emerging markets: 
most of this innovation does not take place in formal 
settings. To reach the advanced stages of innovation is 
very often a slow process. As has been observed in the 
case of South Korea and Taiwan, slowly the firms build up 
capability to take up more complex innovation.20 
Other than low-cost and incremental innovation, there is a 
third kind of innovation as well in emerging markets, albeit 
on a small scale. This form of innovation, known as radical 
innovation, is an advanced level of innovation. This 
innovation ―departs from the evolutionary path of existing 
technologies and provides substantially greater customer 
                                                          
18  Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, ―Wake Up and Smell the Ginseng: 
International Trade and the Rise of Incremental Innovation in Low-
wage Countries‖ (2010) 91 Journal of Development Economics 64–
76. 
19  Gabriela Dutrénit, ―Technological Capability Accumulation in the 
‗Maquila Industry‘ in Mexico‖ (2005) EBAPE.BR, 3(spe), 01-16 
<http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-
39512005000500016> (accessed 9 May 2016). 




benefits than existing technologies‖.21 In other words, 
customers get totally new benefit from the product. 
Examples of radical innovation can be digital photography, 
online banking, and smart phones. This kind of innovation 
is visible in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, where the 
indigenous firms are innovating radically new 
pharmaceutical products.22 
From low-cost inclusive innovation to radical innovation, 
developing countries have a disparate pattern of 
innovation. The following table from the OECD 
summarizes the nature of innovation that takes place in 
developing countries that are at different levels of 






























































                                                          
21 YongchuanBao, Xiaoyun Chen and Kevin Zheng Zhou, ―External 
Learning, Market Dynamics, and Radical Innovation: Evidence 
from China's High-tech Firms‖ (2012) 65 (8) Journal of Business 
Research 1226-1233. 
22 Rezaie et al. identified 141 new drugs within 41 indigenous firms in 
China, India and Brazil. Out of these new drugs Indian firms had 
90, Chinese 48 and Brazilian 27. Rahim Rezaie, Anita M 
McGahan, Abdallah S Daar and Peter A Singer, ―Innovative drugs 
and vaccines in China, India and Brazil‖ (2012) 30(10) Nature 
Biotechnology 923-26. 
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Table 1. The nature of innovation in developing countries that are at 
different levels of economic development. Source: © OECD (2012), 
―Innovation for development: The challenges ahead‖, in OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing<ht
tp://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_outlook-2012-7-en> 
1.1. Innovation and Development in Developing 
Countries 
There is a rich body of research that links innovation to 
economic growth (often measured in terms of rise in 
GDP).23The link between innovation and growth is not just 
limited to the developed world; there is evidence that R&D 
played a critical role in the growth process of Asian economies 
such as China, India and Korea.24 
This thesis is an attempt to promote innovation through 
competition law in emerging markets, as innovation fosters 
development. Any such effort must, however, begin with 
defining development. Development is largely understood 
as a growth not only in Gross National Product (GNP) but 
also as reduction in poverty and inequality in society.25 
Another very interesting conception of development is 
                                                          
23  See n (3); see also, M.Zachariadis, ‗‗R&D, Innovation, and 
Technological Progress: A Testof the Schumpeterian Framework 
without Scale Effects,‘‘ (2003) 36 (3) CanadianJournal of 
Economics 566–586. 
24  James B. Ang and Jakob B. Madsen, ―Can Second-Generation 
Endogenous Growth Models Explain the Productivity Trends and 
Knowledge Production in the Asian Miracle Economics?‖ (2011) 
93(4)The Review of Economics and Statistics 1360-1373. 
25  John Martinussen, Society, State& Market: A Guide To Competing 




given by the noble laureate, Amartya Sen. Sen views 
development as freedom.  
“Development requires the removal of major sources of 
unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, 
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or 
overactivity of repressive states.”26 Interestingly, 
“freedoms are not only the primary ends [constitutive] of 
development, they are also among its principal means 
[instrumental].”27 
Sen suggests five distinct types of instrumental freedom 
that advance the general capability of a person: (1) political 
freedom (free speech and elections), (2) economic facilities 
(in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and 
production), (3) social opportunities (in the form of 
education and health facilities), (4) transparency 
guarantees (the freedom to deal with one another under 
guarantees of disclosure and lucidity) and (5) protective 
security.28 
If freedom is the main objective and means of 
development, then innovation is a vehicle to emancipate 
and include those who have been left out of the process of 
growth. The ICT innovations in developing countries are a 
prominent vehicle to realize these freedoms.29 M-PESA, 
discussed above, by ensuring economic inclusion leads to 
                                                          
26 Amartya Sen, ―Development as Freedom‖ (Oxford University 
Press, 1999, first published OUP paper back in 2001) p 3. 
27 ibid, p 10. 
28  ibid 
29  For a good review of how ICT is helping in poverty alleviation, 
development and improving governance see World Bank, ―ICT for 
Greater Development Impact: World Bank Group Strategy for 
Information and Communication Technology‖ (2012)<http://siteres
ources.worldbank.org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICAT
IONANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/WBG_ICT_Strategy-
2012.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2016). 
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economic freedom; social media lends voice to masses, 
and thus ensures political freedom; mobile phones based 
applications are helping fight diseases such as HIV and 
AIDS in Africa30, and are helping spread education31– this 
way ensuring social opportunity. The latest ICT 
technology assists in public safety management of crisis 
situations like natural disasters, health care delivery, and 
the distribution and use of energy.32 These advances in 
technology are thus a way to realize the freedoms that Sen 
regards fundamental to development. Interestingly, these 
gains of innovation are in addition to the economic growth 
that is the direct result of innovation. Therefore, in addition 
to positively affecting growth, innovation also helps address 
social challenges such as poverty and health.  
Innovation is an imperative for developing countries, as 
many a time the demand driven innovation from the 
Western countries does not cater to the needs specific to 
the developing world. For instance, not much research has 
been undertaken on the tropical diseases, such as dengue, 
malaria and tuberculosis that effect only poor people in 
developing countries. With an innovative capability, 
emerging markets can provide cure to such diseases and 
thereby ensure social opportunities and productivity. A 
                                                          
30  Dallas Swendeman and Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus, ―Innovation in 
Sexually Transmitted Disease and HIV Prevention: Internet and 
Mobile Phone Delivery Vehicles for Global Diffusion‖ (2010) 
23(2) Current Opinion in Psychiatry 139-144. 
31  Simone Cecchini and Christopher Scott, ―Can Information and 
Communications Technology Applications Contribute to Poverty 
Reduction? Lessons from Rural India‖ (2003) 10 Information 
Technology for Development 73–84. 
32  Robert J. Shapiro and Kevin A. Hassett, ―The Employment Effects 
of Advances in Internet and Wireless Technology: Evaluating the 
Transitions from 2G to 3G and from 3G to 4G‖ (NDN and New 
Policy Institute, January 2012) <http://www.sonecon.com/docs/stud
ies/Wireless_Technology_and_Jobs-Shapiro_Hassett-




successful example of welfare inducing local innovation 
can be seen in India‘s agriculture sector. India‘s Green 
Revolution in the 1960s encouraged innovation that in turn 
led to the introduction of high-yield varieties of seed 
resulting in increase in grain production. Thus, agricultural 
innovation helped India deal with food scarcity among 
poor.33 Evidence also suggests that R&D-led productivity 
growth in agriculture leads to poverty alleviation.34 
Further, the forces of globalization also make it mandatory 
for the emerging markets firms to be innovative in order to 
sustain competition from their Western rivals, who 
compete on the basis of innovative new products. 
It is true that the nature of innovation changes as per the 
level of economic development of a country (see Table 1). 
Thus, the innovation policy should be country specific. At 
the same time, countries should endeavor to support 
innovation through appropriate legal framework. 
Recognizing the key role of innovation in economic growth, 
and in realizing development as freedom, the normative aim 
of the policymaking should be to foster innovation.  
1.2 Innovation and Competition Law 
In a market place, law sets the rules of behavior for the 
participating firms. In this way, law as a part of 
jurisdiction-specific policy provides a framework that may 
support market activities that positively affect innovation. 
On the other hand, if law is not appreciative of innovation, 
it may stifle the same. Several laws such as intellectual 
property, torts, taxation, and antitrust influence innovation. 
                                                          
33  ©OECD, Innovation for development: The challenges ahead, 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012 
34 Colin Thirtle, Lin Lin and Jenifer Piesse, ―The Impact of Research-
Led Agricultural Productivity Growth on Poverty Reduction in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America‖ (2003) 31 (12) World 
Development 1959–1975. 
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Intuitively, IP rights– most prominently patents35– seem to 
have a direct bearing on the level of innovation, as they 
create legal exclusion in order to incentivize and reward 
innovative activity. This is a source of a firm‘s market 
power– an ability to raise prices above marginal cost. On 
the other hand, competition law is a set of rules to ensure 
the process of rivalry in a free market, with the eventual 
goal to promote ‗consumer welfare‘36, both in the short run 
and the long run. In the short run an antitrust intervention 
may lower the prices, for example by prohibiting a merger 
between two rivals or by issuing compulsory license. The 
long run consumer welfare can be ensured through 
antitrust laws for example by allowing the rival firms to 
merge, if they can convince the antitrust body that the 
merger will support innovation. However, finding the 
optimal balance between the short run and the long run 
goals in competition law has been a perennial dilemma, 
even for the mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the 
US. As the legal exclusion guaranteed by IP rights is 
against the process of rivalry, competition law may be used 
for breaking the IP created market power– this is the tussle 
between IP and competition law. For instance, when a 
pharmaceutical firm refuses to share its patented Active 
Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) with generic firms, or 
charges high prices for the same, competition law, by 
mandating sharing of IP right, may ensure the short run 
consumer welfare. To this end, the agreement on the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) allows the Member countries to use competition 
law in case of ‗abuse‘ of IP rights.37 On the other hand, an 
                                                          
35  In the ever-increasing digital world, copyright is increasingly 
becoming important for innovation. 
36  Consumer Welfare is different from consumer interest, and is 
measured by the area between demand curve and competitive 
prices on a demand-supply curve.  
37  See Article 8(2), 31 (b) and 40 (2) of the TRIPS agreement. For an 




over intrusive competition law intervention may stifle 
innovation by disregarding optimal incentives to 
innovators. This is the principal reason to decide the role 
that competition law can play towards fostering innovation 
in emerging markets. 
Further, the level of competition in market determines the 
amount of innovation.38 Also, activities such as joint 
ventures, licensing, and mergers are scrutinized by 
competition agencies for their possible detrimental affect 
on consumer welfare. In such cases, the short run losses– 
increase in prices due to market power– can be offset, or 
more than offset by gains in the long run, i.e., innovation. 
However, if the competition agency does not appreciate the 
long run gains, it may end up stifling innovation.39 Some 
scholars have paid attention to the role and nature of IP 
rights in promoting innovation in developing countries, in 
light of the special economic characteristics prevailing in 
developing countries.40 No such known attention has been 
given to the role of competition law. For these reasons, this 
thesis attempts to approach innovation through competition 
                                                          
38  The Industrial Organization literature, however, does not have a 
consensus on the optimal level of competition for innovation. See, 
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (G. 
Allen &Unwin Ltd 1943); Kenneth Arrow, ‗Economic Welfare and 
the Allocation of Resources for Invention‘ in The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 
(Princeton University Press 1962); Philippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, 
Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt, ‗Competition 
and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship‘ (2005) 120 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 701. 
39  For a detail discussion on the role of competition law in innovation 
see, © OECD (2006), ―Competition, Patents and Innovation‖, 
DAF/COMP (2007) 40. 
40  See for example Yongmin Chen and Thitima Puttitanun, 
―Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing 
Countries‖ Journal of Development Economics 78 (2005) 474– 
493; Suzanne Scotchmer, ―The Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property Treaties‖ (2002) NBER Working paper 9114. 
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law in emerging markets, and explores the extent to which 
competition law can promote the long run consumer 
welfare by way of innovation in the ICT and 
pharmaceutical sectors, against the socio-economic and 
institutional realities in developing countries. 
1.3 Competition law and Emerging Markets 
As emerging markets embrace the free market economy, 
they require a legal framework to ensure that market power 
of the firms do not jeopardize consumer welfare.41 There is, 
however, very little research on the nature of competition 
law in emerging markets. One strand of research– being 
mindful of the different socio-economic, and political 
conditions– argues a totally different ‗brand‘ of competition 
law, with different substantive features.42 This school 
advocates a proactive use of competition law to promote 
                                                          
41  The concept of market power and its application in different forms 
is central to the competition policy. M. Motta, Competition Policy: 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 2009) 101. 
42  Josef Drexl, Consumer Welfare and Consumer Harm: Adjusting 
Competition Law and Policies to the Needs of Developing 
Jurisdictions, in Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.) The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 
Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 293; Eleanor Fox, Competi
tion, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Compe
tition Law Fit for Developing Countries, Josef Drexl et al 
(eds.), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing 
Countries (Edward Elgar 2012) 273-290; William E. Kovacic, 
―Institutional Foundations for Economic legal reform transition 
Economies: the case of competition Policy and antitrust 
enforcement‖ (2001) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 265; 
MorBakhoum, 'A Dual Language in Modern Competition Law? 
Efficiency Approach versus Development Approach and 
Implications for Developing Countries' (2011) 34 (3) World 
Competition 495–522; M. S. Gal and E.M. Fox, Drafting 
competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning from 
experience, Michal S. Gal et al (eds.), The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 




development. On the other side of the spectrum, some 
commentators argue that the Western model of competition 
law is good for developing countries as well.43 
The nature of competition law, like any other law, is shaped 
by jurisdiction-specific socio-economic, and institutional 
realities. The term ‗emerging markets‘ may invoke some 
common perceivable images. For instance, lack of 
resources, poverty, missing markets and weak institutions. 
Thus, prima facie, a different nature of competition law in 
emerging markets may seem appropriate. As one digs a little 
deeper, this general broad-brush prescription seems over 
simplistic. The emerging markets, even though put together 
in one group, consist of countries very different from each 
other. It is difficult to see common ground between China 
and countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Further, even within a 
country, different sectors of the economy may be at 
different stages of value chain, demanding different legal 
treatment. For instance, the pharmaceutical sector in India is 
showing signs of from ―imitation to innovation‖, even as 
other sectors may be less developed.44 
Competition law is a ―multifaceted tool‖ that can be adapted to 
different economic circumstances in developing countries.45 
                                                          
43 EinerElhauge and Damien Gerardin, Global Competition Law and 
Economics (2ndedn., Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2011), 
p v; George L. Priest, Competition Law in Developing Nations: The 
Absolutist View, in D. Daniel Sokol et al. (eds.) Competition Law 
and Development (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 
2013) 79-89. 
44 Joanna Chataway, Joyce Tait and David Wield, ―Frameworks for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation in Developing Countries—The Case of 
Indian Pharma‖ (2007) 19(5) Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 697-708. 
45  Simon J. Evenett, Competition Law and the Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Countries, in Michal S. Gal et al. 
(eds.) The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: 
Their Implications for Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) page 
18. 
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For example, large informal sector characterizes 
developing countries. However, this does not require a 
different treatment of firms in the informal sector while 
undertaking the competition assessment, as the 
conventional antitrust tools can take account of such 
realities. Evenett explains: ―the presence in many 
developing countries of a large informal sector in certain 
markets may alter assessments of the number of substitutes 
available to buyers and therefore the assessment of the 
market power of incumbent firms.‖46 However, Evenett 
believes that the enforcement priorities should be different 
in emerging markets as ―spending is concentrated on a few 
product categories‖.47 
With scant resources and little experience, the enforcement 
efforts should be directed at those sectors where consumers 
could see visible changes brought about by antitrust 
intervention. Evenett shows that maximum spending in the 
low-income countries is concentrated in food, clothing, and 
housing sectors. Anti-competitive practices in such sectors 
will have the most detrimental effects on poor. Thus, 
naturally, these sectors should be the enforcement priority. 
Moreover, high prices affect the poor consumers more than 
the rich consumers, as the poor consumers tend to spend a 
higher share of their income on basic provisions such as 
food staples, housing, and fuel than wealthier consumers.48  
An OECD study shows that the harm caused by monopoly 
power on levels of household spending on staple products 
like tortillas, chicken, and milk is greatest among the 
poorest 10% of households in Mexico.49 
                                                          
46  ibid 
47  ibid 
48  © OECD, Competition Law and Policy: Drivers of Economic 
Growth and Development (2015) < https://www.oecd.org/ 
development/002014381_CfD_E-book_FINAL%20VERSION% 
20FOR%20WEB.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2016) 




Another question is how to employ competition law to 
foster development and poverty alleviation in developing 
countries. Does this objective require changes in 
competition law, such as safeguarding the local 
manufacturers from being acquired by international 
firms?50 Or, are there less intrusive means as well? 
Competition law, in itself, by ensuring optimal and healthy 
rivalry in the marketplace increases productivity, leads to 
reduction in prices and development of new and better 
products. In turn, this leads to overall economic 
development, which – combined with other policies – can 
lead to poverty alleviation.51 A healthy process of 
competition ensures that only efficient firms stay in the 
market (productive efficiency); rivalry among competitors 
also reduces prices of commodities, and thereby leads to 
more economic inclusion (allocative efficiency); finally, in 
order to compete with rivals, firms innovate (dynamic 
efficiency).52 These factors, in turn, translate into growth at 
a macroeconomic level. 
The newly liberalized emerging economies may have 
dominant previously state-owned firms. Thus, competition 
is a good tool to ensure optimal markets by facilitating 
entry of smaller firms in the market place by guarding 
them against the unfair use of the market power of 
                                                          
50  For example Drexl is of the opinion that ―protection of the local 
competitors against incoming international players should not be 
excluded from the ambit of domestic competition law (of 
developing countries)‖, see Drexl (n 38) p 293. 
51  See Simon J. Evenett, What is the Relationship between 
Competition Law and Policy and Economic Development?, in 
Douglas H. Brooks and Simon J. Evenett, Competition Policy and 
Development in Asia ( Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005) 1-26;  
Stefan Voigt , ―The Effects of Competition Policy on Development 
– Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators‖ 45 (8) 
(2009) Journal of Development Studies 1225-1248; see also © 
OECD (n 48) 
52  OECD (n 48) 
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dominant undertakings. Therefore, pure competition in 
itself is a way to ensure development, as has been observed 
in the following text. 
“Competitive markets are the best way yet found for 
efficiently organising the production and distribution of 
goods and services. Domestic and external competition 
provides the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and 
technological progress.”53 
This is not to say that developing countries are not 
different. The difference can be economic, social, political, 
and institutional. So far as the economic differences are 
concerned, this thesis argues that the special characteristics 
of emerging markets do not warrant different substantive 
rules, as the existing tools of mainstream competition law 
are flexible enough to be employed in the special economic 
settings of emerging markets.  
As regard the social characteristics of developing countries 
are concerned, some emerging jurisdictions, most 
prominently South Africa, try to achieve social causes such 
as empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups 
through competition law. Such ingenious and well-
intentioned additions in competition legislation may rather 
lead to practical problems with regard to enforcement. For 
example, an acquisition that changes the ownership of a 
firm from disadvantaged sections to non-disadvantaged 
section may run foul of specific provisions of the South 
African competition legislation.54 At the same time, 
                                                          
53   World Bank, World Development Report, 1991, p.1 
54  For similar cases see ©OECD, Competition Law and Policy in South 
Africa, An OECD Peer Review (2003)<http://www.oecd.org/ 
daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/2958714.pdf> 
(accessed 6 April 2016); see also, VaniChetty, ―The Place of Public 
Interest in South Africa‘s Competition Legislation: Some Implications 
for International Antitrust Convergence‖ (2005) ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law <http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-




however, this acquisition may have positive effects on the 
overall consumer welfare. In such scenario, it is difficult 
for an antitrust regulator to balance, at least economically, 
competing goals. Further, a balancing exercise in such 
cases makes the competition law enforcement vulnerable 
to subjective considerations. Any inclusion of public 
interest goals makes the competition law enforcement 
politically sensitive too. It is difficult to imagine how 
economic reasoning, howsoever convincing, would take 
preponderance over public interest goals. This should be 
seen against the institutional backdrop in emerging 
markets, where newly established competition regulators 
may not be politically independent. Furthermore, antitrust 
guidelines that provide an objective legal framework for 
antitrust assessment may be missing, as the antitrust 
jurisprudence is scant. Some scholars also support taking 
into consideration the protection of local manufacturers 
against international players through competition law.55 
Any such attempt, however, will reduce competition law to 
merely an industrial policy tool. A more optimal solution 
would be sector-specific Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
policy. If such acquisitions are considered detrimental for 
local businesses, the government can cap the maximum 
limit of FDI in a particular sector. Therefore, the more 
optimal solution is to achieve public interest through other 
legislations and policies, provided they are within the 
WTO framework. 
The spread of market may have overall positive effects on 
the well-being of people. However, free market economy 
does not come without evils. Policy makers have to 
grapple with concomitant problems such as rising 
pollution, increasing unemployment, and economic 
downturns. On a different level, rising individualism and 
stress are also attributed to the ever-growing pressure to 
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perform well in highly competitive working environment. 
But, as we know, each statute is aimed at addressing some 
specific mischief. To this end, competition law is aimed at 
checking the misuse of market power of players in a free 
market, with the end aim to ensure consumer welfare both 
in the short run and the long run.56 Consequently, any such 
objective that cannot be accommodated within the 
economic meaning of the short run or the long run 
consumer welfare falls outside the scope of competition 
law. There are other tools for these objectives such as 
consumer protection laws, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprise (SME) policy, and social welfare policy. 
Antitrust cases involve heavy economic analysis, and 
market assessment requires professional skills and 
experience. Arguably, the know-how and required skills 
are not readily available to the antitrust regulators in 
emerging economies. In view of the complexities involved 
in taking Economics-Based Model (EBM) of competition 
law as prevalent in the EU and the US, one commentator 
has argued for adapting the role of economics in the 
context of emerging markets.57 Gerber, in view of resource 
limitations, lack of training and expertise, limited 
experience, and learning and application obstacles suggests 
a ‗descriptive‘ role of economics for developing countries. 
As per this approach, the resort to economic analysis 
should be made only in limited cases.58 However, this 
                                                          
56  Of course, the short run and the long run consumer welfare present 
a policy choice. 
57  David J. Gerber, ―Competition Law and the Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Countries‖ Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.) 
The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their 
Implications for Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 248. 
58  ibid, ―Economics can, for example, play a descriptive role. In this 
function, economics is used to interpret data. It answers questions 
such as ‗What actually happened?‘, ‗What are the likely 
consequences of a particular agreement such as, for example, a 




approach does not offer a practical framework for 
competition analysis. Almost all competition law cases 
require thorough economic analysis. Consequently, any 
reduced or narrow application of economics in competition 
cases would entail either over enforcement (Type 1 error) 
or under enforcement (Type 2 errors)– both are bad for 
consumers and firms. 
As seen above, the jury is still out on the true role and 
nature of competition law in emerging markets. There are 
wide-ranging differences among scholars. At the same 
time, competition regimes in these countries are 
increasingly dealing with complex cases, especially in the 
high-technology sector where innovation is often the key 
to compete successfully. High-technology firms such as 
Google and Facebook are present everywhere, and their 
practices result in similar legal consequences in emerging 
markets as well. Thus, it seems appropriate to equip the 
competition agencies in these countries with adequate tools 
and training, rather than changing the standards of 
analysis.  
The legal and economics literature, in general, uses several 
terms to denote developing countries. There is no standard 
definition of a ‗developing country‘ or ‗emerging market‘. 
Different institutions have different criteria to classify a 
country as developing.59 There is, however, a consensus on 
the following features of developing countries: presence of 
high transaction costs, which often include corruption; weak 
institutions; markets are often incomplete, weak or non-
existent; often research organizations and multinational 
companies operating at the technology frontier coexist with 
                                                          
59  See, Peter Marber, ‗Redefining EM: Country clusters offer new 
matrix‘, Financial Times (August 5, 2015); see also Robert E. 
Hoskisson, Lorraine Eden, Chung Ming Lau and Mike Wright, 
―Strategy in Emerging Economies‖ (Jun., 2000) 43(3) The 
Academy of Management Journal 249-267. 
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micro-enterprises having little technological capacities; 
several LDCs have low innovative capabilities and are 
dependent on industrialized countries for the provision of 
new technology and knowledge; domestic demand is 
usually small; and agriculture is a critical sector in 
economy.60 For the purpose of competition law following 
are the common features of developing countries: lack of 
competition culture; concentration of economic and political 
power, which facilitates the capture of public entities; 
scarcity of financial and human resources; abundance of 
small and medium-sized firms, and lack of capacity in the 
judicial system.61 This thesis uses the terms emerging 
markets, developing countries, and transition economies 
interchangeably.  
1.4 The Gap in Scholarship 
As innovation is increasingly becoming important in 
developing countries, it is crucial to provide supporting 
institutions. In this regard, the role played by law in providing 
a more enabling environment is crucial. However, as scholars 
are mostly debating the nature of competition law in 
emerging markets, little research has been undertaken on the 
role of dynamic efficiency, and how the same can be 
promoted through competition law in developing countries.62 
                                                          
60 Andréanne Léger, ―The Role(s) of Intellectual Property Rights for 
Innovation: A Review of the Empirical Evidence and Implications 
for Developing Countries‖ (2007) DIW Berlin, Discussion paper 
707 <https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/61916/dp707. 
pdf> (accessed 6 April 2016) 
61  See, Competition Policies in Emerging Economies: Lessons and 
Challenges from Central America and Mexico (Claudia Schatan 
and Eugenio Rivera eds., Springer 2008)16. 
62  A prominent study is A Singh, ―Competition and Competition 
Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental 
Dimensions‖ (G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No 18, September 
2002) <http://unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf> (accessed 
6 April 2016). Singh suggests that even developing countries can 




Evidently, the task to balance the short run losses against 
the long run gains is more difficult in emerging markets 
against the backdrop of poverty, socio-economic 
inequalities, technological differences, and institutional 
capacity. This, however, warrants a more active interest of 
scholars in this conundrum. The problem is not just an 
academic one. The competition agencies in emerging 
markets are dealing with or bracing themselves to deal 
with extremely complex cases in high-technology sectors 
where innovation occupies the center stage. For example, 
standardization processes and their interface with 
competition law are extremely technical issues. Not only 
do such issues demand a shift from conventional static 
efficiency based approach to considering dynamic 
efficiency issues, they also demand the competition 
agencies in developing countries to appreciate the 
progression and evolution of technology. China and India 
are already grappling with the legal issues involved in the 
standardization processes.63  The other developing 
countries also realize the importance of their participation 
in the standardization processes.64 For example, Africa and 
Arabic regions have their own intergovernmental standards 
body, the African Organisation for Standardisation 
(ARSO) and the Arabic Industrial Development and 
Mining Organization (AIDMO) respectively. 
                                                          
63  See, the DIPP paper in India, ―Discussion Paper on Standard 
Essential Patents and their Availability on FRAND terms‖ 
<http://www.ipindia.nic.in/Whats_New/standardEssentialPaper_01
March2016.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2016); For an overview of the 
position in China see D. Daniel Sokol and WentongZheng, 
―FRAND in China‖, 22 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal. 
71 2013-2014. 
64 For an account of standardization capabilities in developing 
countries see the ITU report, ICT Standardization Capabilities of 
Developing Countries: Bridging the Standardization 
Gap<https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/0B/1F/T0B1F00000133 
01PDFE.pdf>(accessed 6 April 2016) 
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Even though developing countries are yet not actively 
participating in international technology standard setting, 
this process does affect them inasmuch as the firms in 
developing countries are the users of international 
standards. In fact, the World Telecommunication 
Standardization Assembly (WTSA)-12 resolution 44 
recognizes the ―standardization gap‖ between developed 
and developing countries and advocates for bridging the 
same.65 
Increasing international trade has also exposed the 
developing countries to complex legal issues that merit the 
same gravity and consideration as they merit elsewhere in 
the developed world. For instance, determination of 
complex legal issues including dumping, countervailing 
duties, and de-minims limits requires the application of 
economics. Therefore, any such proposal that competition 
law enforcement in emerging markets should not follow or 
follow a limited economics-based approach is far-fetched 
from reality.  
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007, whose effects 
still linger, further showed that financial markets in 
emerging markets are not insulated from the global 
shocks.66 Financial markets are complex, and equally 
complex are the financial products. It requires a great deal 
of legal and economic understanding to fully comprehend 
financial products such as Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs), derivatives, and repos for the purpose of 
regulation. To assume that developing countries lack 
know-how and resources; and, therefore, recommend a 
sub-optimal legal framework is to let developing countries 
                                                          
65 Resolution 44 - Bridging the standardization gap between 
developing and developed countries <http://www.itu.int/pub/T-
RES-T.44-2012>(accessed 6 April 2016) 
66 Bruno Gurtner, ―The Financial and Economic Crisis and 
Developing Countries‖, International Development Policy p 189-




languish in mediocrity. Instead the focus should be on 
capacity building through increased cooperation. In this 
regard, the International Competition Network (ICN), 
UNCTAD, the European Commission, and the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have taken some steps. 
The foreseeable new era of technology, characterized by 
‗Internet of Things‘ (IoT) and ‗Big data‘ is ushering in a 
new era. IOT comprises of connected machines (Machine-
to-Machine, M2M) and connected environment (Machine-
to-Person, M2P). The International Telecom Union (ITU) 
predicts 25 Billion Networked Devices by 2020. 
Developing countries too have already started resorting to 
‗IoT‘ and ‗Big Data‘ analysis to solve critical issues in the 
third world such as sanitation, healthcare and agriculture.67 
The following illustration from the ITU highlights the role 
played by the new technology in developing countries. 
[S]ensors in agricultural fields are monitoring soil 
conditions and moisture levels.  RFID tags are helping 
farmers provide more personalized care for their livestock. 
Connected thermometers are monitoring vaccine delivery 
and storage in real-time. Cameras and sensors in 
smartphones and tablets are allowing healthcare workers 
to provide remote diagnosis of disease. And off-grid solar 
systems, monitored via SMS, are bringing affordable 
electricity to lower income families.68 
The ‗IoT‘ and  ‗Big Data‘ present emerging markets with 
not only new opportunities, but also with new 
challenges. The IoT has regulatory implications across the 
areas of licensing, spectrum management, standards, 
competition, security, and privacy.69 Further, the new ICT 
                                                          
67 The ITU report, Harnessing the Internet of Things for Global 
Development <https://www.itu.int/en/action/broadband/Documents/ 
Harnessing-IoT-Global-Development.pdf>(accessed 6 April 2016) 
68  ibid 
69  ibid 
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technology is facilitating a different kind of innovation 
where users contribute in the innovation process- this form 
of innovation is knows as ‗open innovation‘ or ‗user 
innovation‘.70 This new form of innovation as well 
presents challenges for conventional competition law and 
intellectual property paradigms. 
Consequently, as the world enters a new era of technology, 
the legal and regulatory framework should be well 
prepared to deal with the new challenges. In this vein, the 
research in this thesis takes a forward-looking approach in 
terms of identifying the importance of innovation in the 
development process, and attempts to make adequate space 
for it in the competition law enforcement in emerging 
markets. 
While discussing the nature of competition law in 
emerging markets, and exploring the possible ways to 
incorporate dynamic efficiency concerns, it is crucial to 
look at the patent-antitrust interface. After all, the legal 
monopoly by virtue of patents may lead to higher prices– 
this may be the motivation for emerging markets to employ 
competition law to break such monopoly. One view is that 
patent and antitrust have the same objective–innovation. 
The following observation of R. Hewitt Pate manifests this 
view.71  
                                                          
70  Henry W. Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for 
Creating and Profiting from Technology (Harvard Business School 
Press, 2003); Eric Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 2006)<http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/books/
DI/DemocInn.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2016); Geertrui Van 
Overwalle,  ―Inventing Inclusive Patents: From Old to New Open 
Innovation‖ (December 26, 2014). Kritika: Essays on Intellectual 
Property, vol. 1, P. Drahos, G. Ghidini and H. Ullrich (eds.), 
Edward Elgar, 2015, 206-277<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705109> 
(accessed 6 April 2016) 
71 R. Hewitt Pate, ―Antitrust and Intellectual Property‖ <https:// www. 
justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-and-intellectual-property> (accessed 




A few decades ago, it might have been accurate to say that 
antitrust and IP were in conflict. In fact, for many years my 
own agency had a "Professions and Intellectual Property" 
section that was active in opposing the exercise of IP 
rights. In that era, our view was that intellectual property 
rights regimes created monopolies to spur innovation, 
while the antitrust laws sought to eliminate monopolies. 
The modern view, in contrast, is that intellectual property 
and antitrust laws both seek to promote innovation and 
consumer welfare. 
This view, however, suits developed economies that are at 
the forefront of technological frontier. The policy choice 
is, therefore, in favor of strong patent rights.72 At the same 
time, loose patent rights might adversely affect the local 
innovators in developing countries– or, at least, in those 
sectors that have started showing the signs of 
innovation. Therefore, ideally, the balance between patents 
and antitrust in developing countries depends on the 
technological capability to innovate in a specific sector.73 
This thesis (the fifth chapter) looks into this interface from 
a Systems of Innovation approach. 
1.5 Research Areas and Questions 
The thesis comprises four papers. Each paper has different 
set of research questions. Also, the research methodology 
adopted varies. The broader research question, however, 
that sets the research path is: to what extent competition 
law can foster innovation in the ICT and pharmaceutical 
                                                          
72  For example see Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 
2007 E.C.R. II-3601 (Ct. First Instance) in EU, and Verizon 
Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP 540 
US 398 (2004) in the US. 
73  Thomas K. Cheng, ―The Patent - Antitrust Interface in Developing 
Countries‖, in Daniel D. Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng,  and  Ioannis 
Lianos (eds.) Competition Law and Development  (Oxford 
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sectors in emerging markets? This question is asked in the 
context of the short run imperative of ensuring easy access, 
as the majority of the population is less well off, 
institutions are underdeveloped, and the general economy 
is backward. 
The sectors of inquiry are the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) and pharmaceutical 
sectors. Both these sectors are high-technology areas, 
where innovation is a key aspect of competition.  
The ICT sector is a platform sector that supports other 
industries in manufacturing and services.74 In developing 
countries, access to ICT is showing positive effects on 
healthcare, governance, education, poverty alleviation, and 
even in reducing corruption. ICT can also play the key role 
in facilitating modern urbanization in developing countries 
by supporting ‗smart cities‘.75 Thus, it is an imperative that 
the masses can get cheap access to the ICT technology. At 
the same time, ICT happens to be a dynamic sector where 
the technology gets obsolete quickly. The latest ICT 
technology such as optical fiber, 4G and 5G technologies 
increase spectral efficiency and thus support better 
communication, and facilitate innovative services. 
Therefore, the policy dilemma in this sector is between 
incentivizing new technology and facilitating cheap access.  
Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is in decline.76 
As the innovation declines, the firms in the pharmaceutical 
                                                          
74  Johannes M. Bauer and Woohyun Shim, ―Effects of Regulation on 
Innovation in the Information and Communications Sector‖ (2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028523> 
(accessed 6 April 2016). 
75  Jung Hoon Lee, Marguerite Gong Hancock and Mei-Chih Hu, 
―Towards an effective framework for building smart cities: Lessons 
from Seoul and San Francisco‖, Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change 89 (2014) 80-99. 
76 David F Horrobin, ―Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry‖ 




sector are choosing to merge in order to be profitable.77 
The development of new drugs requires legal and 
regulatory framework to ensure adequate incentives. This 
is possible only when firms charge prices above marginal 
cost. The legal monopoly by way of patents allows firms to 
charge such prices. In developing countries, where the 
consumers are poor, high prices may prevent them from 
accessing the life-saving medicines. In turn, poor health 
has adverse effect on country's productivity, growth, and 
ultimately on economic development.78 Naturally, 
affordable price is the most crucial factor that enables 
access to medicines.79 In this regard, the role played by 
generics in increasing price competition, and thereby 
reducing prices is crucial. Therefore, it was pertinent to 
look at the role that competition law can play in opening 
up access for generics.  
The thesis also explores the balance between IP and 
Competition law. Theoretically, there are two choices for 
developing countries. First is to allow the local firms to 
imitate. Second, to promote innovation by ensuring 
adequate incentives for innovative firms. So far as the 
latter choice is concerned, domestic innovators may also, 
at least theoretically, benefit from strong IP rights. The 
latter option has prompted some to advocate strong IP 
rights in emerging markets for the sake of supporting 
domestic innovation.80 
                                                          
77  ibid 
78  Matthew A. Cole and Eric Neumayer, ―The impact of poor health 
on factor productivity: an empirical investigation‖ (2006) 42 
(6) Journal of Development Studies 918-938 <http:// eprints. lse. 
ac. uk/ 19780/1/ The % 20 impact% 20of% 20poor% 20health% 
20on%20 factor % 20 productivity (lseror). pdf> (accessed 6 April 
2016). 
79 The WHO recognizes this. See, Access to Medicines<http: // www.  
who.int/trade/glossary/story002/en/>(accessed 6 April 2016) 
80  Chen and Puttitanun (n 40) 
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Chen and Puttitanun explain that the optimal IP regime 
follows the development trajectory in a specific 
jurisdiction.81 
“Starting from low levels of economic development, an 
initial increase in a country’s technological ability has a 
greater impact on the efficiency of imitating northern 
technologies than on the efficiency of domestic 
innovations, which makes it desirable for the country to 
lower IPRs. Once the country’s technological ability is 
above a certain threshold, the imitation effect is dominated 
by the innovation effect, and the optimal protection of IPRs 
increases with the levels of development.” 
This finding is extremely relevant for the purpose of 
striking the right balance between competition law and IP. 
Evidently, when a country has no or little innovative 
capability, a strong IP regime would be counterproductive. 
However, there is one additional element that must factor 
in policy-making– within a country, different sectors of the 
economy may be at different stages of value chain. Thus, 
the balance between competition law and IP should vary 
from sector to sector. This theme has been developed in 
paper three and four of the thesis. Especially, the fourth 
paper approaches this concept through the framework of 
Systems of Innovation and investigates the innovative 
capability of the Indian and Brazilian pharmaceutical 
sector to draw a prescription for compulsory licenses.  
1.6 Preview 
The main contribution of this thesis is to analyze the extent 
to which innovation can be pursued through competition 
law and policy in developing countries. As discussed 
above, there is a dearth of competition law scholarship that 
looks into the trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency within the context of emerging markets. The 
                                                          




starting point of the research is the benefits that result from 
innovation.  
Even before the sector enquiry could be taken up, it was 
pertinent to have an understanding and definition of 
dynamic efficiency. A preliminary research revealed that 
there was a general disagreement on the definition of 
dynamic efficiency. Economists, in general, even while 
determining efficiency as the goal of competition law, do 
not define it categorically. A proper recognition of 
dynamic efficiency in competition assessment, however, is 
not possible unless lawyers understand the ambit of the 
same. The first paper, A Conceptual Framework to Identify 
Dynamic Efficiency, published in the European 
Competition Journal82, is devoted to this issue. This paper 
after analyzing the main definitions of dynamic efficiency 
develops a conceptual framework to identify the same. 
The second paper of the thesis, Access and Investment in 
the ICT Sector for Developing Countries, published in the 
Law and Development Review83, looks at the trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency in the ICT sector. 
The ICT sector is quite peculiar in that it has positive 
effects on the key aspects of development such as 
education, health and governance. Thus, ensuring access to 
telecom services is crucial in developing countries. On the 
other hand, the ICT sector is characterized by rapid 
technological changes. The new generations of ICT are not 
only faster and more efficient, but more expensive as well. 
Interestingly, the new ICT technology has better potential 
to develop new businesses, facilitate healthcare and 
support economy. The paper recognizes this trade-off, and 
by discussing two specific policies, Local Loop 
                                                          
82 A Conceptual Framework to Identify Dynamic Efficiency (2015) 
11(2-3) European Competition Journal 319-339. 
83 Access and Investment in the ICT Sector for Developing Countries 
(2015) 9(1) Law and Development Review 1-27. 
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Unbundling (LLU) and Universal Service Obligation 
(USO), suggests measures to facilitate investment and 
innovation in the new technology without jeopardizing 
access. This approach, while recognizing that due 
incentives for the innovative firms is crucial, especially 
when return on investment is uncertain, gives due 
weightage to the need of local population to access the ICT 
services. This pragmatic approach is important in the wake 
of other perplexing issues in the ICT sector such as 
Network Neutrality– the policy choice for which cannot 
always be binary. The research in this paper is helpful to 
this end, as it advocates a legal framework that facilitates 
the adoption and diffusion of latest ICT technology by 
promising incentives to the private sector, while ensuring 
affordable access at the same time. This new technology, 
in turn, fosters more innovation and inclusion, and 
development on the local level.  
The third paper in the thesis, Pharmaceutical Mergers and 
their Effect on Access and Efficiency: A Case of Emerging 
Markets, published in the World Competition Law and 
Economics Review84, shifts the focus of enquiry from the 
ICT sector to the pharmaceutical sector. A choice between 
the short run and the long run efficiency becomes more 
difficult in the pharmaceutical sector, as access to 
healthcare is one of the basic human needs. Since the 
bigger part of the population in developing countries still 
languishes in poverty, ensuring cheap access often requires 
government intervention including price regulation. 
Against this backdrop, the third paper looks at the effect of 
pharmaceutical mergers on access and efficiency in 
developing countries.  
                                                          
84  Pharmaceutical Mergers and their Effect on Access and Efficiency: 
A Case of Emerging Markets (2016) 39 (3)World Competition Law 




The acquisition of generic pharmaceutical firms by foreign 
branded pharmaceutical firms may cause concerns, as the 
firms in developing countries may stop producing cheaper 
alternatives to branded medicine post acquisition. This fear 
can result in using competition law as an effective 
industrial policy tool to insulate the local generic 
pharmaceutical firms from being acquired by the 
multinational firms. Further, pharmaceutical mergers may 
be motivated by the desire to achieve efficiency, including 
innovation. These two issues have been analyzed in this 
paper. Furthermore, this paper also discusses the nature of 
competition law in emerging markets. As opposed to 
suggesting that substantive competition law rules should be 
changed in the special socio-economic setting of 
developing countries, the framework developed in this 
paper argues that application of competition law is sector-
specific, and is guided by socio-economic realities of a 
particular sector and institutional realities of the 
jurisdiction.  
The final paper of the thesis, Competition Law and 
Compulsory Licenses in Emerging Markets: A Systems of 
Innovation Approach, under review for publication, deals 
with one of the most controversial issues in competition 
law– compulsory licenses. The primary criticism of 
compulsory licenses is that they disincentivize 
innovation. However, compulsory license is a potent policy 
tool to ensure access by reducing prices. In order to best 
analyze the trade-off between the short run and the long 
run, and make an optimal choice between the two, the 
paper relies on the concept of Systems of Innovation. One 
of the primary themes in this thesis– competition law 
application is sector specific– finds a proper substantiation 
in this paper. After investigating the innovative capability 
of the Brazilian and the Indian pharmaceutical sector, the 
paper makes a prescription for issuing compulsory 
licenses. The principle that emerges from this research is: 
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when a sector does not exhibit any innovative capability, 
the policy choice should be in favor of maximizing the 
short-run welfare, as the short run gains are higher than the 
long run losses. 
The common theme running through the mentioned papers 
is whether, and to what extent, dynamic efficiency 
concerns can and should be pursued through competition 
law and policy within the specific socio-economic and 
institutional context in emerging markets in the ICT and 
pharmaceutical sectors. The link begins with the first paper 
by establishing a theoretical framework to understand 
dynamic efficiency and differentiate it from static 
efficiency. This way the first paper serves as the prelude to 
the other chapters. Thereafter, the extent and viability of 
innovation and diffusion of the latest technology is traced 
in the ICT sector within the context of developing 
countries. The link further stretches to the last two papers 
that look at the trade-off between the short run losses and 
the long run gains in the pharmaceutical sector.  
1.7 Methodology 
The investigation undertaken in the thesis predominantly 
takes a law and economics approach. The endeavor in this 
research is to recognize innovation in competition 
assessment, as innovation is a more efficient choice over 
the short run goal of ensuring cheap prices. However, the 
concept of efficiency is debatable. A choice that 
maximizes the aggregate welfare may be efficient in the 
utilitarian sense of the word, but it will not be fair or just 
when social realities are obfuscated.85 This should be seen 
                                                          
85 Stephen E. Margolis, ―Two Definitions of Efficiency in Law and 
Economics‖ (1987) 16 (2) The Journal of Legal Studies 471-82. 
Margolis observes: ―A faulty definition of efficiency will lead to a 
faulty analysis, which could exclude key features of the social 





against the broad notion of development, which goes 
beyond GNP growth, this thesis relies on.  
In this regard, the next question is to what extent can 
fairness or equity be accommodated in the antitrust 
analysis? The tools of competition law are specific– they 
are aimed at achieving a particular goal, i.e., consumer 
welfare.86 The choice of consumer welfare over producer 
welfare itself is a safeguard against the aggregate wealth 
maximization that competition law can ensure. The 
investigation in this thesis is mindful of social realities in 
emerging markets. For example, chapter four, while 
discussing cross-market efficiencies, argues that in light of 
different buying power of two different groups of 
consumers, cross-market efficiencies should not be taken 
into account while assessing efficiency claims in mergers.  
The methodology avoids a utilitarian approach that treats 
one person‘s pleasure as much as another‘s, regardless of 
the real distinction between two.87 When the capital 
markets are weak, consumers are poor, and share holding 
is not widely dispersed, reliance on aggregate data is 
misplaced– this is the limited extent of redistribution that 
antitrust can offer. For this reason, the fourth chapter 
advocates consumer welfare standard over total welfare 
standard. Even while advocating the long run consumer 
welfare through innovation, which requires the short run 
losses, the thesis takes a skeptical view and places a burden 
on the claimant to prove the likelihood of innovation to 
offset the short run losses. This delicate balance between 
                                                          
86 The area between competitive prices and demand curve is 
considered as consumer welfare, and is typically measured by 
consumer surplus. 
87  Robert D. Cooter, The Confluence of Justice and Efficiency in the 
Economic Analysis of Law, in The Origins  of  Law and  
Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (2003) <http://works. 
bepress.com/robert_cooter/106/> (accessed 9 May 2016).  
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efficiency and justice has influenced the overall research in 
this investigation. 
The papers in the thesis do not follow the same 
methodology. The overarching research topic, Emerging 
Markets and Innovation in the ICT and Pharmaceutical 
Sector: Role of Competition Policy, is divided into several 
research questions and hypothesis in the four papers. The 
first paper is theoretical in nature. This paper analyzes 
various different definitions of dynamic efficiency given 
by economists and policy institutions. These definitions are 
then categorized into four approaches based upon the view 
they take of dynamic efficiency. After identifying the 
limitations of every approach, a holistic definition is 
proposed.  
The second paper recognizes the importance of investment 
in the ICT innovation and its diffusion in emerging 
markets, as a tool to foster development. The research, 
however, approaches economic development from the law 
and development literature. Thus, economic development 
also encompasses poverty alleviation and inequality 
reduction. Thereafter, two specific policies– Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU) and Universal Service Obligation 
(USO)– have been analyzed, as they present a trade-off 
between ensuring cheap access and incentivizing 
innovation and diffusion of the latest technology. The 
analysis looks at the changing treatment of LLU and USO 
in mature jurisdictions, and then analyzes the viability of 
these policies in the socio-economic settings of developing 
countries. This paper also takes note of the changes in the 
ICT technology.  
The third paper takes a law and economics approach to 
define the nature of competition law in emerging markets. 
In addition, it also borrows from the public choice 
literature in order to assess the regulatory environment, and 




fourth paper draws from the Systems of Innovation 
approach that has its genesis in evolutionary economics. It 
also compares the pharmaceutical sector in two 
jurisdictions, India and Brazil, so far as their innovative 
capability is concerned. Brazil and India were chosen for 
comparison as they have accumulated technological 
capabilities that facilitate the transition from production to 
innovation. This paper uses quantitative approach to gauge 
innovative capability of the Brazilian and Indian 
pharmaceutical sector. Thereafter, it uses the finding to 
prescribe suggestion for issuing compulsory licenses under 
competition law in these two countries. 
1.8 Significance of the project 
The project is an attempt to recognize the role of 
innovation in fostering development in emerging markets, 
and prepare a supportive competition law and policy 
framework for the same. As discussed above, innovation in 
developing countries leads not only to economic prosperity 
but also to social inclusion. The thesis, therefore, sees 
innovation as a vehicle to achieve not only economic 
development, but also as a means towards various 
freedoms. It is true that a policy choice favoring the long 
run efficiency in emerging markets is difficult, as the 
majority of the population is less well off. Intuitively, the 
infrastructure and institutions that support innovation are 
under-developed in emerging economies. Consequently, 
innovation does not figure in policy discussions very often. 
Policy making, however, is not a realm of intuitions and 
fancies. This thesis, therefore, is an effort to use the 
insights from economics, management, and development 
literature into competition law analysis with a view to 
promote innovation, to the extent it conforms to socio-
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economic realities, technological capabilities, and 
institutional capacity of emerging markets. Not only does 
this research contribute to the scant literature on the nature 
of competition law in developing countries, it also attempts 
to embody innovation within the competition assessment in 
developing countries– an exercise that has hitherto been 





A Conceptual Framework to Identify Dynamic Efficiency 
(2015) 11(2-3) European Competition Journal 319-339. 
Even though dynamic efficiency has a great potential to 
bring social welfare, it was not until recently that dynamic 
efficiency started impressing competition authorities in 
deciding the net effect of mergers, agreements and abuse of 
dominance practices on competition. The problem, however, 
is that there is a general confusion regarding the difference 
between static and dynamic efficiency. Also, there is no 
unanimously accepted holistic definition of dynamic 
efficiency. For the correct application of competition law it 
is, therefore, essential that competition law practitioners, 
both lawyers and economists, are able to correctly identify 
dynamic efficiency. This paper after analyzing several 
definitions of dynamic efficiency categorizes the definitions 
into four approaches and develops a conceptual framework. 
After ascertaining the limitations in each approach a 
holistic definition is suggested.  
Introduction 
Dynamic efficiency in general is concerned with 
innovation whereas static efficiency is concerned with 
reduction in cost. Competition in markets may achieve 
both these efficiencies and thus foster welfare. However, 
there are trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiencies 
and the policy choice between them is difficult.1  While the 
                                                          
1  Even though a substantial body of mainstream economic literature 
favours dynamic efficiency over static efficiency, it was not until 
recently that dynamic efficiency started finding mention in competition 
analysis. See, Guidelines (EC) OJ C31/03 of 05 February 2004 on the 
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (Guidelines); 
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former may promote welfare in the short run, the latter 
fosters relatively more welfare but in the long run. Thus, 
there is a policy choice between lower prices in the short 
run, and relatively higher prices that may foster innovation 
resulting in better and new products in the long run. There 
is no unanimously agreed upon definition of dynamic 
efficiency. Economists are generally concerned with the 
concept of efficiency. The contours and limitations of 
definitions of several forms of efficiencies may not be of 
much importance to them. On the other hand, non-
economists too use various efficiencies loosely. Gilford 
and Kurdle have observed that, and rightly so, that unlike 
economists, courts, policymakers and lawyers are often not 
careful in their use of terms like ‗efficiency‘ or ‗economic 
efficiency‘.2 Thus, a 2012 OECD report warns that even 
though there may be a wide consensus amongst the 
antitrust scholars and practitioners on the inclusion of 
efficiency gains, the competition authorities may make an 
error in the application of the concept of efficiency.3 This 
warrants an orientation of legal practitioners to the 
economic concepts of efficiency. This article, written by a 
lawyer, is an effort to seek clarity on the framework of 
dynamic efficiency. It is not an attempt to pigeonhole 
various types of efficiencies. Rather, this is an endeavour 
to devise a conceptual framework to identify and separate 
static and dynamic efficiencies in view of the increasing 
reliance of competition agencies on the latter.   
                                                                                                                   
Article 2(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the 
ECMR) [2004] OJ L24/1.  
2  Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle, ‗Rhetoric and Reality in the 
Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European 
Union‘(2005) 72(2) Antitrust Law Journal 423. 
3    © OECD (2012), The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust 
Proceedings, <http://www.oecd.org/competition/Efficiency Claims 
2012.pdf> accessed on 19 June 2014. 
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Part I of the paper is a general primer on the concepts of 
efficiencies and the trade-off between various efficiencies. 
This part also justifies the inclusion of dynamic efficiency 
gains in the competition law assessment. Part II ― the core 
of the paper ― analyses various different definitions of 
dynamic efficiency given by economists and policy 
institutions. These definitions are categorised into four 
approaches based upon the view they take of dynamic 
efficiency. After identifying the limitations of every 
approach a holistic definition is proposed.  
1. Different types of efficiencies and the trade-off 
between them 
Before the paper delves deeper into the concepts in order 
to provide a conceptual framework to identify dynamic 
efficiency and differentiate it from allocative efficiency, it 
will be practical to begin with the basic definitions of 
various kinds of efficiencies for the sake of understanding. 
1.1.Meaning and definition of different types of 
efficiencies 
A 2007 International Competition Network (ICN) report 
states that promoting efficiency is one of the aims of 
competition law. However, the question is what does 
efficiency actually imply? The report notes, ―efficiency is a 
broad economic term that may refer to allocative efficiency 
(allocation of resources to their most efficient use), 
productive efficiency (production in the least costly way), 
or dynamic efficiency (rate of introduction of new products 
or improvements of products and production 
techniques).‖4 In very simple terms, these efficiencies can 
                                                          
4  The Unilateral Conduct Working Group, ‗Report on the Objectives of 
Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance / Substantial 
Market Power and State Created Monopolies‘  (6th Annual Conference 
of the International Competition  Network,  Moscow, May 2007), 
<http://www. internationalcompetitionnet work.org/uploads/library/ 
doc353.pdf> accessed on 18 June 2014. [hereinafter 2007 ICN 
Report]. 
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be understood as: allocative efficiency― resources are 
allocated to the production of only those goods and 
services that are most desirable in the society.5 This 
efficiency is achieved when firms produce output up to the 
point where the marginal cost of each unit just equals the 
value of that unit to consumers. At this point goods and 
services are supplied to those buyers who value them most 
highly; productive efficiency ―forces firms to cut their 
costs in order not to lose sales to more efficient rivals. 
Productive efficiency depends upon the existing 
technology and resource prices6; dynamic efficiency― 
stimulates investment and innovation.7 Central to the 
concept of dynamic efficiency is the phenomenon of 
innovation. Jorde and Teece define innovation as ―the 
search for, and the discovery, development, improvement, 
adoption and commercialization of new processes, new 
products, and new organizational structures and 
procedures‖.8 Allocative and productive efficiencies are 
together termed as static efficiency.   
1.2.The trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency 
Miguel de la Mano argues that ―in general, allocative, 
productive and dynamic efficiencies cannot be simultaneously 
realised‖.9 There may be trade-offs between allocative and 
                                                          
5 Graham Bannock and R.E. Baxter, The Penguin Dictionary of 
Economics (8thedn, Penguin Group 2011) 111. 
6  Miguel de la Mano, ‗For the customer‘s sake: The competitive effects 
of efficiencies in European merger control‘, (2002) Enterprise Papers 
No. 11.  
7  For a more detailed discussion on these efficiencies the reader is 
directed to appendix, A taxonomy of Efficiencies, in the paper 
written by William J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick, ‗The Merger 
Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review 
of Horizontal Mergers‘(2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 207. 
8  Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, ‗Innovation and Cooperation: 
Implications for Competition and Antitrust‘ (1990) 4(3) The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 75. 
9  Miguel de la Mano (n 6). 
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productive, and static and dynamic efficiencies. For 
example, a merger may lead to rise in market power. A 
higher market power provides the firm with the ability to 
increase the prices. On the other hand, this merger may 
lead to reduction in marginal cost as the merging firms 
may achieve economies of scale or scope. This is a trade-
off between allocative and productive efficiency, which is 
very well demonstrated in Williamson‘s model.10 
Similarly, there are trade-offs between allocative and 
dynamic efficiencies. For example, a merger may increase 
the resources to invest in R&D that may result in 
innovation. But, at the same time increased market power 
may be detrimental for allocative efficiency.11 Two real 
life examples will clarify the trade-off between various 
efficiencies. In 2007 Ryanair, a low cost airline, wanted to 
acquire Aer Lingus, the Irish flag carrier. 12 At the time of 
the decision by the European Commission, Aer Lingus and 
Ryanair were in direct competition with each other on 35 
routes to and from Ireland. On 22 of these routes, the 
merger would have resulted in a monopoly. On the 
remaining routes, Aer Lingus and Ryanair were each 
other‘s closest competitors and the merger would have 
resulted in a joint market share of 60 per cent. Thus, there 
was a fear that the proposed merger would result in higher 
prices and reduced choices, resulting in allocative 
inefficiency. In this case Ryanair had asserted that merger 
will allow the parties to achieve efficiency through 
―operational cost savings‖ in the form of savings in staff 
costs, aircraft ownership costs, maintenance costs, airport 
charges and ground operational costs, ancillary sales and, 
finally, distribution efficiencies.13 Thus, there was a trade-
                                                          
10  Oliver E. Williamson, ‗Economics as Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs‘ (1968) 58(1) The American Economic Review 18. 
11  For trade-offs, see in general Miguel de la Mano (n 6). 
12 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case COMP/M.4439) Commission Decision of 
27 July 2007, 3104. 
13 Role of Efficiency Claims (n 3). 
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off between allocative and productive efficiencies. 
Eventually, the European Commission prohibited this 
takeover.14 
A trade-off between allocative and dynamic efficiency may 
be seen in the case of mandatory Local Loop Unbundling 
(LLU). LLU refers to the process of requiring incumbent 
telecom operators to open, wholly or in part, the last mile 
of their telecommunications networks to competitors.15 On 
one hand artificially induced competition brings down the 
prices for consumers―thus, resulting in allocative 
efficiency. On the other hand, as several researchers have 
found, LLU adversely affects investment and innovation in 
the telecom sector.16 
1.3.In defense of Dynamic Efficiency 
It is difficult to quantify dynamic efficiency.17 Further, 
dynamic efficiency gains often materialise in the future. 
Therefore, the balancing of long term dynamic efficiency 
gains against short term allocative efficiency losses may be 
                                                          
14 European Commission, Mergers: Commission prohibits Ryanair‘s 
proposed takeover of Aer Lingus, European Union - IP/07/893 
(27/06/2007) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-893_en. 
htm> accessed on 17 June 2014. 
15  International Telecommunication Union, Birth of broadband,(2003) 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/sales/birthofbroadband/ 
BoBexecsumm.pdf> accessed on 23 June 2014.  
16  Hans Friederiszick, MichałGrajek and Lars-HendrikRöller, ‗Analyzing 
the relationship between regulation and investment in the telecom 
sector‘(2008) ESMT European School of Management and 
Technology, 7; MichałGrajek and Lars-Hendrik Roller, ‗Regulation 
and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European 
Telecoms‘, (2012) 55(1) Journal of Law and Economics 189; Philip G. 
Gayle and Dennis L. Weisman, ‗Efficiency Trade-Offs in the Design 
of Competition Policy for the Telecommunications 
Industry‘(2007)6(3) Review of Network Economics.  
17  IK Gotts and CS Goldman, ‗The Role of Efficiencies in M&A Global 
Antitrust in Review: Still in Flux?‘ in BE Hawk (ed.) International 
Antitrust Law & Policy: Annual Proceedings of the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (Juris Publishing Inc, Huntington 2003). 
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difficult.18 This may explain as to why dynamic efficiency 
has not found favour with competition agencies. 
Miguel de la Mano argues that innovative activity may 
yield higher consumer satisfaction through cheaper, better 
or new goods.19 Dynamic efficiency in general is good for 
the economy as whole and leads to rise in living standards. 
Several economic studies support the claim that dynamic 
efficiency brings more social welfare than static efficiency. 
Robert Solow, who is known for his path-breaking work in 
the growth theory that won him the Nobel Prize, showed 
that 90 per cent of the increase in per capita output 
between the years 1909 and 1949 in the US was due to the 
technological change which averaged 1.5 per cent per 
year.20 In an oft cited paper, Grossman and Helpman 
concur with Schumpeter and Solow to hold that 
improvement in technology is the real reason behind rising 
standards of living.21Audretsch et al., basing their reliance 
upon the work of Austrian economists in the area of 
industrial organization, argue that the existing enchantment 
of competition policy with static efficiency is misplaced.22 
They note that ―in a dynamic economy competition in 
product and process innovations may have a more 
                                                          
18  Christian R. Fackelmann, ‗Dynamic Efficiency Considerations in EC 
Merger Control: An Intractable Subject or Promising Chance for 
Innovation‘ (2006) University of Oxford, Centre for Competition Law 
and Policy Working paper No. L-09/06, <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
910465> accessed on 18 June 2014. 
19  Miguel de la Mano (n 6). 
20  Robert M. Solow, 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function‘ (1957)39(3) The Review of Economics and Statistics 312. 
21 Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, ‗Endogenous Innovation in 
the Theory of Growth‘ (1994) 8(1) The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 23. 
22 David B. Audretsch, William J. Baumol and Andrew Emmet Burke, 
‗Competition policy in dynamic markets‘, (2001) 19(5) International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 613. 
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significant effect on welfare‖.23 This prescription is valid 
even for developing countries. Singh argues that a 
competition policy which has dynamic efficiency at the 
center is good for developing countries as well for the 
purpose of economic development.24 Scholars have argued 
that there is now a consensus that innovation has a 
significant effect on productivity at the level of the firm, 
industry and country.25 
The recognition of dynamic efficiency gains by economists 
has slowly started impressing the competition authorities in 
decision making. Many competition scholars have argued 
that allocative efficiency alone should not be the aim of the 
agencies; rather, the cardinal aim of competition policy 
should be to promote dynamic efficiency as maximum 
social wealth is achieved by dynamic efficiency.26 The 
                                                          
23  ibid; See also, Phil Evans, ‗In Search of the Marginal Consumer: The 
FIPRA Study‘, (2008) FIPRA Group. Evans suggests that long-term 
consumer interest is safeguarded only by an economy founded on 
innovation and efficiency; Joseph F. Brodley, ‗The Economic Goals of 
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological 
Progress‘ (1987) 62 New York University Law Review1020. Brodley 
argues that ―of the three types of efficiencies, innovation efficiency 
provides the greatest enhancement of social wealth, followed by 
production efficiency, with allocative efficiency-the main focus of 
current enforcement efforts-ranking last.‖ 
24  Ajit Singh, ‗Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions‘, (G-
24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18, September 2002) <http://unctad. 
org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf> accessed on 19 June 2014. 
25  G. Cameron, 'Innovation and Economic Growth', (LSE Center for 
Economic Performance Discussion Papers, No. 277, February 1996) 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20685/1/Innovation_and_Economic_Growth.p
df> accessed on 19 June 2014. 
26 Brodley (n 21); See also, Michael E. Porter, ‗Competition and 
Antitrust: Toward a Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating 
Mergers and Joint Ventures‘ (2001) 46 Antitrust Bull 919. Porter notes 
that ―productivity growth is central because it is the single most 
important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a nation‘s 
standard of living‖. 
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competition agencies are now more willing to accept that 
―behavior which is anticompetitive in the static context 
may be procompetitive in a dynamic one‖27. One US case 
where dynamic efficiency played a significant role was 
the acquisition of Novazyme by Genzyme. The FTC 
closed its investigation of this 2001 acquisition taking 
into account dynamic efficiency gains as the firms would 
combine their synergies resulting from acquisition, which 
would lead to increased chances of development of a new 
drug for the treatment of Pompe disease.28 Emerging 
competition regimes such as India also have mention of 
dynamic efficiency gains in the competition legislation 
while assessing whether a combination will have 
appreciable adverse effect on competition.29 Apart from 
mergers, dynamic efficiency concerns may arise in 
agreements and abuse of dominance or monopolisation 
cases as well. 
The issue of innovation acquires all the more 
significance in the post financial crisis world as 
innovation may be the key to recovery from the 
downturn. A 2009 OECD report argues this point and 
notes that several countries have given due weight to 
innovation in their stimulus packages.30 Paunov argues 
that since long term growth prospects of a country 
                                                          
27 Jorde & Teecen (8).  
28  Federal Trade Commission, ‗FTC Closes Its Investigation of Genzyme 
Corporation‘s 2001 Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals‘, 
Federal  Trade Commission  <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/ 
genzyme.htm. >  accessed on 16 June 2014; For an analysis of the case 
see, Douglas L. Wald and Deborah L. Feinstein, ‗Merger Enforcement 
in Innovation Markets: The Latest Chapter — Genzyme / Novazyme‘, 
(2004)  The  Antitrust Source. 
29 Indian Competition Act 2002,Section 20(4) (l). 
30  © OECD (2009), Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis: Investing 
in Innovation for Long-Term Growth, Paris, <http://www.oecd.org/ 
sti/42983414.pdf> accessed on 14 June 2014.  This report gives the 
example of Finland and Korea. Both of these countries increased 
spending in R&D which helped them tied over the crisis.  
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depends upon innovation― which requires significant 
investment― reduction in investment in innovation 
because of the global crisis will delay the recovery.31 
However, firms have cut down investment in research 
and development because of reduction in overall budget 
due to the crisis.32 It has been observed that investment 
in innovation seems to be procyclical and may reduce 
during recession.33 Based on a survey of Latin American 
firms, Paunov looked at the innovation performance of 
the firms during the global crisis and found that one in 
four firms stopped innovation projects due to the global 
crisis.34Archibugi et al. also, through the analysis of a 
European survey, found that financial crisis reduced the 
number of firms willing to increase their innovation 
investment from 38 to 9 per cent.35 
2. The framework to identify dynamic efficiency 
This part looks into the several definitions of static and 
dynamic efficiencies. As will be demonstrated below 
there is no unanimity on the understanding of dynamic 
efficiency. This part analyses these definitions and 
classifies them into four approaches. No approach 
alone can capture the meaning of dynamic efficiency. 
After ascertaining the limitations of each approach a 
holistic definition of dynamic efficiency has been 
proposed. 
  
                                                          
31 Caroline Paunov, ‗The Global Crisis and Firms‘ Investments in 
Innovation‘(2012) 41(1) Research Policy, 24. 
32  ibid.  
33 Policy Responses – OECD, (n 30). 
34 Paunov (n 31). 
35  Daniele Archibugi, Andrea Filippetti and Marion Frenz, ‗The Impact 
of the Economic Crisis on Innovation: Evidence from Europe‘ (2013) 
80(7) Technological Forecasting and Social Change 1247. 
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2.1.Similarities between productive and dynamic 
efficiencies in terms of their effect on supply curve 
 
 
Before we look at the distinction between static (mainly 
productive) and dynamic efficiencies, it will be instructive 
to understand the similarities between these efficiencies for 
the purpose of clarity. Sherer notes that, ―from the 
standpoint of those who stress the desirability of allocative 
efficiency, triangle EFG (represents ‗deadweight loss‘) is 
what antitrust is all about.‖36 Barnett also argues that static 
efficiency is concerned with minimising deadweight loss.37 
Referring to allocative efficiency, such as curbing ‗double 
markup problem‘ in vertical mergers, Barnett explains that 
―within a given production technology and demand 
conditions, the most efficient output is where the marginal 
cost of production equals the value of the product to the 
marginal consumer (price equals marginal cost).‖38  He also 
                                                          
36 F.M. Sherer,‗Antitrust, Efficiency and Progress‘ (1987) 62 New 
York University Law Review 998. 
37 Thomas O. Barnett,‗Maximizing Welfare Through Technological 
Innovation‘ (2008) 15 George Mason Law Review 1191. See also, J. 
Gregory Sidak and David Teece,‗Dynamic Competition in Antitrust 
Law‘ (2009) 5 (4) Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 581. 
38  ibid. 
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argues that productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency 
shift the supply curve out.39 Productive efficiency enables 
the firms to maximize the output at a particular cost. 
Whereas, dynamic efficiency, through the introduction of 
new ways/means reduces the production cost.40 It could also 
be argued that dynamic efficiency― in terms of better 
products― shifts the demand curve out as consumers find 
themselves willing to pay more for the same good, thereby 
increasing the consumer surplus. One conclusion we may 
draw from this discussion that both productive efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency in terms of cost reduction of the 
same products shift the supply curve out. 
2.2. Broad and Narrow view of dynamic efficiency 
Miguel de la Mano identifies that ―dynamic embodies two 
related but distinct components, a time dimension and the 
notion of change.‖41 The time dimension implies that 
efficiency gains will materialise in the future, and the 
notion of change implies innovation. For example, Miguel 
de la Mano provides the following definition of dynamic 
efficiency― ―Dynamic efficiency in antitrust economics is 
connected to whether appropriate incentives and ability 
exist to increase productivity and engage in innovative 
activity over time, which may yield cheaper or better 
goods or new products that afford consumers more 
satisfaction than previous consumption choices‖.42 This is 
a broader approach that takes into account both 
dimensions, time and innovation. On the other hand some 
economists have taken a narrower approach to dynamic 
efficiency by predominantly stressing innovation. For 
example see this definition by Motta― ―dynamic 
                                                          
39  ibid. 
40  See, N. Gregory Mankiw and Mark P. Taylor, ‗Microeconomics‘ (2nd 
Edition, South-Western Cengage Learning, 2011), 78-79. 
41  Miguel de la Mano (n 6) footnote 14. 
42  ibid. 
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efficiency…refers to the extent to which a firm introduces 
new products or processes of production.‖43It will be seen 
in the following text that even the broader definition does 
not provide a comprehensive framework to identify all 
kinds of dynamic efficiencies. For example, economies of 
scale in R&D post-merger is treated as dynamic efficiency 
gain even though no new product or process comes into 
existence post-merger. The merger merely gives an ability 
to innovate. Also, Learning by Doing (LBD hereinafter), in 
itself, does not lead to a new product or process, although 
the results accrue over a period of time. There are other 
questions as well regarding the bright line distinction 
between static and dynamic efficiencies. For example, as 
opposed to economies of scale and scope in R&D, 
economies of scale and scope in production are considered 
static efficiency gains. Arguably, the gains from economies 
of scale and scope in production may be invested in further 
research. After analysing different definitions adopted by 
several institutions and economists, an attempt has been 
made to categorise them in various approaches. As will be 
seen, there is no comprehensive legal definition or 
framework that may clearly define or distinguish 
productive and dynamic efficiencies.  
2.2.1. Approach A- when the difference between static 
and dynamic efficiencies is only of time 
As seen above, there are two elements in dynamic 
efficiency―time and innovation. There are definitions 
which predominantly focus upon the former. For example 
consider this statement by OECD ― ―The key difference 
between the two concepts (static and dynamic efficiency) 
is the relevant time horizon over which these efficiencies 
display their effects‖.44 One obvious question, then, will be 
                                                          
43  Massimo Motta, ‗Competition Policy: Theory and Practice‘ (1stedn., 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 55. 
44  Role of Efficiency Claims (n 3). 
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what is the time horizon? The same paper by OECD goes 
on to clarify that, ―in the case of static efficiencies firms 
(and consumers) are observed at a particular point in time, 
like in a snapshot. The technology with which goods are 
produced is also assumed to be fixed, i.e. not subject to 
change‖.45 
This fascination with time factor may be misleading. Some 
efficiencies that are considered productive may take some 
time to materialise. A merger may lead to productive 
efficiency; however, the gains from cost savings may not 
be passed on to consumers in terms of lower prices. But, as 
the merged entity faces competition from other firms, in 
future it may start reducing the prices.46 In this situation, it 
cannot be said that gains from static efficiency materialise 
instantly or at one point. This statement by Röller et al. 
affirms that some economies of scale may materialise in 
future ― ―economies of scale, realised through a merger, 
may be the result of co-ordination of the (formerly 
separate) firms‘ investments in physical capital—called 
long-run economies of scale. Other realisations of 
economies of scale may, however, come already in the 
short run (when physical capital is held fixed).‖47 
In the mentioned case, one may confuse the productive 
efficiency gains with dynamic efficiency, if the sole 
                                                          
45  ibid. 
46 Andrew Tepperman and Margaret Sanderson,‗Innovation and 
Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Review‘ < http : / / www. 
competitionbureau. gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02376.html>. In 
footnote 12 of the report the authors argue that ―If innovations are 
expected to diffuse rapidly to other market participants, the returns 
from innovation would likewise be expected to be competed away in a 
short time.‖ Likewise, how sooner or later productive efficiency 
benefits consumers depends upon the competitiveness of a firm‘s 
competitors. 
47  Lars-HendrikRöller, Johan Stennek and Frank Verboven, ‗Efficiency 
Gains from Mergers‘, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, 
Working Paper No. 543, 2000. 
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criterion to differentiate between static and dynamic 
efficiencies is time. Further, technology with which goods 
are produced can also not be the pivotal point of 
distinction, as in the case of dynamic efficiency as well, 
such as LBD, the technology may remain the same. 
2.2.2. Approach B- Static efficiency gains materialise 
only once whereas dynamic gains are recurring 
The OECD policy brief paper on ‗Mergers and Dynamic 
Efficiencies‘ defines static efficiencies as ―static 
efficiencies are those which occur only once – going from 
two managing directors to one; or eliminating some 
production sites because both firms had plants that were 
running well below capacity levels‖48. Productive 
efficiency is said to be achieved with the reduction in cost 
of production. This reduction may happen at once, for 
example at the time of merger. When the cost savings are 
one time saving they are productive efficiency gains. On 
the other hand, if the cost savings are recurring and 
materialise in the future they are dynamic efficiency 
gains― ―whereas static efficiencies relate to a particular 
point in time, dynamic efficiencies relate to evolutionary 
forces like R&D, which can occur and have effects in 
multiple time periods.‖49 The Bureau of Competition 
(Canada) in its Merger Enforcement Guidelines (2011) 
gives some examples of productive efficiencies, such as 
economies of scale; economies of scope; economies of 
diversity; savings that flow from specialisation, the 
elimination of duplication, reduced downtime, a smaller 
base of spare parts, smaller inventory requirements and the 
avoidance of capital expenditures that would otherwise 
                                                          
48  ©OECD (2008), Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies<http://www. 
oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/41359037.pdf> accessed on 19 June 
2014. 
49  © OECD (2007), Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, DAF/ 
COMP(2007)41 < http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/4062356
1.pdf> accessed on 19 June 2014.  
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have been required; savings that arise from plant 
specialisation, the rationalisation of various administrative 
and management functions (e.g., sales, marketing, 
accounting, purchasing, finance, production), and the 
rationalisation of research and development activities; and 
savings that relate to distribution, advertising and raising 
capital.50A scrutiny of these examples shows that these 
gains happen once, mostly at the time of merger. The 
OECD paper on dynamic efficiency in mergers51 lists 
following as dynamic efficiencies―learning by doing, 
upgrading management, combining complementary 
distribution or marketing assets, elimination of duplicative 
R&D, economies of scale and scope in R&D, joint 
exploitation of intellectual property, better R&D risk 
spreading, better IP enforcement, increased financial 
resources with which to fund R&D, standard-setting, 
Schumpeter effect. Let us scrutinise the definition of 
dynamic efficiency provided by Van den Bergh and 
Camesasca ――Dynamic efficiency is achieved through the 
invention, development and diffusion of new products and 
production processes that increase social welfare. Whereas 
productive efficiency and allocative efficiency are static 
notions, progressiveness or dynamic efficiency refers to 
the rate of technological progress.‖52 We see that the first 
dimension of dynamic efficiency, i.e., innovation is clearly 
present. However, as regard the second dimension, time, 
there is a little confusion. Static notion implies happening 
of an event at a particular point of time. The authors have 
juxtaposed this idea with ‗rate of technological 
progress‘. This means, that event is recurring in nature. 
                                                          
50 Merger Enforcement Guidelines, (2011) para 12.16 < http://www. 
competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf /eng/03420.html#foot note 
58b> accessed on 14 June 2014. 
51 Dynamic Efficiencies ―OECD (n 48). 
52 Roger J. Van den Bergh and Peter D. Camesasca, ‗European 
Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective‘ (2nd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 30. 
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This implies, as per the authors, there are several time 
frames associated with dynamic efficiency. However, it is 
not correct to say that dynamic efficiency gains are 
recurring in nature. An R&D process may lead to a new 
product or process only once. Financial resources that may 
fund R&D may increase significantly post-merger. These 
gains occur only once, for example at the time of merger.  
2.2.3. Approach C- Dynamic efficiency pertains to the 
arrival of ‘new’ product or process as a result of 
innovation 
A closer look at the productive efficiency gains makes it 
clear that the gains arise out of existing capabilities, tangible 
or intangible, which lead a firm to efficient scale of 
production and thereby cut production costs (thus, the 
technology remains constant). Contrary to this, dynamic 
efficiency results from the arrival of a new or improved 
product or process in terms of quality or reduced cost. Van 
den Bergh and Camesasca note that dynamic efficiency in 
its broad sense includes both productivity increase and 
product innovation.53 Productivity increase may, however, 
be attributed to several other factors such as efficiently using 
the existing resources, employing expert labourers, 
rationalisation of production post-merger etc. However, 
productivity increase in order to be categorised as dynamic 
efficiency must be the result of new technology or process 
which is different from the previously employed technology 
or process. Stressing on innovation may be a key element in 
order to determine the true nature of any efficiency. 
Introduction of new ideas which is an exogenous element 
determines innovation which is the key element of dynamic 
efficiency.54 It is also a matter of debate what products and 
processes qualify to be termed ‗new‘ or ‗improved‘. I will 
return to this question towards the end of this section 
                                                          
53 ibid 30. 
54  See Suzanne Scotchmer, ‗Innovation and Incentives‘, (1st Edn., The 
MIT Press, 2006). As per Scotchmer ideas are exogenous. 
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(2.2.3.). However, if we rely solely upon innovation then 
LBD does not qualify to be a dynamic efficiency gain as no 
‗new‘ product or process ever comes in to existence. 
Klein defines static efficiency as ―fine-tuning whose 
objective is to make best use of existing information‖ and 
dynamic efficiency as ―changing the production function in 
profitable directions‖.55Ghemawat and Costa also define 
static and dynamic efficiency, in essence, similarly, ―static 
efficiency,…involves continuous search for improvements 
within a fixed set of initial conditionsand dynamic 
efficiency,…involves continuous reconsideration of initial 
conditions.‖56 These definitions stress a very critical aspect of 
productive efficiency―productive efficiency pertains to 
existing level of knowledge where initial conditions are fixed. 
Miguel de la Mano notes that ―allocative and productive 
efficiency are static notions concerned with the performance 
of an economy, industry or firm at a given point in time, for a 
given technology and level of existing knowledge‖.57 Thus, 
in the process of its operations, if a firm acquires new 
information/knowledge which makes it more efficient, it is 
not a static efficiency gain. It is worth noticing that 
introduction of exogenous ideas and increase in knowledge 
are two different things. While, introduction of a new idea 
(which is the essence of innovation) is exogenous, increase in 
knowledge/information is an endogenous development. In his 
seminal paper Kenneth J. Arrow shows that intertemporal and 
international shifts in production functions can be explained 
                                                          
55  B. H. Klien, ‗Prices, Wages and Business Cycles: A Dynamic Theory‘, 
(1984, New York). As quoted in PankajGhemawat and Joan E. Ricart I 
Costa, ‗The Organizational Tension between Static and Dynamic 
Efficiency‘ (1993) 14 Strategic Management Journal, Special Issue: 
Organizations, Decision Making and Strategy 59. 
56 Ghemawat and Costa, (n 55). 
57  Miguel de la Mano (n 6). 
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by an endogenous theory of knowledge.58 By knowledge 
Arrow implies learning. The OECD paper on dynamic 
efficiency in mergers defines LBD as ―leaning by doing is 
simply what happens when firms get better at what they do 
by gaining experience doing it. Over time, they may learn 
new ways to minimize their costs or make improvements to 
their products‖59. Regardless of the different nomenclatures 
used for LBD such as ‗‗learning curve‘‘, ‗‗progress ratio‘‘ or 
‗‗learning‖, they all refer to the same process through which 
firms become more efficient by accumulating knowledge that 
facilitate lower costs or higher productivity.60 
An example will clarify how learning by doing brings 
efficiency endogenously. Kazuhiro Mishina in his paper 
examined the Boeing plant that manufactured the B-17 
bomber during World War II and noted that labour time 
per airframe in 1944 fell to almost one-tenth of that three 
years earlier.61Mishina argues that the skill of workforce 
deteriorated considerably as the skilled workers enlisted or 
were promoted to supervisory positions. It implies that the 
increase in productivity was not due to specialisation as 
skilled labourers were no longer present.62 He also shows 
                                                          
58 Kenneth J. Arrow, ‗The Economic Implications of Learning by 
Doing‘, (1962) 29(3) The Review of Economic Studies, 155. 
59 Dynamic Efficiencies, OECD (n 48). 
60  Salvador Barrios and Eric Strobl, ‗Learning by Doing and Spillovers: 
Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data‘ (2004) Review of industrial 
organization 175. 
61  Kazuhiro Mishina, ‗Learning by New Experiences: Revisiting the 
Flying Fortress Learning Curve‘, in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. 
G Raff, and Peter Temin (eds), ‗Learning by Doing, in Markets, Firms 
and Countries‘, (University of Chicago Press, 1999) 145-184. 
62  Kazuhiro Mishina (n 61), Mishinanotes that ―During the four years 
Boeing produced the B-17s in high volumes, the unit direct labor hours 
declined from roughly seventy-one worker-years to eight worker-years. 
The magnitude involved here is clearly too large to be explained by 
skill improvement. In Plant No.2 the bulk of labor savings appeared to 
originate from the hours in which direct skill was not being applied in 
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that economies of scale was not the reason behind increase 
in production. This example offers an insight into the 
difference between gains from specialisation and learning 
by doing. Learning by doing is a result of hands on 
experience, where the work force becomes productive over 
a period of time. Wright attributes cost reductions and 
increase in quantity to "the improvement in proficiency of 
a workman... less changes to disconcert the workman ... 
greater spread of machine and fixture set up time . . . 
ability to use less skilled labor as more and more tooling 
and standardization of procedure is introduced‖63.  
Also, learning by doing is not only limited to the 
specialisation gained over a period of time, it also relates to 
how efficiently the existing resources are used by learning 
from experience. Learning by doing has two 
components―first, increase in the specialisation gained 
over time. Or, the way Smith puts it, increase in dexterity 
in every particular workman; and second, more efficient 
use of existing resources.64 
Bahk and Gort term LBD as a by-product of production of 
goods and services.65 They divide LBD into three 
components according to their nature. 
                                                                                                                   
the first place. The key was instead throughput-time reduction and the 
operating know-how that enabled it.‖  
63 T.P.Wright, ―The Effect of quantity production on cost‖, (1936) as 
quoted in Kazuhiro Mishina (n 61). 
64  Explaining increase in productivity Adam Smith found following 
reasons- "first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; 
secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing 
from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and 
enable one man to do the work of many." Adam Smith, ‗An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations‘ Edwin Cannan 
(ed) (University of Chicago Press, [1776] 1976) as quoted in Kazuhiro 
Mishina n (61). 
65 Byong-HyongBahk and Michael Gort,‗Decomposing Learning by 
Doing in New Plants‘ (1936) 101(4) Journal of Political Economy. 
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1. Labor learning- ―Workers' skills in specific tasks 
are enhanced through experience. Jobs become 
routinized through repetition and workers better 
adjusted to the jobs.‖ 
2. Capital Learning- ―This refers to the increases in 
knowledge about the characteristics of given 
physical capital. It encompasses engineering 
information that accumulates through experience 
on the tolerances to which parts are machined, on 
the use of special tools and devices, and on 
improvements in plant layout and the routing and 
handling of materials. As operation continues, 
information also accumulates on the true capacity 
of equipment, on required maintenance, on the 
ways to avoid breakdowns and malfunctions or 
minimize their effects, and on complementarities or 
interactions among capital inputs added at different 
points in time.‖ 
3. Organization Learning – ―The principal elements of 
organization learning may be summarized as 
follows: (i) the matching of individuals and tasks 
based on knowledge derived from experience of the 
capacities and limitations of employees (another 
aspect of the same process is the screening of 
personnel from external sources to assure the 
matching of individuals and tasks); (ii) 
accumulation of interdependent knowledge about 
production possessed by members of a team and 
not portable by any one member of the team; (iii) 
the development of interactions among employees, 
an example of which might be knowing whom to 
ask for help when problems arise; and (iv) 
managerial learning reflected in improved 
scheduling and coordination among departments 
and in the selection of external suppliers of services 
or products.‖ 
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Reduction in human error is also learning by doing. 
LBD is also different from diffusion of know-how. Lars-
HendrikRöller et al. argue that diffusion of know how 
arises when merger between firms with different 
capabilities (technological or administrative) lead to a 
diffusion of knowledge across participants which expands 
the inferior firm‘s production frontier. Defining learning 
by doing they state, ―learning by doing means that the 
firms‘ average costs are declining in their cumulative 
(past) output (as a measure of experience)‖.66 They treat 
learning by doing as an example of diffusion of know-how. 
It is argued here that diffusion of know how is a static 
efficiency whereas learning by doing is dynamic in nature. 
In diffusion of know-how existing capabilities are 
exchanged as opposed to new knowledge that is 
learnt/acquired endogenously through learning by doing.  
Adam Smith in his book Wealth of Nations observed that 
wealth is created by specialisation. In the famous pin 
factory example he showed how division of labor created 
more wealth. Röller et al. note that ―long-run economies of 
scale may also arise because of the benefits from 
specialisation. Each worker can concentrate his or her 
efforts on certain specific tasks that can be implemented 
more efficiently.‖67 Specialisation happens when 
production process is broken into many parts and each part 
is then done by specialised labourer. Contrary to this, 
learning by doing may also materialise by using the 
existing resources, including employees, in more efficient 
ways. Thus, the workers learn as they work.  
                                                          
66  Lars-HendrikRöller, Johan Stennek and Frank Verboven, ‗Efficiency 
Gains from Mergers‘ (2000) The Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics, Working Paper No. 543 ; Interestingly, Röller et al. have 
categorised diffusion of know-how under technological progress. Thus, 
technological progress is not always dynamic in nature. 
67  ibid. 
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This discussion explains that since LBD is an endogenous 
growth in knowledge, it is considered a dynamic efficiency 
gain. 
2.2.3.1. What is a new product or process? 
If the key element of dynamic efficiency is innovation, 
then it becomes pertinent to understand what innovation 
is. The following definition of innovation is provided by 
Oslo manual― ―A technological product innovation 
is the implementation/commercialization of a product with 
improved performance characteristics such as to deliver 
objectively new or improved services to the 
consumer. A technological process innovation is the imple
mentation/adoption of new or significantly improved 
production or delivery methods. It may involve changes in 
equipment, human resources, working methods or a 
combination of these.‖68This definition of innovation 
stresses on one very critical aspect of innovation― ideas 
themselves do not constitute innovation. Ideas have to be 
implemented/commercialised.69  Further, the concept of 
innovation is intricately related to introduction of novelty 
into the economic sphere.70 
The issue of novelty has posed a challenge before the EU 
courts and academics alike. In the IMS case the ECJ while 
deciding the charges pertaining to refusal of supply held 
that the applicant needs to show that he ―intends to 
produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of 
                                                          
68  © OECD (2005),Working Party of National Experts on Scientific and 
Technology Indicators, ―The Measurement of Scientific and 
Technological Activities: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Innovation Data: Oslo Manual, Third Edition‖. 
69  See, Suzanne Scotchmer (n 54). Scotchmer notes innovation requires 
ideas and incentives. While ideas are exogenous incentives are 
endogenous. 
70  Jan Fagerberg, ‗Innovation: A Guide to the Literature‘, in Jan 
Fagerberg, David C. Mowery and Richard R. Nelson, ‗The Oxford 
Handbook of Innovation‘, (OUP, 2005) 20. 
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the right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand‖.71 However, the ‗new product‘ test is not easy to 
apply in reality. Whereas, in certain cases it is easy to see 
that the proposed product will be new and different (for 
example in Magill), in other cases one may not be sure 
about the final product.72 It is also not clear how different a 
product should be from the existing products in order to be 
termed as a ―new product‖. 73Ahlborn et al. suggest an 
approach to determine a new product for the purposes of 
the implementation of the ECJ test (in Magill and IMS) 
――[a] new product expands the market by bringing in at 
current prices consumers who were not satisfied before‖.74 
Alternatively, it may be argued that the key element should 
be consumer opinion, i.e. whether the consumers perceive 
                                                          
71  Case C-418/01, IMS Health GMBH & Co. OHG v NDC Health 
GMBH & Co. KG, [2004] ECR I-5039, para 49; This principle was 
first laid in the Magill case, ‗ The appellants‘ refusal to provide basic 
information by relying on national copyright provisions thus prevented 
the appearance of a new product…which the appellants did not offer 
and for which there was a potential consumer demand‘, Case C-241-
1/91 P, RTE & ITP v Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, para 54. 
72  Damien Geradin, ‗Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the 
EU Learn from the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the 
Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom‘ (2004) 41 Common 
Market Law Review 1519. Geradin argues that the ‗new product‘ test 
as proposed in the IMS case is ‗absurd‘. 
73  ibid. Geradin also argues that it was not appropriate for the court to 
deviate from the existing notion of substitutability and coin the concept 
of ‗new product‘. In Geardin‘s view even if the proposed product has 
some degree of novelty it will qualify to be a ‗new product‘, this is 
certainly a low threshold set by the court which will eventually save 
competitors instead of competition in refusal to supply cases. 
74  Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, and A. Jorge Padilla, ‗The Logic 
and Limits of the ―Exceptional Circumstances‖ in Magill and IMS 
Health‘(2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal, 1109. Ahlborn 
et al. argue that a product which is merely a variant of an existing 
product is unlikely to expand demand, it rather shifts demands from an 
existing product. ‗A guide that is merely a variant of an existing guide 
is unlikely to expand demand significantly; more likely, it shifts 
demand from an existing guide.‘ 
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the product to have enough novelty. From the Microsoft 
case on tying, it is clear that the test to determine whether 
products are distinct to determine tying is consumer 
demand.75 This rationale can be extended to determine 
whether the consumers perceive the innovated product as 
new. However, this approach has its own problems― 
product experience is specific to consumers and depends 
upon their aesthetic sense, habits and is also industry 
specific. 
In patent laws invention is considered new if it does not 
form part of the state of the art. The state of the art 
comprises all matters made available to the public before 
the priority date of the invention by written or oral 
description, by use or in any other way.76 In patent laws 
words of the claim determine if the patent is valid.77 
In the 2008 Microsoft decision78, the Commission relied 
upon the well-established patent jurisprudence in order to 
determine whether Microsoft‘s protocol were innovative.79 
                                                          
75  Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601, paras 
917-922. 
76  See William Cornish and David Llewelyn, ‗Intellectual Property: 
Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights‘, (5thEdn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003) 176; see also, Rüdiger Rogge, ‗The Concept of 
Novelty and European Patent Law‘ (IIC 1997) 443. 
77 Mark A. Lemley,‗Point of Novelty‘, (2011) 105 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1253; Mark A. Lemley, ‗The Changing 
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms‘ (2005) 104 Michigan Law Review 
101, 105. 
78  Commission Decision C(2008) 764 final of 27 February 2008.<http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_3997
_9.pdf> accessed on 19 June 2014. 
79  ―If the protocol technology currently used by Microsoft, although 
different from protocol technology available in the public domain, is 
not novel, in the sense that it already forms part of the state of the art, 
or is obvious to persons skilled in the art (namely if there is no 
innovation in the Interoperability Information), Microsoft should not 
be entitled to charge for such protocol technology.‖ Commission 
Decision C(2008) 764 final of 27 February 2008 ( n 79) para 130.  
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This approach of the Commission was subsequently upheld 
by the General Court in its 2012 decision.80 The novelty in 
patent laws is a judicially determined standard and the 
discretion of courts plays an important part.81 Ahlborn et 
al. have rightly noted that ‗it is therefore a matter of 
judgment whether a product is a "new" one‘.82 
2.2.4. Approach D- Synergies that provide the ability 
or incentive to innovate are dynamic in nature 
There is a fourth way to look at the distinction between 
static and dynamic efficiencies. This approach also 
includes the ability or incentive to innovate as dynamic 
efficiency. ―They (dynamic efficiencies) have recurring 
effects, which considerably enhances their potential impact 
on performance. In general, dynamic efficiencies are 
synergies that enable firms to improve their performance 
on a potentially continuing basis. Efficiencies that enhance 
the ability or incentive to innovate, for example, are 
considered dynamic‖.83  This approach explains why 
elimination of duplicative R&D, economies of scale and 
scope in R&D, joint exploitation of intellectual property, 
better R&D risk spreading, better IP enforcement, 
increased financial resources with which to fund R&D and 
standard-setting qualify as dynamic efficiency. This 
approach will also qualify fixed cost saving (apart from 
savings for R&D) as dynamic efficiency, in those cases 
                                                          
80 Case T-167/08 Microsoft Corp. v European Commission, < http : // 
curia. europa. eu / juris / document / document. jsf? text= & docid= 
124434&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&par
t=1&cid=2322513> accessed on 19 June 2014 
81 Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green, ‗Novelty and Disclosure in 
Patent Law‘ (1990) 21(1) The RAND Journal of Economics 131-146. 
82 Ahlborn et al. (n 74). 
83  Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies (n 48);  See also,  ©  OECD 
Policy Brief (2008)<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/413
59037.pdf>accessed on 14 June 2014. It argues ―efficiencies that 
enhance the ability or incentive to innovate, for example, are 
considered dynamic‖. 
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where it has the potential to enhance the ability to innovate 
by providing surplus capital. There may be cases when a 
merger reduces fixed costs substantially (for example by 
providing access to IPRs).  
In general, if a merger reduces variable cost it is 
considered to be static efficiency as it leads to lower prices 
which are passed on to the consumers.84 Prima facie, gains 
in fixed cost are not passed on to the consumers in terms of 
lower prices. For example, in the Drug Wholesalers case 
the question was whether savings resulting from 
elimination of duplicative distribution centers should count 
in favor of the merger. The court refused to take such 
efficiencies into account and rather held that these 
efficiencies may give rise to anticompetitive price 
increase.85The Canadian Competition Bureau, however, 
considers fixed cost savings as part of any efficiency 
claim.86  The treatment of fixed cost saving seems to be 
changing in the US as well. The FTC and DOJ have 
asserted in Merger Guidelines Commentary to take into 
                                                          
84 Guidelines (n 1). 
85 See George S. Cary, ‗Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: From Both 
Sides Now Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization Commission‘, 
(17 November 2005) Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, <http : // govin fo. library. unt. edu/ amc/ commission_ 
hearings/ pdf/ Statement_ Cary_ final. pdf> accessed on 14 June 2014. 
86  Andrew Tepperman and Margaret Sanderson, ‗Innovation and 
Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Review‘, (2007) Competition Bureau, 
Canada <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/ 
02376.html> accessed on 14 June 2014, The authors argue that ―Both 
variable and fixed cost savings are relevant to the analysis because both 
generate producer surplus (even though it is recognized that generally 
only variable (i.e. marginal) cost savings lead to price reductions).‖ 
The authors have quoted Mergers Enforcement Guidelines (Canada) 
(2004). Richard Elliott and Mark Katz have argued that in 'Superior 
Propane' both fixed and variable costs were taken into account in the 
trade offanalysis, see ―Canada: what have we learnt in 20 years?‖, (200
6) 9(6) <http://www.dwpv.com/~/media/Files/PDF/Elliott-Katz_ 
Paper_-_20_Years_-_GCR_June_2006.ashx> accessed on 14 June 
2014. 
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account merger specific fixed-cost savings, even if they do 
not bring short term procompetitive price effects as 
consumers may benefit in the long run.87  There is a potent 
reason to take into account fixed cost savings especially in 
technology intensive industries. Carry argues that in 
technology intensive industries marginal costs of products 
are trivial. Thus, variable cost efficiencies may not be 
beneficial to consumers.88 The Antitrust Modernization 
Committee final report recommends that certain fixed-cost 
efficiencies ―such as research and development expenses, 
in dynamic, innovation-driven industries where marginal 
costs are low relative to typical prices‖ should be given 
due weightage in efficiency analysis.89 
Another reason to take fixed cost savings into account is 
that determination of fixed or variable cost depends upon 
time. Kolasky argues that ―fixed cost savings 
matter….First, which costs are variable depends in part on 
how long our time horizon is. With a longer horizon, costs 
that might otherwise appear fixed may indeed impact 
marginal pricing decisions.‖90Mankiw and Taylor also 
share the same opinion, ―A firm‘s costs often depend on 
the time horizon being considered. In particular, many 
costs are fixed in the short run but variable in the long run. 
                                                          
87 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
‗Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines‘ (2006) 58<http:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/ 
commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf> 
accessed on 14 June 2014. 
88  George S. Carry (n 85). 
89  Antitrust Modernization Commission, ‗Report and Recommendations‘ 
(2007), <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/a
mc_final_report.pdf> accessed on 14 June 2014. 
90  William J. Kolasky, ‗The Role of Economics in Merger Enforcement: 
Efficiencies and Market Definition under Conditions of Price 
Discrimination‘, (Charles River Associates Conference, ―Current 
Topics in Merger & Antitrust Enforcement‖, Washington DC, Dec. 11, 
2002). 
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As a result, when the firm changes its level of production, 
average total cost may rise more in the short run than in the 
long run‖.91 
There is one more reason to take fixed cost savings into 
account―lower fixed costs may motivate firms to 
undertake more R&D work.92 Since fixed cost savings in 
some cases increase the financial resources to undertake 
R&D, it may be considered as dynamic efficiency gain. 
However, there are certain qualifications―the firm has to 
prove that savings in fixed cost will be diverted to R&D, 
and also firms cannot easily get money for R&D from 
financial markets.93 
2.3.The Closest definition 
As we see there are several approaches and definitions but 
they do not provide a comprehensive framework to 
identify and distinguish between static and dynamic 
efficiencies. Combining all approaches together the 
following definition comes closest to the concept of 
dynamic efficiency― Dynamic efficiencies are related to 
the ability of a firm and its incentives to introduce new 
products or processes of production (or to improve existing 
ones) by adopting new technology or enhancing knowledge 
endogenously, i.e. to ―move the efficient frontier of 
production faster or further forward. Dynamic efficiencies 
are therefore linked to innovation, learning by doing and 
                                                          
91 N. Gregory Mankiw and Mark P. Taylor, ‗Economics‘ (2nd Edition, 
South-Western Cengage Learning, 2011), 283. 
92 Dynamic Efficiencies – OECD (n 48). This paper quotes Katz and 
Shelanski- ―it is important that fixed costs not be summarily excluded 
from the efficiencies analysis when innovation is at issue‖, Michael 
Katz & Howard Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, (2007) 74, 
Antitrust Law Journal 1, 3; See also, US Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, Report and Recommendations, (2007)<http://apps.ameri
canbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-s1/pdf/developments/amc-
s1.pdf> accessed on 20 June 2014.  
93  For this suggestion I am thankful to Professor Jan Boon, Tilburg 
School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics. 
Emerging Markets and Innovation...Role of Competition Policy 
 
 69 
research and development (R&D) activity; contrary to 
static efficiencies, then, they display their effects generally 
over time.94 
If we rely upon this approach then combining 
complementary distribution or marketing assets (as a result 
of merger) does not qualify to be a dynamic efficiency 
gain, as the process is not new and firms merely bring in 
their comparative advantages together by way of 
integration.95 This is merely a ‗synergy‘. As per Farrell and 
Shapiro ‗synergies‘ are ―efficiencies based upon the close 
integration of specific, hard-to-trade assets owned by the 
merging parties‖.96 This integration leads to lower costs or 
improved quality. They contrast this with ‗efficiencies 
without synergies‘ such as ‗rationalisation‘ of output 
between the operations of two merging firms.97 The 
essential difference between these two concepts is that 
‗efficiencies without synergies‘ may be achieved by one 
firm even without a merger.98 An example of non-synergy 
efficiency may be economies of scale. Both ‗synergies‘ 
                                                          
94  I have modified the following definition provided by OECD in its 
paper, The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceeding (n 3) - 
―Dynamic efficiencies are related to the ability of a firm and its 
incentives to introduce new products or processes of production (or to 
improve existing ones), i.e. to ―move the efficient frontier of 
production faster or further forward (Motta, 2004, 55). Dynamic 
efficiencies are therefore linked to innovation, learning by doing and 
research and development (R&D) activity; contrary to static 
efficiencies, then, they display their effects over time.‖ 
95 The OECD paper on dynamic efficiency in merger analysis treats 
combining complementary distribution or marketing assets as dynamic 
efficiency. See, Dynamic Efficiencies – OECD (n 48). 
96 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ‗Scale Economies and Synergies 
in Horizontal Merger Analysis‘ (2001) 68(3) Antitrust Law Journal 
(Farrell and Shapiro). See also, Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, 
‗Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis‘1990 80(1) 
American Economic Review 107-126. 
97  Farrell and Shapiro (2001) (n 96). 
98  ibid. 
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and ‗efficiencies without synergies‘ are productive 
efficiencies as they cut the cost of production by using 
alternative combination of resources. In this process the 
technology is kept constant.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Competition law is an economic law. Its theories, 
application and evolution depend upon economic theories. 
There has been an acceptance of more economics based 
approach in competition law lately. As lawyers share the 
equal responsibility to correctly apply competition law, it 
is important that they (lawyers) understand the economic 
arguments. On the other hand, economists too should 
attempt to appreciate the fascination of lawyers with issues 
such as clarity and certainty. Keeping this mutual 
cooperation in mind, this paper has attempted to bring in 
legal clarity to the concept of dynamic efficiency by 
developing a framework.  
The motivation behind this paper was the great deal of 
confusion that a competition law lawyer encounters in 
identifying and separating dynamic efficiency from static 
efficiency (mainly productive efficiency). The paper has 
argued that faced with a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency, the latter should be duly taken into 
account while assessing the anti-competitive effects of 
mergers, agreements or abuse of dominance cases as 
several researchers have shown that dynamic efficiency 
brings more social welfare as compared to static efficiency. 
Further, stressing on dynamic efficiency is all the more 
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recovery. The focus of the paper, however, was to arrive at 
a holistic definition of dynamic efficiency. The 
methodology employed to develop this framework is 
simple ― based upon several existing definitions of 
dynamic efficiency four approaches are identified. Each 
approach has its limitations and exceptions. After 
analysing all the approaches one holistic definition/ 




Access and Investment in the ICT Sector for  
Developing Countries 
(2015) 9(1) Law and Development Review 1-27 
The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
sector is characterized by rapid changes in technology. 
The innovation in the ICT has shown its benefits in not 
only facilitating better communications, but also in 
fostering development. Therefore, ensuring proper 
incentives to the private sector for innovation or diffusion 
of technology is crucial. However, incentivizing the private 
players may be challenging in developing countries, where 
majority of the population requires cheap access. Thus, 
this paper analyses the extent to which developing 
countries can ensure incentivizing the providers of 
technology, without failing on their commitment to provide 
cheap access to the poor. The paper analyses Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU) and Universal Service Obligation 
(USO) and suggests ways to ensure adequate investment 
without jeopardizing access. The framework chosen in this 
paper is to see the changing treatment of LLU and USO in 
mature jurisdictions, and then analyze the viability of these 
policies in the socio-economic settings of developing 
countries. The framework also takes note of changes in the 
ICT technology.  
Introduction 
The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
sector is characterized by fast changing technology. Each 
new generation offers better and more efficient mode of 
communication. In view of the benefits of the new 
technology, therefore, it is imperative that the policy 
promotes the adoption and diffusion of the latest 
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technology, by ensuring right incentives to the providers of 
the technology. There is one additional benefit of 
providing new ICT technology in the developing 
countries–it allows developing countries the opportunity to 
leapfrog the old technology.1 On the other hand, 
developing countries also have to ensure cheap access to a 
large part of population.2 Thus, the challenge is to 
understand the viability and limitation of incentivizing 
investment in light of different socio-economic 
background in each individual developing country.  
Midgley defines economic development “as a dynamic 
process that creates wealth and raises standards of living”.3 
As opposed to economic development, social welfare is a 
                                                          
1   Robert Davison, Doug Vogel, Roger Harris and Noel Jones, 
„Technology Leapfrogging in Developing Countries - An Inevitable 
Luxury?‟, Electronic Journal of Information System in Developing 
Countries, (2000) 1, 5 , 1-10. They define leapfrogging as “The 
specific use of IT to accelerate development and promote economic 
growth is often referred to as technology leapfrogging: the 
implementation of a new and up-to-date technology in an application 
area in which at least the previous version of that technology has not 
been deployed.”; Jeffrey James, „Leapfrogging in mobile telephony: 
A measure for comparing country performance‟, Technological 
Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 991–998. Jeffery James 
argues “it is developing countries with the least commitment to the 
older technological infrastructure that potentially have the most to 
gain from the transition to a new paradigm”. 
2  For the purpose of this paper, the definition of developing countries 
is based on the World Bank classification. See  „How  
does the World Bank classify countries?‟,<https://datahelpdesk. 
worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-
world-bank-classify-countries> accessed 24 July 2015, The world 
bank terms  low and middle-income economies as developing 
countries. However, it also gives the caveat– “the term developing 
used to denote all low- and middle-income countries in this context 
does not imply that all economies in the group are experiencing 
similar levels of development or that other economies have reached 
a preferred or final stage of development.” 
3  James Midgley, „Growth, Redistribution, and Welfare: Toward 
Social Investment‟ [1999] 73 Social Service Review 3-21. 
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“mechanism for redistributing this wealth to fund social 
services for the poor and the oppressed.”4 Measuring 
development in terms of economic growth is a narrow 
conception. As has been argued, development is 
increasingly seen as a process of social transformation.5 
Martinussen notes that there is no consensus on the 
definition or understanding of economic development; 
however, the following definition has received wide 
approval lately ― “economic development is a process 
whereby the real per capita income of a country increases 
over a long period of time while simultaneously poverty is 
reduced and the inequality in society is generally 
diminished- or at least not increased”.6 Therefore, the 
concept of development is broad and incorporates social 
welfare as well. This paper will follow this broad 
understanding of development. 
 In general, promoting investment in new ICT technology 
by developing countries may be questioned, as there is a 
large part of the population that still needs to have basic 
access.7 Economic development, even when seen as a 
broader concept that goes beyond GDP growth and per 
capita income, is fostered by investment in the new ICT 
technology. As will be argued, improved ICT services 
                                                          
4  ibid. 
5 Innovation and the Development Agenda, OECD, 2010 (Erika 
Kraemer-Mbula and Watu Wamae eds.) <http://www.idrc.ca/EN/ 
Resources/Publications/openebooks/501-4/index.html#page _40> 
accessed 19 June 2014. 
6  John Martinussen, Society, State& Market: A Guide To Competing 
Theories of Development (5th edn, London: Zed 2005) 37. 
7  For an account of special economic characteristics of developing 
countries that may have bearing on the nature of policies including 
competition law and policy see Simon J. Evenett, „Competition law 
and the economic characteristics of developing countries‟, in 
Michal S. Gal et al (eds). The Economic Characteristics of 
developing jurisdictions: Their Implications for competition law 
(Edward Elgar 2015) page no. 15 
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have positive impact on health, education, corruption 
reduction, poverty alleviation etc. For example, Cecchini 
and Scott, in a paper written in 2003, have documented 
how ICT is helping to alleviate poverty in rural India by 
improving poor people‟s access to education, health, 
governance and financial services.8 
This paper analyzes two specific policies (Local Loop 
Unbundling and Universal Service Obligation) that have 
bearing on investment and argues for protecting and 
promoting investment in the ICT sector. The paper also 
provides solutions for ensuring access and equity without 
jeopardizing the adoption of new technology. Since there 
are differences among developing countries there cannot 
be a universal policy prescription for the developing world. 
The policy recommendations of this paper, however, may 
serve as a starting point. Part I of the paper discusses how 
investment in the new ICT services is positively related to 
social welfare. This part also explains the importance of 
investment for innovation and diffusion of new 
technology. Further, it also analyses the substitutability 
between wireline and wireless telephony as changing 
technology affects policy. Part II analyses two specific 
policies― Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) and Universal 
Services Obligation (USO) ― which have bearing on 
investment in the ICT sector, and proposes solutions for 
encouraging investment without failing on the commitment 
to provide easy access to the ICT. The methodology 
chosen is to understand these two policies in more mature 
jurisdictions of the US and EU and analyze the viability in 
the socio-economic settings of a developing country. The 
                                                          
8  Simone Cecchini and Christopher Scott, „Can Information and 
Communications Technology Applications Contribute to Poverty 
Reduction? Lessons from Rural India‟ (2003) 10 Information 
Technology for Development 73-84 <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
904333> accessed 19 June 2014. 
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analysis also takes note of changing ICT technology that 
may affect the policy choice. 
1. Investment in network improvement and social 
welfare 
Investment in the new ICT technologies leads to societal 
welfare. For example investment in new technologies such 
as 3G and 4G improves the quality of life by creating new 
jobs.9 Shapiro and Hassett estimate that every 10 per cent 
increase in the adoption of 3G and 4G wireless 
technologies could add more than 231,000 new jobs to the 
US economy in less than one year.10 A World Bank study 
found that for every 10 percentage point increase in high-
speed internet connections, there is an increase in 
economic growth of 1.38 percentage points for developing 
countries.11 
 
                                                          
9   Robert J. Shapiro and  Kevin Hassett, „The Employment Effects of 
Advances in Internet and Wireless Technology: Evaluating the  
Transitions from 2G  to 3G  and  from  3G  to 4G‟  (NDN  and  
New  Policy  Institute,  January 2012) <http://www.sonecon. com/ 
docs/studies/Wireless_Technology_and_Jobs-Shapiro_Hassett - 
January_2012.pdf> accessed 
 15 July 2014. They argue that, “new econometric analysis set forth in 
this study shows that the investments and innovation entailed in the 
transition from 2G to 3G wireless technologies and Internet 
infrastructure spurred the creation of some 1,585,000 new jobs 
from April 2007 to June 2011.” 
10  ibid. “The research found that a 10 percentage point gain in 
penetration of a new generation of wireless technology in a given 
quarter leads to a 0.07 percentage-point gain in employment in the 
following quarter and continuing gains in subsequent quarters. 
These results suggest that a national job creation strategy should 
include or encourage appropriate measures to accelerate the 
deployment of 4G infrastructure.” 
11  C.Z.W. Qiang and C.M. Rossotto, Economic Impacts of 
Broadband, in Information and Communications for Development 
2009: Extending Reach and Increasing Impact, World Bank 
(2009), Washington D.C., 35-50. 
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There are strong societal and private benefits of 4G 
products and services such as public safety management of 
crisis situations like natural disasters, health care delivery, 
and the distribution and use of energy.12 The health care 
gains of broadband are noteworthy. Qiang et al. note how 
broadband-enabled telemedicine is benefiting remote areas 
relying upon technologies such as videoconference.13 They 
quote an interesting example of Arvind Eye Hospital in 
Tamil Nadu, India which by using wireless broadband, that 
provided 100 times faster speed than dial-up network, 
connected five of its rural clinics in 2004 to provide eye 
services to rural residents. The high-speed enabled the 
doctors to provide Web camera consulting to 1500 patients 
each month.14 
Telecom also provides a platform technology that is used 
by other industries in manufacturing and services.15 That 
means a faster and efficient broadband will bring more 
innovation and efficiency in other sectors. Deployment of 
4G technology in recent times have one more added 
advantage ―Shapiro and Hassett argue that rapid 
deployment of 4G technology and the accompanying 
innovation may also lead to stronger economic recovery 
and expansion from the recent recession.16 
Thus, investment in improved ICT technology has positive 
effects on social welfare and economic growth. On the 
other hand socio-economic realities in the developing 
world make any attempt to promote investment in the ICT 
                                                          
12  Shapiro and Hassett (n 9). 
13 Qiang and Rossotto (n 17). The authors have very well elucidated 
various benefits of broadband in developed and developing 
countries. 
14  ibid.  
15 Johannes M. Bauer and WoohyunShim,„Effects of Regulation on 
Innovation in the Information and Communications Sector‟, (2012) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028523> accessed 15 July 2014. 
16  Shapiro and Hassett (n 9). 
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sector difficult, as there are strong voices that demand that 
prices are kept low to support redistribution. Or, can there 
be an alternative approach that allows for a middle path 
between access and investment in the ICT sector? In Part II 
certain issues that pose a dilemma with respect to making a 
choice between access and investment have been analyzed. 
However, before that it becomes important to understand 
the changing role of regulation in the telecom sector.  
Eli Noam notes that the telecom sector has experienced 
three generations so far.17 The first two stages were 
followed by suitable regulation. The first generation was 
marked by state owned monopoly on copper analog 
system. The regulation was thus tailored to cooperate with 
the monopolist in spreading the services, but at the same 
time keeping a check on its market power. A need was felt 
to introduce more competition in the second generation. 
Thus, it resulted in privatization and liberalized entry in the 
telecom sector. This was achieved through regulation that 
induced competition. It was believed that competition 
would lead to innovation. Empirically also it was found 
that competition had a positive effect even in developing 
countries.18 Finally, the current, third generation, is 
characterized by the arrival of fiber-optic and high capacity 
wireless access networks which will provide speed in the 
gigabit range. The biggest challenge in this generation is to 
                                                          
17 Eli M. Noam, „Regulation 3.0 for Telecom 3.0‟ [2010] 34 
Telecommunications Policy 4-10. 
18 Scott J. Wallsten, „An Econometric Analysis of Telecom 
Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin 
America‟ [2001] 49 The Journal of Industrial Economics 1-19. 
“Wallsten in his econometric analysis of the effects of 
telecommunication reforms in developing countries found that 
competition (as measured  by the number of mobile operators in the 
country not owned by the incumbent) is significantly associated 
with increase in the per capita number of telephone mainlines, 
payphones, and connection capacity, and with decrease in the price 
of a local call.”  
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balance the need of an advanced network infrastructure 
with other important policy goals such as providing access, 
especially when the financial cost of fiber upgrade to rural 
area is substantial. Noam argues that the second generation 
regulation is not fit for the third generation technology in 
the telecom sector inter alia because of growing 
investment requirements.19 Several economists have also 
shown, as argued in Part II, that providing easy access to 
the competitors to advanced networks of incumbents will 
slow down investment and innovation in the ICT sector. 
The choice between providing cheaper access to 
consumers and ensuring investment in the new technology 
becomes more difficult, as several studies have found a 
positive correlation between increase in broadband Internet 
access and growth in GDP.20 
1.1. Investment for innovation and diffusion of new 
technology in the telecom sector 
Innovation is a multi-stage process where ideas are 
transformed into new/improved products, services or 
processes.21 It has two important components: ideas and 
implementation of the ideas. Innovation in the mobile 
telephony may take place in three different segments― 
applications for the handsets, core network and handsets. 
Innovation in the core sector may increase spectral 
efficiency. Spectral efficiency means the quantity of bits 
(i.e., information) that can be transmitted permegahertz 
                                                          
19 Noam (n 17). 
20  For an overview of such studies see Tim Kelly and Carlo Rossotto, 
„Broadband Strategies Handbook‟ (World Bank, 2012) 
<http://broadbandtoolkit.org/Custom/Core/Documents/Broadband
%20Strategies%20Handbook.pdf> accessed 15 July 2014. Kelly 
and Rossotto also note “a comprehensive study regarding the effect 
of broadband on GDP in developing countries is warranted”. 
21 Anahita Baregheh, Jennifer Rowley and Sally Sambrook, „Towards 
a multidisciplinary definition of innovation’, (Management 
Decision, 2009 vol 47 issue 8) 1323-1339. 
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(Mhz) (i.e., bandwidth) of spectrum.22 Spectral efficiency 
results in increased capacity to make voice calls and 
increased speed to access internet and download 
information using less spectrum.23 Since, wireless 
telephony is on the rise all over the globe, technological 
innovation is required to increase spectral efficiency. Some 
scholars argue that next generations wireless will have the 
technological capability to offer the same bit rates as are 
offered by the wireline presently.24 
Spectrum is a limited natural resource; thus, investment is 
needed in order to find ways to optimize the use of 
spectrum but at the same time not affect the quality of 
services provided. So far as fixed telephony is concerned, 
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology requires 
investment to increase the transmission capacity and to 
split the traffic into data and voice.25 Also, cable TV 
infrastructure requires investment that may permit reverse 
flow of data.26 Investment is also required to rollout new 
fiber optic. Investment in the ICT sector, even when it is 
not directed at innovation but at spreading the new 
technology is important, as it has been argued above that 
the new ICT technology promotes social welfare. It is true 
that local ICT firms in the developing countries are still not 
taking up enough R&D; however, adequately incentivizing 
                                                          
22  Gerald R. Faulhaber and David J. Farber, „Innovation in the 
Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer Centric Framework‟ (2010) 4 
International Journal of Communication 73-112. 
23  ibid. 
24  Tim Kelly and Carlo Rossotto (n 20) 229. 
25 ITU note that even now xDSL accounts for over half or more than 
five out of every ten fixed broadband lines. See, The State of 
Broadband 2014: Broadband for all, A report by the Broadband 
Commission, September 2014. 
26 Gordon Klein and Julia Wendel,„The Impact of Local Loop 
Unbundling Revisited‟, 25th European Regional Conference of the 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Brussels, 
Belgium, 22-25 June 2014. 
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the ICT sector in general will have at least two benefits. 
Firstly, incentivizing the ICT providers will ensure faster 
adoption of the latest technology. Secondly, the developing 
countries will benefit from the innovative technology as 
much as the developed countries. Of course, such 
incentives are subject to the socio-economic realities in the 
developing world as will be seen in Part II. 
Faulhaber and Farber note that investment and innovation 
are two sides of the same coin as investment is required in 
order to materialize new ideas, new technologies and new 
business methods.27 No investment can happen unless 
there are incentives for innovators and investors.28 With 
respect to the telecom industry, not only providing access 
at near marginal cost and overlooking the huge sunk cost is 
detrimental, but also since the telecom industry is 
characterized by rapidly changing technology and 
economics, the investment incentives of incumbents may 
be significantly lower if competitors are artificially 
allowed access.29 The telecom sector requires huge 
investment (see Table 1). The perfect competition model 
that calls for prices that are equal to marginal cost is not 
viable for this sector.30 Further, incentives to innovate 
decrease as returns to innovation become more uncertain.31 
Over The Top (OTT) services such as VoIP are also 
                                                          
27 Gerald R Faulhaber and David J. Farber, „Innovation in the 
Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework‟ (March, 19, 
2010). International Journal of Communication, Vol. 4, 2010. <http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1574966> accessed 15 July 2014. 
28  ibid.  
29  Jerry Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications 
Regulation (James Alleman & Eli Noam, The New Investment 
Theory of Real Options and its Implication for Telecommunications 
Economics ed, 1999) 191-204. 
30  ibid. 
31  ibid.  
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eroding the revenue basis of telecom operators making it 
difficult for them to invest in R&D.32 
 
In the telecom sector, regulation follows the technological 
changes which may occur at a very fast pace. The 
technological progress in mobile telephony has added new 
dimensions to the telecom sector. In several developing 
countries mobile phones have outnumbered fixed lines. 
Thus, a forward-looking regulatory telecom policy depends 
a lot upon the issue of substitutability between wireless and 
wireline telephony. If wireless and wireline are found to be 
substitutes for each other, it may result in substantial 
policy changes. Therefore, before analyzing the policies 
that have an effect on investment, in the following text it 
will be seen if the new wireless technologies may 
substitute fixed wireline telephony in developing countries. 
1.2. Are wireless and wireline telephony in the same 
market in the developing countries? 
Wireless may provide the same services as wireline 
telephony. The difference merely concerns the speed 
                                                          
32 Martin Peitz , Heike Schweitzer and Tommaso Valletti, „Market 
Definition, Market Power and Regulatory Interaction in Electronic 
Communications Markets‟ (2014), CERRE study <http://www.cerre.
eu/sites/cerre/files/141029_CERRE_MktDefMktPwrRegInt_ 
ECMs_Final.pdf> accessed on 17.02.2014 
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provided by these technologies. Thus, this paper for the 
purpose of ascertaining substitutability between wireless 
and wireline considers all kinds of services―voice, video 
and data ― provided by wireless and wireline telephony. 
The criterion to ascertain if wireline and wireless are in the 
same market is to see to what extent consumers in 
developing countries find wireless to be a substitute of 
wireline telephony ― this is the relevant market test in the 
competition law parlance.33 Rather than carrying out the 
SSNIP test, the paper looks at the qualitative differences 
along with changing user pattern in developing countries to 
gauge substitutability. It is important to note that 
substitutability between wireless and fixed telephony 
matters only in the local loop, as generally the backbone is 
fixed infrastructure, be it copper or fiber. The local loop is 
considered to be a natural monopoly where constructing a 
parallel network is socially wasteful. 
Very often high-speed internet is referred to as broadband. 
However, there is no common definition of broadband. 
Kelly and Rossottonote that “due to each country‟s unique 
needs and history, including economic, geographic, and 
regulatory factors, definitions of broadband vary widely”.34 
They also note that traditionally broadband has been defined 
on the basis of data transmission speed. Thus, 
technically, both wireless and wireline may qualify as 
broadband depending upon the data transmission speed 
chosen as threshold. Aside from mobility, there are other 
differences between wireless and wireline telephony. Lehr 
and Chapin view capacity limits as the most important 
fundamental difference between wired and wireless 
networking. They observe that a single coaxial cable has a 
useful frequency range in order of 1 GHz, while a single 
                                                          
33  For market definition and the tests to identify relevant market see, 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law (97/C 372 /03). 
34  Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 3. 
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optical fiber has a useful frequency range of over 1000 GHz. 
Highlighting the limitations of wireless telephony, they note 
that the entire wireless RF spectrum (3 Hz to 300 GHz) can 
fit easily in a single fiber.35 However, that much broadband 
is generally not required in the local loop. Another 
disadvantage of wireless is that raw data transmission in 
wired networks is generally much more reliable than in 
wireless networks.36 However, the most crucial and useful 
benefit of wireless telephony is mobility. When seen 
together, this is the most critical aspect other than cheaper 
prices that determines the choice of consumers.  
Several researchers have found mobile telephony as a 
substitute for fixed line.37 A 1999 paper by Sidak et al. 
considers wireless and wireline as substitutes.38 However, 
after network convergence this question becomes more 
complex as voice, video and data are transmitted together 
and the wireless suffers from capacity constraints, at least 
in some cases such as high-definition (HD) video.  
In Austria, the telecommunications regulator determined in 
2009 that DSL, cable modem, and mobile broadband 
                                                          
35 William H. Lehr and John M. Chapin, „On the convergence of 
wired and wireless access network architectures‟ (2010) 22 
Information Economics and Policy 33-41. 
36  ibid. 
37  For a review of such literature see Michael R. Ward and Glenn A. 
Woroch, „Fixed-Mobile Telephone Subscription Substitution in the 
U.S.‟, University of Texas at Arlington, Department of Economics 
Working Papers 0501. Ward and Woroch also find that some 
degree of subscription substitution began to occur in the US as of 
2001; See also Christopher Garbacza and Herbert G. Thompson Jr, 
„Demand for telecommunication services in developing countries‟ 
[2007] 31 Telecommunications Policy Volume 276–28. Garbacza 
and Thompson found that the even though several researchers have 
found wireless and wireline to be substitutes, the degree of 
substitutability varies.  
38  J. Gregory Sidak,  Hal  J. Singer  and  David  J.  Teece,  „A General 
Framework for  Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications‟, 
[1999] 50 Hastings Law Journal 1639-1672. 
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connections for residential consumers are substitutes at the 
retail level.39 Yet there are others who are skeptical about 
the capacity of wireless to substitute wireline.40 The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), at present, 
considers mobile broadband as a complement rather than a 
substitute for fixed services in those countries with 
widespread fixed broadband coverage.41Calvo also views 
fixed and wireless telephony as complementary in almost 
all cases, as in order for wireless to perform efficiently, it 
has to be supported by fiber backbone networks.42 Also, he 
argues that in order to reduce demands on scarce spectrum, 
for some uses fixed networks may be used while scarce 
spectrum may be used by those who require mobility.43 It 
is true that at present wireless does not provide the same 
speed as wireline; however, with the introduction of new 
mobile broadband technologies such as HSPA+, LTE, 
WiMAX, wireless broadband may become a suitable 
alternative for a fixed broadband connection rather than 
just a complement. ITU asserts that, “[T]o the extent that 
such services (HSPA+, LTE, WiMAX ) exist in economies 
that can be classified as next generation broadband leaders, 
it might be appropriate to consider fixed and mobile 
broadband to be in separate markets”.44 
 
                                                          
39  Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 117-118. 
40  In its Open Internet Order, the FCC noted that the extent to which 
mobile wireless offerings will compete with wireline offerings is 
unknown. See Jeffrey A. Eisenach, „Broadband Competition in the 
Internet Ecosystem‟ [2012] AEI Economic Studies.  
41  ITU, „Competition and regulation in a converged broadband world‟ 
(2013) <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/ Competition 
regulation.pdf > accessed 15 July 2014. 
42  A. G. Calvo, Universal Service Policies in the Context of National 
Broadband Plans, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 203, OECD, 
2012 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k94gz19flq4-en> accessed 15 July 
2014. 
43  ibid. 
44 ITU (n 41). 
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There is an alternative approach as well. This approach 
suggests that the extent to which mobile broadband 
technologies are complementary or substitutable for other 
broadband access technologies depends upon the specific 
market.45 In a paper published in 2004, Banerjee and Ros find 
that technological substitution in some countries and 
economic substitution in others may explain differential 
patterns of development in global fixed and mobile 
telephony.46 They note that “[t]echnological substitution is 
less likely to be observed, however, in developed countries 
where both mobile and fixed line services of acceptable 
quality are available simultaneously”.47 Wireless is easier and 
cheaper to deploy as compared to wireline.48 As the cost and 
resources required for the deployment of wireline broadband 
are very high, wireless is a viable alternative for developing 
countries especially in rural and remote areas.49 Such 
substitution has already begun. For instance, wireless 
broadband subscription in Sub-Saharan Africa is more than 
eight times the number of wireline subscriptions.50 In India, 
out of a total of 895.51 million telephone connections, 864.72 
                                                          
45  ibid. 
46 Aniruddha Banerjee and Agustin J. Ros, „Patterns in global fixed 
and mobile telecommunications development: a cluster analysis‟ 
[2004] 28 Telecommunications Policy 107–132. “Arguably, good 
service quality, uniform technological standards, and the promises 
of next generation cellular technology have boosted subscribership 
for mobile services in some countries. In other countries, increasing 
affordability, convenience, problems that retard further 
development of existing fixed networks, and long waiting lists for 
fixed services have likely prompted potential telecommunications 
customers to look in mobile telephony‟s direction.” 
47  ibid. 
48  Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 229. 
49 ibid 19. 
50 ibid 20. 
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million are wireless telephone connections.51 In Morocco, 
third-generation (3G) mobile broadband connections 
surpassed asymmetric DSL (ADSL) wireline connections in 
September 2009.52 
In the opinion of ITU, growth in mobile broadband 
connection is not merely a result of poor fixed network 
infrastructure. Along with changing usage patterns supported 
by mobile data cards and smartphones, 4G network provides 
substantial improvements in mobile technology as it offers 
substantially higher data rates.53  ITU also argues that at 
present there are few services that would require substantially 
higher download speeds than mobile broadband can offer.54 
Tim Wu considers 4G as a replacement for fixed line 
network.55 But, there is no consensus that 4G can be a 
substitute for fixed line telephony.56 
The discussion above shows that even though there are 
technological limitations of wireless telephony in terms of 
matching the speed offered by fixed lines, even after the 
                                                          
51 Annual Telecom Report, 2012-13  < http: // www. dot. gov .in / 
sites /default/files/Telecom%20Annual%20Report-2012-13% 20 
(English) % 20_ For%20web%20(1).pdf>  accessed 15 July 2014. 
52  Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 96. For the latest data about fixed and 
wireless telephony in different countries see, The State of 
Broadband 2014(n 25). 
53 ITU (n 41). 
54  ibid. 
55 Tim Wu, Creeping Duopoly?(Prepared Testimony Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights 
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Hearing on The Verizon/Cable 
Deals: Harmless Collaboration or a Threat to Competition and 
Consumers? 2012) 2. 
56 See, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, „Broadband Competition in the Internet 
Ecosystem‟ [2012] AEI Economic Studies. “Moreover, although 
many think that the next generation of 4G wireless services (based 
on LTE or WiMAX technology) will serve as an economic 
substitute for wireline broadband, there is not yet a consensus that 
that moment has arrived; hence, the wireline and wireless markets 
are often considered separately.” 
Emerging Markets and Innovation...Role of Competition Policy 
 
 88 
introduction of 4G telephony, wireless is substantially 
cheaper than rolling out fiber optics. This difference 
significantly influences the choice made by developing 
countries. Now, developing countries and to some extent 
even developed countries have started relying upon 
wireless telephony in the local loop, instead of choosing to 
spend exorbitant amount of money on spreading new fiber. 
This implies that particularly in developing countries 
wireless is largely considered as a substitute for wireline 
telephony in the local loop. Further, it also offers 
developing countries an opportunity to leapfrog the 
existing technology followed by developed countries.  
1.2.1. Disruptive Innovation Analysis 
As per Christensen, disruptive innovation is a process by 
which a product or service takes root initially in simple 
applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly 
moves up market, eventually displacing established 
competitors.57 Ever since Christensen‟s influential book on 
this issue, several researchers have tried refining and 
building on this theory.  
Govindarajan and Kopalle identify, based upon the 
existing literature, following five features of disruptive 
innovations: (1) the innovation underperforms on the 
attributes mainstream customers value; (2) the new 
                                                          
57 C.M. Christensen and J.L.  Bower, „Customer power, strategic 
investment, and the failure of leading firms‟ (1996) Strategic 
Management Journal 17(3), 197; C.M. Christensen, The 
Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms 
to Fail (Boston, MA Harvard Business School Press, 1997); Dan 
Yu and Chang Chieh Hang, „A Reflective Review of Disruptive 
Innovation Theory‟ (2010) International Journal of Management 
Reviews 12 (4), 435; R.  Adner „When are Technologies 
Disruptive? A Demand-based View of the Emergence of 
Competition‟ (2002) Strategic Management Journal 23(8), 667; 
Clayton M. Christensen, „The Ongoing Process of Building a 
Theory of Disruption‟, Journal of Product Innovation Management 
23, 39. 
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features offered by the innovation are not valued by the 
mainstream customers; (3) the innovation typically is more 
simple and cheaper and is offered at a lower price than 
existing products; (4) at the time of its introduction, the 
innovation appeals to a low-end, price-sensitive customer 
segment, thus limiting the profit potential for incumbents; 
and (5) over time, further developments improve the 
innovation‟s performance on the attributes mainstream 
customers value to a level where the innovation begins to 
attract more of these customers.58 As evident from the 
above literature, new wireless technology satisfies all these 
five features of disruptive innovation in developing 
countries. Thus, new wireless technology is disruptive in 
nature and has resulted in the shift from fixed to wireless in 
the local loop in developing countries.  
2. Effect of Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) and Universal 
Service Obligation (USO) on investment and 
innovation and the choice for developing countries 
Having answered the question regarding substitutability 
between wireless and fixed telephony, this part will look at 
two specific policies that affect investment in the ICT sector. 
The implementation of these policies will be analyzed in the 
socio-economic context of developing countries, taking 
account of technological changes in the ICT sector. 
2.1. LLU in developing countries 
LLU refers to the process of requiring incumbent operators 
to open, wholly or in part, the last mile of their 
telecommunications networks to competitors.59 LLU allows 
                                                          
58  V. Govindarajan and P.K Kopalle,„ The Usefulness of Measuring 
Disruptiveness of Innovations ex post in Making ex ante 
Predictions‟, (2006) Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
23, 12. 
59 ITU, „Birth of Broadband‟ (2003) Geneva<http://www.itu.int/wsis/ 
tunis/newsroom/stats/BirthofBroadband_2003.pdf>accessed 15 July 
2014. 
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entrants to reach end-users by purchasing access from 
incumbents at the wholesale level. LLU was first adopted in 
the US in 1990s. The mandatory sharing of facility in the 
US was seen as a means to eventual competition between 
rival infrastructures.60  It was considered a substitute to 
facility based competition, especially in those markets and 
areas where additional access network would not be 
economically viable.61 Thus, the clear idea behind LLU was 
to introduce competition in the telecom sector.  
LLU is a classic case of tension between allocative 
efficiency gains resulting in lower prices and dynamic 
efficiency gains resulting in investment and innovation, 
when there is a need for new infrastructure. While there are 
conflicting views and results regarding the impact of 
access regulation on investment in telecommunications, the 
majority of scholars agree that access regulations 
negatively affect the infrastructure investment.62 In a paper 
written in 2005, Hausman and Sidak analyze the 
                                                          
60  Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, „Did Mandatory 
Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence From Five 
Countries‟, [2005] 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
173-246. 
61  Paul de Bijl and Martin Peitz, „Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: 
Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges‟ Tilburg Law and 
Economics Center (TILEC) Discussion Paper, DP 2005-008. 
62  Hans Friederiszick, Michal Grajek and Lars - Hendrik Röller, 
Analyzing the Relationship between Regulation and Investment in 
the Telecom Sector (White Paper, Cm 108-01, 2008) 
<http://www.esmt.org/fm/13/WP-108-01.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2014. They note that “the arguments that mandated access coupled 
with cost-based access charges undermine innovation have a 
relatively strong theoretical underpinning and include: i) Lowering 
the option value of the incumbent‟s investment, ii) Shifting the 
burden of risk from the entrant to the incumbent and iii) Increasing 
the incumbent‟s cost of capital”. For a more recent study see, 
Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach , Allan T. Ingraham, „The 
Long-run Effects of Copper-loop Unbundling and the Implications 
for Fiber‟, Telecommunications Policy37 (2013)262–281. 
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unbundling rationales63 in five countries (United States, 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Germany) and 
found that none of the four rationales were supported in 
practice.64 Grajek and Roller in their empirical study found 
that access regulation discourages investment by 
incumbents and individual entrants, even as entrants‟ total 
investment increases. They also quantify the magnitude of 
loss resulting from access regulation at €16.4 billion over 10 
years (1997-2006).65 Gayle and Weisman argue that with 
respect to process innovation, investment in innovation 
increases when the unbundling obligation is 
relaxed.66 Frieden also notes that LLU failed to foster 
competition in the US as many ventures fold, exit the 
market, or pursue other market opportunities.67 So far as the 
diffusion of fixed broadband is concerned, Lee et al. found 
that LLU has a positive effect on diffusion of fixed 
broadband in OECD countries. However, they caution that 
the results of their study are specific to the OECD countries 
and thus may not be true for developing countries.68 
                                                          
63 There rationales are ―1. Competition in the form of lower prices 
and greater innovation in retail markets is desirable 2. Competition 
in retail markets cannot be achieved with mandatory unbundling 3. 
Mandatory unbundling enables future facilities-based investment 
('stepping-stone' or 'ladder of investment hypothesis) 4. 
Competition in wholesale access markets is desirable. 
64 Hausman and Sidak (n 60). 
65  Michal Grajek and Lars-Hendrik Roller, „Regulation and 
Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European 
Telecoms‟ [2012] 55 Journal of Law and Economics 189-216. 
66  Philip G. Gayle and Dennis L. Weisman, „Efficiency Trade-Offs in 
the Design of Competition Policy for the Telecommunications 
Industry‟ [2007] 6 Review of Network Economics. 
67  Rob Frieden, „Unbundling the local loop: a cost/benefit analysis for 
developing nation‟ [2005] 7 info 3 – 15. 
68 Sangwon Lee, Mircea Marcu and SeonmiLee, „An Empirical 
Analysis of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Diffusion‟ [2011] 23 
Information Economics and Policy 227–233. 
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As the fixed-line telephony now has moved on to fiber from 
copper, LLU presents further difficulties. Kelly and Rossotto 
caution that LLU may be detrimental to fresh infrastructure 
investment such as rolling out new fiber optic.69 Not only 
does access regulation reduce the incentives of the incumbent 
to invest in the facility, it also reduces incentives to build new 
infrastructure because infrastructure can be rented from 
incumbents at mandated prices.70 The development of Next 
Generation Networks (NGNs) requires significant 
investment. As easy access, including LLU, impedes 
investment, the development of NGNs may be adversely 
affected by LLU. From the incumbent‟s point of view, 
instead of LLU, wholesale product such as bit stream access 
is preferable over unbundling as the incumbent retains its 
control over the physical line. Implementation of LLU or 
Wholesale Broadband Access (WBA) in general presents 
further difficulties. National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
have to constantly oversee the process of LLU and determine 
the access cost. NRAs have to determine which elements the 
incumbent may share, and set a reasonable price that may 
induce competition without distorting the revenues of the 
incumbent that may adversely affect innovation, facilities 
investment and long term consumer benefit.71 This may be 
very demanding for regulatory bodies in developing countries 
with limited resources.72 
                                                          
69   Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 117.  
70 MichałGrajek and Lars-Hendrik Roller (n 65); See also Valletti M. 
Tommaso, „The Theory of Access Pricing and Its Linkage with 
Investment Incentives‟ [2003] 27 Telecommunications Policy 659–675. 
71 Frieden (n 67). 
72 Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis, „Toward a Theory of 
Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques 
Laffont's Lead‟ [2009] 47 (3) Journal of Economic Literature, 729-
770. Estache and Lewis argue that, “key aspects of institutional 
failure affecting regulation in LDCs can be grouped into four broad 
limitations: limited regulatory capacity, limited commitment, 
limited accountability, and limited fiscal efficiency”. 
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Unbundling in general is losing its viability. While it used 
to be a prominent policy choice in 1990s, it has now been 
phased out in the US. Europe, however, still continues to 
practice it.73 The Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) shunned the mandatory unbundling requirement in 
February 2003 with respect to new fiber-optic network; 
however, unbundling of the existing copper lines still 
continued.74 Interestingly, this step was affirmed by the 
judiciary on the ground that unbundling would adversely 
affect investment.75 The industry responded positively and 
announced an increase in investment.76 The Financial crisis 
has, however, adversely affected investment in fiber optic. 
An ITU report, as early as 2009, had expressed fears that 
the crisis could delay rolling-out NGNs as some operators 
were cancelling their investment plans.77 Further, 4G 
wireless telecom made investment in fiber non-viable. In 
2012, the number of added lines per day was 16,703 that 
were 72 per cent less than the highest recorded growth in 
January 2006, and also 47 per cent less than 2009.78   
                                                          
73  Friederiszick et al. (n 62); See also Johannes M. Bauer and Erik 
Bohlin, „From Static to Dynamic Regulation: Recent Developments 
in US Telecommunications Policy‟ 43 Inter economics 38-50. “In 
the US, the goals of unbundling have changed over time from a 
narrow focus on stimulating market entry to a broader view of its 
implications for investment and innovation.” 
74 Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, „Review of the Section 251: Unbundling Obligations 
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In 2000 when the LLU was mandated in Europe, the 
legislators had a clear understanding that it should be used 
to deal with network monopolies, but as it reduces 
incentives to innovate and invest, it should be withdrawn 
when there would be sufficient competition.79 However, 
LLU is still in practice in Europe. As per the European 
Commission, “empirical evidence shows that investment 
and innovation are strongest where there is effective 
competition between infrastructures. However, there is still 
no infrastructure-based competition on around 80 percent 
of the EU‟s local loops. This means that, ex-ante, 
regulation continues to play a crucial role in maintaining 
competition and protecting consumers by setting 
conditions for access to the incumbent‟s infrastructure”.80 
The policy choice to opt for LLU also depends upon 
competition between legacy infrastructures in a particular 
country. Kirsch and Hirschhausen have termed competition 
between DSL and cable TV as historic coincidence.81 In 
several countries cable networks compete vigorously with 
DSL connections for broadband access.82 The US and 
Canada started deploying cable in the 1940s and have 
extensive cable network. In those countries where cable and 
DSL compete (inter-platform competition), there are 
                                                          
79  European Parliament and Council (2000), “Regulation (EC) No 
2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop”, Official 
Journal of the European Communities L 336, 30.12.2000, 4-8. See 
also, Bijl and Peitz (n 61). 
80  Commission Staff Working Document, Summary of the Impact 
Assessment (Cm 473, 2007) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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81  Fabian Kirsch and Christian von Hirschhausen, „Regulation of 
NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation 
at All?‟ (2008) Communications & Strategies No. 69, 63. 
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incentives for the legacy networks to upgrade to NGNs.83  It 
has also been observed that, in some countries strong inter-
platform competition (as among DSL, cable and fiber) has 
resulted in strong intra-facility competition among fiber 
networks.84 Thus, in such countries LLU is not the optimum 
solution as the fiber provider will not have a monopoly. 
Unlike US, where cable TV network provides an alternative, 
several European countries only have DSL as the most 
common used infrastructure.85 In the absence of the LLU, an 
upgrade to NGNs will allow the incumbent telecom operator 
to reap monopoly rent. Therefore, the EU still practices LLU.  
The above mentioned path-dependence vis-à-vis LLU may 
not influence the policy choice in developing countries 
about LLU, in the absence of competition from alternative 
infrastructure such as cable.86 However, as developing 
countries are leapfrogging to wireless technology in the 
local loop, unbundling is not the right policy choice. 
Very often Ladder of Investment (LOI) is suggested as a 
technique to mitigate the negative effects of LLU. Ladder of 
investment is a technique, initially suggested by Cave87, that 
                                                          
83  Tricia Ragoobar, Jason Whalley and David Harle, „Public and 
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Policy35 (2011)827–841. 
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seeks to strike a balance between short term (service based) 
competition and long term (facility based) competition. This 
technique involves providing entrants access at a charge that 
increases over time or by withdrawing access obligation, for 
example by setting a sunset clause, thus inducing them to 
invest in their own facility. Here, different levels of access are 
provided gradually, and at each level, as the customer base of 
the entrant increases, the entrant is encouraged to invest in 
network elements.88 However, there may be difficulties for 
the regulators to see the development of facility based 
competition from service based competition. As Oldale and 
Padilla note “[R]egulators are unlikely to have the detailed 
knowledge that is required to micro-manage the investment 
ladder that could transform the service providers of today into 
the facilities-based competitors of tomorrow”.89 Vareda also 
argues that asymmetric information between the service-
based entrants and the regulator may further complicate 
implementing the LOI.90 Bourreau et al. argue that “[O]ne 
can only imagine how such informational asymmetries on the 
cost side would also complicate the implementation of the 
LOI. For example, when facing multiple potential entrants, 
potentially with different cost structures, determining the 
right sequence of rungs, as well as deciding on the time (and 
mechanism) at which to burn existing rungs would be 
extremely complicated.”91 Also, from a business perspective, 
                                                          
88  Marc Bourreau, Pınar Dogan and Matthieu Manant, „A Critical 
Review of the „„Ladder of Investment” Approach‟ [2010] 34 
Telecommunications Policy 683–696. 
89 Alison Oldale and A.J.Padilla (2004), The Pros and Cons of Antitrus
t in Deregulated Markets (Swedish Competition Authority (Ed.) 20
04) <http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/trycksaker/rapporter/pros&con
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and Policy 192–199. 
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an investor will want to charge more initially rather than 
gradually increasing the rates of each rung.92 Thus, there are 
problems with respect to the implementation of LOI, 
especially for the regulators in developing countries with 
limited resources. Bourreau et al. also note that in  a 
symmetric market, i.e., when the incumbent and the entrant 
both have to invest in new infrastructure, such as in the case 
of rolling of new fiber optic, the utility of LOI is not clear at 
present and warrants more research.93 
LLU is especially detrimental for developing countries 
where the local loop is still not totally built out.94 Kelly 
and Rossotto note that LLU has not been widely 
implemented in developing countries as the base of 
installed wireline in developing countries is lower than the 
developed countries. They also argue that since the 
regulatory resources are limited in developing countries, 
the aim of regulatory policy should be to encourage facility 
based competition rather than spending scarce resources on 
LLU, as there are very few loops to unbundle.95 
It cannot be denied that developing countries should have 
cutting edge technology in order to avoid the digital divide. 
Government spending on the development of NGNs is not a 
viable option for developing countries considering their lack of 
funds. Cave and Martin for the reasons of promoting equity, 
industrial policy requirement and economic recovery have 
argued for public investment in the NGN development.96 
However, the examples chosen by Cave and Martin ―Australia 
[with an investment A$43bn (€ 29 bn)], Singapore and New 
                                                          
92  I am thankful to Professor Pierre Larouche for this insight. 
93 Bourreau et al. (n 88). 
94  Kelly and Rossotto (n 20) 117. 
95  ibid. 
96 Martin Cave and Ian Martin, „Motives and means for public 
investment in nationwide next Generation networks‟ [2010] 34 
Telecommunications Policy, Volume 505–512; See also Tim Kelly 
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Zealand [NZ$1.5bn (€780 m)] ― are all developed countries. It 
is not viable, economically or politically, for developing 
countries to invest in the telecom sector. A weak financial 
market―post crisis―has already shaken the confidence of 
private players. Additionally, Over the Top (OTT) services are 
also eroding the profit base of telecom service providers. Faced 
with this situation, it is important to adopt such policies that may 
encourage private sector to invest in telecom sector. 
In light of the recent technological advancement in mobile 
telephony the viability of LLU is all the more questionable. 
As opposed to fixed line telephony, mobile telephony is 
characterized by full-fledged facility based competition.97 
Grajek and Roller argue that even though it is expensive to 
duplicate the copper lines in a local loop, the natural 
monopoly feature of the fixed line networks is diminishing in 
view of the rise of alternative networks such as mobile 
telecommunications.98 As has been argued in Part 1.2, 
technological advances such as introduction of 4G 
technology, especially in developing countries, have started 
providing a substitute for fixed line network (not only copper 
lines but optical fiber as well). Thus, removing bottlenecks 
through LLU in order to facilitate competition should not be 
the primary policy objective now for developing countries.  
2.2. Universal Service Obligation in developing countries 
In order to provide telecom access to rural areas, several 
countries have imposed USO. USO was traditionally 
financed through cross subsidies: low-cost and high-income 
consumers pay prices above cost to subsidize high-cost and 
low-income consumers, who pay prices below cost.99 Gasmia 
                                                          
97 Friederiszick et al. (n 62). 
98 Grajek and Roller (n 65) foot note 8.  
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et al. in their analysis find that cross-subsidies are preferable 
to explicit taxation of the urban sector for the financing of 
universal service in developing countries.100 In the EU, the 
rationale behind providing universal service is preventing 
exclusion, both geographical and social. This can very well 
be the general objective behind universal service in 
developing countries as well.  In the EU universal service 
promises, at least, access to a public telephone network at a 
fixed location, directory enquiry services and directories, free 
outgoing calls to emergency services and special and/or 
equivalent services for the disabled.101 
USO is one of the thorniest issues in telecom policy. There 
are strong arguments from both supporters and opponents. 
Let us first have a look at the arguments that oppose USO. 
Wallsten argues that cross-subsidies are not an economically 
viable mode to provide universal service.102  Competition on 
one hand may lower the cost of services; on the other, it may 
have a negative effect on the ability of the firms to cross-
subsidize services.103 It is true as competitors strike 
incumbent‟s high profit generating areas/services that 
generate funds to support cross-subsidization.104 Therefore, 
USO, especially when the market is competitive, may 
discourage investment. Ramos et al. find that USO policy 
may be counterproductive, as even though it increases 
                                                          
100 F. Gasmi, J.J. Laffont and W.W. Sharkey, „Competition, Universal 
Service and Telecommunicat-ions Policy in Developing Countries‟ 
[2000] 12 Information Economics and Policy 221–248. 
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investment in rural areas, investment in urban area 
decreases.105 USO also results in economic inefficiency.106 
In view of rapidly changing technology, the telecom sector is in 
urgent need of investment. Not only does fiber optic requires 
huge investment, but also there is a need to increase broadband 
speed. High broadband speed in turn has been found to have a 
positive impact on growth.107 Another prominent argument 
against cross-subsidies is that relatively wealthy benefit from 
them far more than the poor.108 New disruptive innovation like 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) are also threatening the 
revenue base of telecom service providers that fund new 
technology and universal service provisions.  
On the other hand there is a rich literature that supports the 
adoption of USO. The economic rationale behind USO is 
the presence of network externalities. The cost of the 
connection is borne by the rural customer, whereas the 
benefits accrue to all subscribers. Therefore, it is equitable 
to cross-subsidize the rural customers.109 If there is 
sufficient competition present in the market then the prices 
would arguably be low. Thus, there would be no need for 
USO. However, reliance on market mechanism may be 
misplaced in rural areas, since the service provider will not 
be able to recoup the investment, it would not invest.  
                                                          
105 Boris Ramos, Khalid Saeed and Oleg Pavlov, „The impact of 
Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-subsidies on 
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A strong argument that favors the adoption of IT services 
in developing countries is that IT services, by reducing 
transaction costs between economic agents influence 
globalization.110 Globalization is important for social and 
economic integration of the poor in developing countries. 
The easy flow of information facilitated by ICT fosters 
development. 111 In their recent book „Creating a Learning 
Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, 
and Social Progress‟, Stiglitz and Greenwald have very 
well captured the importance of information in ensuring 
development and societal transformation.112 It has also 
been seen that ICT helps achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals.113The Majority of the population, 
around 60 per cent, in low and middle income developing 
countries, still lives in rural areas.114 The existing evidence 
suggests that within developing countries, the benefits 
from the information technology revolution have accrued 
mainly to urban rather than rural areas.115 Thus, if only the 
rich have access to ICT it will further increase disparities. 
This makes a solid case for USO.  
                                                          
110 Jeffrey James, „Information technology, transaction costs and 
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Elgar, 2002) 11. 
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The rationale behind providing USO is not merely limited 
to alleviating poverty. ICT, including internet, is helpful in 
checking corruption.116 Marker et al. argue that, “lack of 
information, and thus lack of transparency, weaken the 
responsiveness and accountability of government 
institutions and create an environment where corruption 
can flourish.”117 Since the incidence of corruption is 
generally high in developing countries, universal access 
may ensure that development is not impeded because of 
corruption. ICT also strengthens democracy by making it 
participative as poor can also voice their aspirations, needs 
and priorities.118 In this regard the role of e-governance 
plays a crucial role.119 Thus, ICT may help developing 
countries in achieving various policy aims and alleviating 
poverty. For instance, Poverty Reduction Strategy paper 
for India identifies two challenges that can be solved by 
relying on ICT:120 
1. Making its development more inclusive, towards an 
increased social cohesion and a substantial reduction of 
poverty, in line with the MDGs. 
2. Deepening and widening structural reforms, including 
better governance and infrastructure, in order to 
                                                          
116  See Mon-Chi Lio, Meng-Chun Liu and Yi-PeyOu, „Can the internet 
reduce corruption? A cross-country study based on dynamic panel 
data models‟, [2011] 28 Government Information Quarterly 47–53. 
117  Phil Marker, Kerry McNamara, and Lindsay Wallace, „The 
Significance of Information and Communication Technologies for 
Reducing Poverty”, Final Report, November 2001, DFID 
118  ibid. 
119 Michiel Backus, „E-Governance and Developing Countries: 
Introduction and examples‟, Research Report, No.3. April (2003) 
< http://www.iicd.org/about/publications/egovernance-and-
developing-countries-introduction-and-examples> accessed 30 
December 2014. 
120 India: Country Strategy Paper, 2007- 2013 < http: 
//eeas.europa.eu/india/csp/07_13_en.pdf> accessed 28 December 
2014 
Access and Investment in the ICT Sector for Developing Countries 
 
 103 
improve the investment climate, boost productivity and 
accelerate growth. 
Stressing redistribution is important not only because 
inequality is unfair, but also because the latest economic 
research empirically shows that inequality hinders 
growth.121 This finding will have significant policy 
implications. Thus, the OECD suggests that, “tackling 
inequality through tax and transfer policies does not harm 
growth, provided these policies are well designed and 
implemented.”122 Therefore, policies such as universal 
service have more to them than merely a moral argument.  
Above all, it is a basic right to stay connected to fellow 
beings. Perhaps for this reason PekkaTarjanne, then Secretary 
General of the ITU, argued way back in 1998 that 
communication is a basic human right.123 A United Nations 
report also recognizes the importance of internet to exercise 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, as guaranteed by 
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.124 
Calvo has, thus, rightly summed up that universal service 
leads to positive social externalities, network effects, boost 
in productivity, supports economic growth, reduces energy 
consumption and increases quality of life.125 
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In order to make sure that the poor in developing countries 
can avail themselves the benefits of ICT through universal 
service, and also to make sure that cross-subsidies do not 
distort efficiency, alternative means of providing universal 
service may be adopted by developing countries. For 
example, an increasing number of countries are shifting to 
Universal Service Fund (USF) ―a fund generated by 
taxing existing telecom services― to ensure universal 
service.126  Auctioning USF may determine which firms 
will take USO and the compensation that they will get. 
Telecom service providers bid for the subsidies out of the 
USF. The company that bids for the lowest subsidy wins 
the bid. Experience has shown that, over time, countries 
improved the bidding structures. In certain cases, 
companies even made zero or negative bids, i.e., rather 
than seeking subsidies, they sought to pay the government 
in order to provide services.127 This is also called reverse 
auction which is, basically, competition for subsidies. 
Auctions have reduced USO subsidy substantially.128 
Allman et al. suggest that competitive bidding is the best 
way to ensure universal service as it does not distort the 
market, mimics the market outcome at the least cost and 
thus provides sufficient incentives for efficient entry and 
investment.129 In addition, USF is more transparent, and 
competitively and technologically neutral.130 Following 
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Chile‟s successes in implementing minimum subsidy 
auctions starting in 1995, several developing countries 
such as Peru, Colombia, Kenya, Uganda, and India have 
implemented reverse auction system to provide universal 
service.131 Some countries also use the USF to supplement 
private investment in new networks.132 India is one such 
country that uses USF to fund the roll out of fiber optic. 
The other question that may perplex developing countries 
is what services need to be provided through universal 
service. In both the US133 and the EU134, one of the criteria 
to provide universal service is that a particular service is 
used by the majority of the population. Oestmann and 
Dymond suggest that no assistance should be provided for 
particular people until a service has achieved a reasonable 
take up, for example over 75 per cent of the larger 
population.135 So far as internet connectivity through 
universal service is concerned, in the EU the current 
universal service requires only functional access to the 
internet.136 With respect to broadband, it can be said that 
the majority of the population in developing countries does 
not have access to broadband; thus, at least for now, 
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broadband should not be included as part of universal 
service.  
In the EU, mobile telephony falls outside the mandate of 
USO. Since wireless is the primary mode of telephony in 
developing countries, it makes sense to bring it under the 
scope of universal service in developing countries. Calvo 
also argues that, in general, “mobile connectivity is 
eroding the justification for fixed-line subsidization 
through universal service obligations.”137 Since Internet is 
still expensive developing countries may adopt Universal 
Access ― which refers to a publicly shared level of 
service, which is generally through public payphones or 
Internet telecentres ― for the Internet.138 In the case of 
mobile, only when there is an efficient market gap, a 
regulatory intervention is justified. This was one of the 
reasons for not including mobile telephony in universal 
services in 2006 in Europe.139 
With respect to providing universal service, there is one 
reminder for competition agencies of developing 
countries― by providing universal service a particular 
carrier may gain some benefits as other carriers may 
indirectly and artificially strengthen its network. This was 
the contention of Orange against Telefónica that industry 
contributed universal funds, where frequencies were 
distributed unevenly, would be contributing to finance the 
expansion of the incumbent Telefónica.140 Such issues can 
be solved by adjusting the contribution system, for 
example by taking into account the benefits a provider 
receives by providing universal service and balancing it 
against the cost incurred in providing universal service.141 
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The discussion above, therefore, supports the inclusion of 
USO as it significantly contributes to social welfare and 
the economic development of the poor in developing 
countries. It also suggests relying on USF in order to 
ensure redistribution without jeopardizing efficiency. 
3. Conclusion 
There is an inherent dilemma between providing cheap 
access to ICT and ensuring investment in new technology. 
Investment is not only important for adoption of the latest 
technology, but is also required for innovation. The 
dilemma between access and investment is all the more 
prominent in the context of developing countries, where a 
large part of the population is not in the position to pay 
high prices that incentivize the private players. This paper 
has analyzed two seemingly conflicting policy choices– 
access on one hand and investment on the other in the ICT 
sector. 
Investment in the ICT sector was found imperative for the 
following reasons. 
1. In light of the technological development in the ICT 
sector, new form of regulation is required that 
facilitates investment and innovation in this sector as 
the old technology and policies are no longer viable. 
2. Investment in the ICT sector is directly related to 
growth. Not only does penetration of the new ICT 
services lead to development, but it also helps achieve 
several social welfare objectives such as poverty 
alleviation, improvement in health care and growth in 
education, corruption reduction etc. 
3. ICT provides a platform for innovation in other sectors 
as well. Thus, faster and more efficient ICT services 
have the potential to create more innovation. Therefore, 
investment in the ICT is pertinent for overall growth. 
On the other hand ensuring access to the ICT is crucial for 
overall inclusion and development. Above all, it is a matter 
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of human rights to ensure access to all the citizens. The 
paper looked at two specific policies, LLU and USO, 
which have significant effect on investment in the ICT 
sector. With respect to LLU, the paper has argued that in 
light of the adverse effects of LLU on investment, the need 
to upgrade to NGNs because of the advent of new 
technology, the failure of ladder of investment technique, it 
is important that developing countries jettison LLU. 
Especially, as mobile telephony has already started 
substituting fixed telephony in the local loop, LLU should 
no longer be a policy choice for developing countries. The 
traditional model of USO which relies upon cross-
subsidization is no longer viable in view of a competitive 
telecom market. Thus, USO may be detrimental for 
investment and innovation. However, being mindful of the 
urban-rural divide and positive effects of ICT in poverty 
alleviation and quality of life, it is argued that market 
based solution to provide universal services such as 
Universal Services Fund should be preferred. Further, in 
light of the shift from wireline to wireless in developing 
countries, universal services should be provided for 
wireless in developing countries. However, regulatory 
intervention should come only when the market cannot 
provide access efficiently. Therefore, there are regulatory 
choices available that ensure proper incentives for the 
innovation and adoption of latest ICT, which at the same 
time ensure easy access to the poor. Before any policy 
recommendation could be made, it was important to see if 
wireless and wireline are substitutes in the local loop in 
developing countries. Even though there are qualitative 
limitations of mobile telephony, increasing numbers of 
developing countries have started substituting wireline 
with wireless technology, as it is significantly cheaper than 
rolling out new fiber. A disruptive innovation analysis also 
suggests that wireless in the local loop is replacing fixed 
telephony. 
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The policy prescriptions of this paper, however, must be 
seen with one caveat ―the analysis presented in this paper 
is specific to the ICT sector. Thus, it takes into account the 
different dynamics and peculiar characteristics of this 
sector. Additionally, each developing country is different, 






Pharmaceutical Mergers and Their Effect on Access and 
Efficiency: A Case of Emerging Markets 
(2016) 39(3) World Competition 465-92 
Pharmaceutical M&As in emerging markets may jeopardize 
cheap access to generics. This may be a motivation for policy 
makers to use competition law as a tool to deter cross-border 
M&As. Additionally, while M&As in the pharmaceutical 
sector may give rise to certain efficiencies, it is not clear how 
efficiencies will be treated in the peculiar socio-economic 
context of emerging markets. This article develops a 
theoretical framework that argues that the application of 
competition law is guided by sector-specific socio-economic 
realities and institutional realities of the jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, it employs this framework to analyze the issues of 
access to generics and efficiencies of production. 
Introduction 
The pharmaceutical sector witnessed a spate of Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A) activity in the recent past. This trend 
extends to emerging markets, in which the M&A wave 
included branded companies acquiring generic firms.1 In 
                                                          
1  For an account of cross-border acquisitions in the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector, see Centre for Trade and Development (Centad), 
Competition Law and Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, New Delhi, 
2010, pp. 47 et seq, http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/ 
PharmInd230611_0.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). Emerging market 
firms also acquired foreign firms. Based on a survey of existing 
Pharmaceutical Mergers...A Case of Emerging Markets 
 
 111 
general, M&A may be triggered by various motivations.2 
Danzona et al. observe that pharmaceutical ―mergers are 
frequently the response to expected excess capacity that is 
triggered by patent expirations and gaps in the product 
pipeline which render marketing resources unproductive.‖3 
Chataway et al. also note that contemporary R&D-based 
multinational firms are changing their corporate and 
organizational system as a result of increasing sectoral 
maturity, and that these changes have led to M&As and 
creating links with Indian firms.4 So far as the desire to 
achieve efficiencies is concerned, Ravenscraft and Long in 
their research find that pharmaceutical mergers lead to 
                                                                                                                         
literature, Duppati and Rao note that emerging market firms participate 
in cross-border acquisitions for two important reasons: resource 
advantage (e.g., financial, technological, managerial and ownership) 
and fast entry into global market (e.g., geographical diversification and 
international competitive share). Geeta Rani Duppati & Narendar V. 
Rao, Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions: Mature Markets vs. 
Emerging Markets—With special reference to the USA and India, 2 
Cogent Business & Management 1 (2015). 
2  For an account of different efficiencies and anticompetitive effects that 
can result from mergers, see Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan Stennek & 
Frank Verboven, Efficiency Gains from Mergers, No 543, Working 
Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics (2000). 
3  Patricia M. Danzona, Andrew Epstein & Sean Nicholson, Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries, 28, Manage. 
Decis. Econ. 325, 307–328 (2007). 
4  Joanna Chataway, Joyce Tait & David Wield, Frameworks for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation in Developing Countries—The Case of 
Indian Pharma, 19(5) Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 697–708 (2007); See also, Samira Guennif & Shyama V. 
Ramani, Explaining Divergence in Catching-up in Pharma between 
India and Brazil using the NSI Framework, 41 Research Policy 430–
441 (2012). The authors note ―Indian firms have such high production 
capabilities and can manufacture generics at such low prices that they 
are becoming attractive to global players.‖ 
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economies of scale and scope. However, their main finding is 
that pharmaceutical mergers are entered into with the 
objective to eliminate excess capacity and inefficiencies 
induced by the changing industry structure and firm product 
portfolios.5 
The relationship between pharmaceutical mergers and R&D 
has not found much attention in the empirical economics.6 
Ornaghi in his analysis, conducted using pharmaceutical 
industry data for the period 1988–2004, found that mergers 
adversely affect R&D in the pharmaceutical sector.7 
Ravenscraft and Long agree that R&D expenditures are cut 
post-merger in the pharmaceutical industry. They explain that, 
these ―Cutbacks are a result of changing pharmaceutical 
economics making marginal internal projects less attractive 
and some external alliance projects more promising.‖8 The 
effect of reduced R&D expenditures on innovation is unclear, 
however.9 There are contrary claims too that acknowledge the 
positive effects of mergers on R&D. Cassiman et al show that, 
in general, M&A between partners with ex-ante complementary 
technologies result in more active post-merger R&D 
                                                          
5  David J. Ravenscraft& William F. Long, Paths to Creating Value in 
Pharmaceutical Mergers, in Mergers and Productivity, from National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 287–326 (2000). 
6  For a review of the studies on the effect of M&A on R&D, see Elena Cefis, 
Mark Grondsma, Anna Sabidussi & Hans Schenk, The Role of Innovation 
in Merger Policy: Europe's Efficiency Defence versus America's 
Innovation Markets Approach, 7(21) Discussion Paper Series/Tjalling C. 
Koopmans Research Institute (Discussion paper) (2007). 
7  Carmine Ornaghi, Mergers and Innovation in Big Pharma, 27 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 70–79 (2009). 
8 Ravenscraft& Long, supra n. 5, p. 322. 
9 Eleanor J. Morgan, Innovation and Merger Decisions in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 19(2) Review of Industrial Organization 181–
197(2001). 
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performance.10 Consequently, to the extent pharmaceutical 
mergers are motivated by the desire to achieve efficiency and 
innovation, the role of law should be to foster such activity. 
There may be other reasons too for multinational firms to 
acquire local pharmaceutical companies in emerging 
markets. The acquisition of generics by branded firms could 
be the result of a strategy to stop the generics from competing 
with the branded medicines. Such fear has been expressed in a 
report of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee.11 The 
report expresses its fear over the acquisition of the local 
generics firms by observing: ―[w]hen the Government would 
consider imposing compulsory license, there are likely to be 
no takers, because there will be only a few or no Indian 
generic companies left.‖12 The report goes on to note that such 
concentration will lead to an oligopolistic market, where it 
will be easier to increase the prices.13Concerns have also been 
raised about the changing post-acquisition business strategy of 
the generics firms. For instance, in India, Daiichi-Sankyo 
(acquirer) immediately after acquisition of Ranbaxy, withdrew 
all its patent challenges on Pfizer‘s blockbuster medicine 
Lipitor, filed in more than eight countries.14 These concerns 
may lead emerging markets to use competition law as a tool to 
block the acquisition of their generic firms.  
                                                          
10 Bruno Cassiman, Massimo G. Colombo, Paola Garrone & Reinhilde 
Veugelers, The Impact of M&A on the R&D Process An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Technological- and Market-Relatedness, 34 
Research Policy 195–220 (2005). 
11  One hundred and tenth report on FDI in pharmaceutical sector, Rajya 
Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi August, 2013, p. 9, http://164.100.47. 
5/newcommittee/reports/English Committees/Committee%20on%20 
Commerce/110.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
12 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 
13 Ibid., p. 11. 
14 Ibid., p. 19. 
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The article enquires into the abovementioned two issues, 
brought to the fore as a result of pharmaceutical mergers in 
emerging markets. The first issue is regarding the acquisition 
of local generics by branded Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), and the resulting fear of unavailability of generic 
medicines. This issue is addressed in Part B. This part argues 
against using competition law as an industrial policy tool, and 
employs established competition law tools in order to ensure 
access to generics. Part C of the article addresses the treatment 
of efficiency claims in pharmaceutical mergers in emerging 
markets. First, however, it is important to develop a theoretical 
framework to understand the nature of competition law in 
emerging markets and guide the analysis of both the issues. 
This framework is developed in Part A. 
The article, therefore, makes a twofold contribution. First, it 
argues against employing competition law as an industrial policy 
tool; instead, it suggests ways to rely upon mainstream 
competition law tools to address consumer harm. Second, by 
developing a theoretical framework for appreciating efficiencies 
resulting from mergers in emerging markets, the article 
advocates a more positive recognition of efficiency claims in 
emerging markets. This article does not look into the viability of 
cross-border pharmaceutical M&As by MNCs in developing 
countries.15 Whether to allow foreign direct investment through 
M&As is an issue for sector-specific policy.  
The term ―emerging markets‖ is hugely debated. Different 
institutions have different criteria to classify a country as an 
                                                          
15  For a background on this issue, see SanjayaLall, Implications of Cross-
Border Mergers and Acquisitions by TNCs in Developing Countries: A 
Beginner’s Guide, QEH Working Papers, 88, http://www3.qeh.ox.ac. 
uk / RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps88.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
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emerging market.16 This article, at the cost of generalization, 
uses the terms ―emerging markets,‖ ―developing countries‖ 
and ―transition economies‖ interchangeably, partly for the 
reason that the existing antitrust literature has not made any 
such differentiation. Some of the common characteristics of 
emerging markets are lack of competition culture; 
concentration of economic and political power, which 
facilitates the capture of public entities; scarcity of financial 
and human resources; abundance of small and medium-sized 
firms; and lack of capacity in the judicial system.17 
1. Theoretical framework 
Is there a need for a different kind of competition law, 
including enforcement priorities for emerging markets? 
Various scholars have answered this question in the 
affirmative.18 Pérez Motta identifies two characteristics of 
                                                          
16  See, Peter Marber, Redefining EM: Country Clusters offer New Matrix, 
Financial Times (5 Aug. 2015); see also Robert E. Hoskisson, Lorraine 
Eden, Chung Ming Lau & Mike Wright, Strategy in Emerging 
Economies, 43(3) The Academy of Management Journal, 249–267(June 
2000). 
17  See, Eugenio Rivera and Claudia Schatan, Markets in Central America 
and Mexico: What Is Happening with Competition?, Claudia Schatan& 
Eugenio Rivera (eds.), Competition Policies in Emerging Economies: 
Lessons and Challenges from Central America and Mexico, 16, 7–47 
(Springer 2008). 
18  See among others, Josef Drexl, Consumer Welfare and Consumer 
Harm: Adjusting Competition Law and Policies to the Needs of 
Developing Jurisdictions, Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.) The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 
Competition Law, 293, 265–295 (Edward Elgar 2015), ―Drexl 
advocates changes in ‗consumer welfare test‘ to accommodate socio-
political, economic and cultural differences in developing countries. He 
argues that in certain cases ‗protecting the competitive process without 
the need to show that the relevant practices also produce harm to 
consumers would enhance the effectiveness of competition law in the 
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emerging markets. First, small market size (as the number of 
players, regardless of the population, who can participate in 
the market is small) resulting in only a few firms that could 
achieve Minimum Efficient Scale (MES). Second, scarcity of 
capital (as capital markets do not function in a competitive 
way) resulting in high cost of capital and thus only a few 
companies in the marketplace.19 Gal also gives a very general 
understanding of small economies. She states, a ―[s]mall 
economy is an independent sovereign economy that can 
support only a small number of competitors in most of its 
industries.‖20 
There are at least two reasons for which one can disagree with 
these assertions, however. First, developing countries are very 
different from each other. Second, all the sectors of the 
economy may differ from each other.21 For example, the 
pharmaceutical industry in India is quite robust and, according 
to a few scholars, is already showing the signs of progressing 
                                                                                                                         
economic interest of the individual developing country.‖ ; Eleanor Fox, 
Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a 
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries,inCompetition Policy 
and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 273–290 (Josef 
Drexl et al (eds.), Edward Elgar 2012); William E. Kovacic, 
Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform Transition 
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 
77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 265 (2001). 
19  Pérez Motta, Competition Policy, Abuse of Dominance and Economic 
Development in Developing Countries, Barry E. Hawk (ed.), Chapter 
16, International Antitrust Law & Policy (Fordham Comp. L. Inst., 
2010), p. 360. 
20 Michal S. Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, 1 
(Harvard University Press 2003). 
21  Some critiques believe that Gal‘s conception of small economies is too 
skewed and does not represent the correct picture. See, Rivera & 
Schatan, supra n. 17, p. 12. 
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―from imitation to innovation.‖22 The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) argues that 
in very large countries such as China or India, certain areas of 
the economy can be very advanced despite the average 
backwardness of the economy.23 The Global Innovation Index 
(2014) report notes that ―[m]ost of the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa] economies are also showing 
other signs of progress. All of them, with the exception of 
South Africa, qualify as ‗efficient innovators‘ this year 
[2014].‖24 The management literature has studied a different 
kind of phenomenon known as reverse innovation, where 
innovations take place in emerging markets and then ―trickle 
up‖ to developed countries.25 Furthermore, consumers in 
                                                          
22  Joanna Chataway et al., supra n. 4, p. 698, The authors argue ―The 
imitation approaches of Indian pharmaceutical firms are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated—not just focused on production cost 
strategies, but also on sophisticated incremental process and product 
innovation.‖ 
23 ©OECD, Innovation for Development (2012), http:// www. oecd. org / 
innovation/inno/50586251.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
24  Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO, The Global Innovation Index 
2014: The Human Factor In innovation, second printing, Fontainebleau, 
Ithaca, and Geneva, p. 12, (2014) < http: // www. wipo. int/edocs/ 
pubdocs/en/economics/gii/gii_2014.pdf>  (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
25  See, Vijay Govindarajan& Ravi Ramamurti, Reverse Innovation, 
Emerging Markets, and Global Strategy, 1 Global Strat. J.,191–205 
(2011); See also, Marco Zeschky, Bastian Widenmayer& Oliver 
Gassmann, Frugal Innovation in Emerging Markets, 54(4) Research-
Technology Management, 38–45 (July–August 2011). Zeschky et al., 
use the term ―frugal innovation‖ for the low-cost innovation that 
originates in developing countries and finds its way to the developed 
countries; For an account of different forms of innovation arising in 
developing countries and how they are different from ―reverse 
innovation,‖ see Max von Zedtwitz, Simone Corsi, PederVengSøberg& 
Romeo Frega, A Typology of Reverse Innovation, 32(1) Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 12–28(January 2015). 
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different sectors are very distinct from each other. For 
instance, a pharmaceutical merger may have wider 
implications across the diverse group of consumers in 
emerging markets, as compared to a merger between makers 
of luxury watches which only a few can afford. Therefore, the 
general characteristics of a jurisdiction do not make a case for 
separate substantive standards in competition law.  
In the case of specific sectors as well, the fundamental tools of 
competition law, such as relevant market, market power, 
theories of harm, etc. are inherently capable of identifying 
consumer harm in varied economic settings, regardless of the 
jurisdiction.  Theories of consumer harm take into account 
sector-specific economic realities (such as size and number of 
competitors, entry barriers, whether the competition is 
Bertrand or Cournot, whether the products are differentiated or 
homogenous, and diversion ratios) in any particular 
jurisdiction. For instance, as a few scholars have argued, 
emerging markets have high concentration and huge entry 
barriers.26 The following illustration shows how competition 
law is capable of taking into account such market 
characteristic while assessing consumer harm. 
Ruritania is an emerging market with high concentration and 
huge entry barriers. There are three market players A, B and C 
with market shares 30, 30 and 40 respectively in a particular 
industry. The products offered are homogenous in nature. 
Further, the entry barriers in this sector are high, owing to 
huge sunk costs and difficulties in raising capital. The 
                                                          
26  See M.S. Gal & E.M. Fox, Drafting Competition Law for Developing 
Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience, in The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 
Competition Law, 296–356 (Michal S. Gal et al (eds.), Edward Elgar 
2015). 
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competition agency is to assess a merger between A and C. 
These specific features of Ruritanian market will factor into 
defining market power, concentration and theories of harm. 
The assessment would be the same regardless of the 
jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that while the nature of entry 
barriers may be different in emerging markets, this will have 
no bearing on substantive analysis. Also, merger scrutiny 
triggers such as ―safe harbor‖ thresholds and HHI indices are 
jurisdiction-specific and are based on economic realities. 
Interestingly, the choice of economic model to test the theories of 
harm may depend upon a particular jurisdiction. The ICN observes: 
―[t]he type and sophistication of analysis that can be performed 
depends on the data available, the features of the market, the 
economic issues under consideration, and any timing and/or 
resource constraints that the agency might be under.‖27 Arguably, 
in emerging markets, relevant data may not be readily available and 
the competition authorities tend to suffer from resource constraints. 
This means the competition authorities in emerging markets should 
prefer those economic methodologies that do not rely heavily on 
data. Thus, the application of competition law is largely sector-
specific, although there are certain issues that are indeed 
jurisdiction specific, for example enforcement priorities.28 
                                                          
27  ICN, The Role of Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger 
Analysis, prepared by The Merger Working Group Presented at the 12th 
Annual Conference of the ICN Warsaw, Poland, p. 3 (2013). 
28  Maher Dabbah argues that action against abuse of dominance should be 
a priority in developing countries. See, Maher Dabbah, Competition 
Policy, Abuse of Dominance and Economic Development in Developing 
Countries, Barry E. Hawk (ed.), Ch. 16, International Antitrust Law & 
Policy (Fordham Comp. L. Inst., 2010), p. 365; see also Simon J. 
Evenett, Competition Law and the Economic Characteristics of 
Developing Countries, Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.) The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 
Competition Law, 24, 15–30 (Edward Elgar 2015). 
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So far as the competition assessment of mergers is concerned, 
there are several issues that are independent of jurisdiction. 
Both developed and developing countries have to deal with 
these issues in the same fashion. These issues include market 
definition, entry barriers, theories of harm, countervailing 
buyer power and the failing firm defense. With regard to 
efficiencies, common issues are the verifiability requirement, 
the acceptability of fixed cost savings, merger specificity and 
the pass-on requirement. Regardless of the jurisdiction, the 
existing framework within which the efficiencies are taken 
into account is already very skeptical of efficiency claims. For 
these reasons, there is no need to change the substantive 
competition law tools. However, that does not imply that 
emerging markets should have exactly the same kind of 
competition law framework as developed countries. The 
following text looks at the social and institutional realities in 
emerging markets, and argues for customizing the 
enforcement accordingly. 
Gifford and Kudrle note that ―[m]erger policy may rest on 
both sociopolitical and economic grounds, and some important 
decisions on both sides of Atlantic have stemmed from 
each.‖29 In the accompanying footnote to this assertion, the 
authors mention some mergers on both sides where industrial 
policy played a definitive role. In the context of emerging 
markets, however, economic factors are not independent of 
social factors. Rather, the latter at times, influence the choice 
of the former in competition assessment, even if they are not 
triggered by industrial policy concerns. For example, the 
choice of the consumer welfare standard over a total welfare 
                                                          
29  Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Atlantic Divide in the 
Antitrust: The Examination of US and EU Competition Policy, 40 (The 
University of Chicago Press 2015). 
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standard in emerging markets is guided by jurisdiction-
specific socio-economic realities, as the majority of population 
is less well off.30 However, not all social realities can be 
addressed within the framework of competition law. For 
example, historically disadvantaged sections of the population 
do require affirmative actions, but such actions are best served 
through other tools such as reservations and subsidies.31 Only 
those social realities that have bearing on consumer welfare 
and efficiency should be accounted for under competition law.  
In a 1997 article, Kovacic set out the distinctive traits of 
emerging markets (Kovacic uses the term ―transition 
environment‖) that have bearing on the enforcement of 
competition law in general and merger enforcement in 
particular.32 Some of the distinctive traits are fragile political 
foundations for competition law, weak indigenous competition 
policy expertise, dysfunctional courts, frail transparency 
safeguards, resource shortages and data shortcomings. In view 
of the duration of time that has lapsed since this observation 
was made and the rising significance of competition law, it is 
not appropriate now to make such general observations. 
However, one claim holds good:  Antitrust institutions are at 
                                                          
30  See the text accompanying footnotes 93–103. 
31  Example of historically disadvantaged sections could be backward 
classes in India and non-whites in South Africa. South African 
competition law has special provisions for non-whites. There are 
several countries that have special provisions for public interest cases, 
for instance South Africa (s. 16 of the Competition Act, 1998) 
Zimbabwe [Section 32 of Competition Act (Chapter 14:28)], Namibia 
(s. 47 of the Competition Act, 2003). However, such non-efficiency 
objectives are best served through other legislations. 
32  William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust 
Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1075, 1090 (1997–98). 
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the core of successful enforcement of competition law.33 The 
importance of antitrust institutions is reflected in this 
statement that Kovacic and Eversley made in a later article:  
The design of a jurisdiction’s administrative infrastructure 
can have a decisive influence on the type and quality of policy 
outcomes that a competition system achieves. Both older and 
newer competition systems have come to realize that a body of 
competition laws is only as good as the institutions entrusted 
with their implementation.34 
Studies highlight the basic characteristics of an effective 
competition agency, such as autonomy from the executive 
branch of government, stable funding, competition specialist 
commissioners, and objective processes for choosing and 
removing commissioners.35 Therefore, so far as the 
enforcement of competition law in emerging markets is 
concerned, it is appropriate to analyze the institutions and 
make suitable changes, rather than to tweak the substantive 
law.36 The focus of enquiry, thus, should shift from 
substantive law to institutions in emerging markets.  
The framework developed here argues against tweaking the 
substantive competition law in the context of emerging 
markets and reducing it to an industrial policy tool. The 
                                                          
33  For the importance of institutions in furthering policy and growth, see 
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990); see also, D. Daniel 
Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 1055 (2009–2010). 
34  W.E. Kovacic& D. Eversley, An Assessment of Institutional Machinery: 
Methods Used in Competition Agencies and What Worked for Them, 1 
(International Competition Network 2007). 
35  See Rivera & Schatan, supra n. 17, p. 28. 
36  For the institutional characteristics of emerging markets and their 
possible implication for enforcement, see Gal & Fox (n 26). 
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objectives of industrial policy and competition law may often 
be in conflict with each other. However, subjugating 
competition principles in order to achieve industrial policy 
objectives is not the optimal solution, as there exist other 
policy tools to achieve the same objectives with minimum 
distortions in the market.37 The framework here argues that 
application of competition law is sector-specific, and the 
inherent tools of competition law are flexible enough to be 
mindful of socio-economic realities of a particular sector in 
emerging markets. Relying on the underlying economic and 
technological realities of a sector in competition assessment is 
more scientific and less controversial. Additionally, the 
application of competition law is guided by the institutional 
realities of a jurisdiction. The article therefore argues for 
contextualizing competition law based upon the socio-
economic characteristics of a sector and the institutional 
realities of a specific jurisdiction. The sector of enquiry 
chosen in this article is pharmaceuticals market in emerging 
markets. A general caveat applies—these prescriptions merely 
serve as a starting point.  
2.  Issue of access 
The acquisition of generic pharmaceutical firms in emerging 
markets presents several challenges. With respect to the 
acquisition of a generic by a branded firm, there may arise two 
issues that have bearing on welfare. First, there will be a loss 
of competition if a branded originator acquires an important or 
sole manufacturer of its generic equivalent. Second, as has 
been alleged in India, there may be a case that after the 
                                                          
37   See, Simon J. Evenett, The Return of Industrial Policy: A Threat to 
Competition Law?, Vinod Dhall (ed), Competition Law Today: 
Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice, 452–478 (Oxford University 
Press 2007). 
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acquisition, the acquired entity stops manufacturing generics. 
In addition, some governments might desire to protect their 
national champion from being acquired. What possible 
remedies do developing countries have?  
One way to deal with such M&As could be to use competition 
law as a tool to protect ―national champions‖ in the 
pharmaceutical sector. This industrial policy desire may have 
implications for competition law in two ways. First, 
competition law may be used to prohibit acquisition of a local 
firm by an international firm.38 Second, an otherwise 
anticompetitive merger may be cleared by a competition 
agency in order to create a national champion.39 In China, the 
                                                          
38  A reverse phenomenon can be seen in 2006 E.ON/Endesa case in the 
EU, where the European Commission approved the acquisition of 
Spanish electricity provider by a German energy group, Commission 
decision of 25 Apr. 2006, Case COMP/M.4110 – E.ON / ENDESA. 
However, the Spanish energy regulator tried to impede the acquisition. 
See, Damien Geradin&IanisGirgenson, Industrial Policy and European 
Merger Control– A Reassessment, Barry E. Hawk (ed.) International 
Antitrust & Policy (Fordham Comp. L. Inst., 2011), p. 364. 
39  Resisting pressure from several Member States, the European 
Commission blocked the acquisition of de Havilland by Aerospatiale 
and Alenia purely on competition grounds. If permitted, this acquisition 
would have created a national champion in the global market for 
regional turboprop aircraft. See, Geradin&Girgenson, supra n. 38, p. 
365. Geradin and Girgenson have very well captured the conflict of 
industrial policy concerns and EU merger control system. However, in 
none of the case discussed by the authors, competition analysis was 
tweaked in order to accommodate industrial policy objectives. The 
authors, however, discuss a possibility of furthering industrial policy 
through competition law. They argue that the Commission in the 
Volvo/Scania merger case could have taken the European market as the 
relevant market instead of holding that national markets were national 
in scope, thus parties would have held dominant position after the 
merger (p. 375). 
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competition law has often been used to further industrial 
policy goals including protecting and promoting national 
champions.40 The European Commission takes a very 
interesting position on forming a national champion. The 
European Commission is not against national champions per 
se, as long as their status is achieved in accordance with EC 
law on competition, mergers and State aid.41 
The OECD argues that relying upon industrial policy to protect a 
national champion may be counterproductive.42 This article 
agrees that governments should not compromise competition 
rules in merger assessment to create or protect a national 
champion. There are other policy tools to ensure that foreign 
firms do not acquire local ones—for example, sector-specific 
                                                          
40 Glencore/Xstrata (MOFCOM required Glencore to divest the Las 
Bambas mine in Peru, in order to extend the scope of a Chinese 
company in Latin America), Marubeni/Gavilon (the parties were 
required to keep their soybean exporting and selling operations 
completely separate in order to promote state-owned commodities 
company), Coca-Cola/Huiyan (the acquisition was blocked, apparently 
to maintain Chinese ownership of a famous brand), see the report of US 
Chamber of Commerce, ―Competing Interests in China‘s Competition 
Law Enforcement: China‘s Ant-Monopoly Law Application and the 
Role of Industrial Policy.‖ See MOFCOM, Notice 22/2009 of 
MOFCOM on Coca-Cola Company Merger with Huiyuan Juice Group 
Ltd. (2009). For the official Chinese text, see http://fldj.mofcom. 
gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html (accessed 7 Mar. 
2016). 
41  See, Contribution by the European Commission, © OECD, 
Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National Champions, DAF / 
COMP/GF (2009) 9. 
42 © OECD, Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National 
Champions, DAF / COMP /GF(2009), 9. 
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regulation.43 However, such policy tools have to be applied 
within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. 
2.1. Potential competition in mergers and access to generics 
This part of the article draws from the theoretical framework 
developed in Part A, and argues against tweaking competition 
law provisions to promote industrial policy goals. Where an 
originator acquires a generic that is active in the same market, 
it can lead to loss in actual competition. A new/innovative 
drug passes through various stages before it is marketed.44 A 
huge investment is required in order to come up with a new 
drug. As opposed to an originator drug, a generic drug—which 
is the therapeutic equivalent of a branded drug—does not have 
to invest the same amount and is chemically identical to the 
branded drug. Generics typically are around 20%–50% 
cheaper than their branded counterparts.45 
Acquisition of a generic company by a branded firm can be 
dealt with relying on the theories of harm in case of horizontal 
mergers, as both branded and corresponding generic are in the 
same relevant market. Thus, the acquisition of the generic may 
remove an important competitive constraint leading to 
consumer harm.46 There may be cases when the acquired 
                                                          
43 Footnote100, Geradin and Girgenson, supra n. 38. The authors give 
example of a couple of cases where, Member States employed sector 
regulations to prohibit the acquisition. 
44  For an account of various clinical and regulatory stages involved, see 
The FDA‘s Drug Review Process, Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and 
Effective, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm14
3534.htm, (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
45 Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3. AstraZeneca. 
46  See Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 24. 
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generic firm is not currently competing with the branded but 
has substitutable generic drug in its pipeline. Relying upon the 
concept of potential competition, the discussion here shows 
that for emerging markets it is possible to address welfare loss 
arising because of acquisition of generic drugs that are in 
pipeline by foreign originator firm. 
The Court of First Instance (now the General Court) in the 
European Night Services held that: 
It must also be stressed that the examination of conditions of 
competition is based not only on existing competition between 
undertakings already present on the relevant market but also 
on potential competition, in order to ascertain whether, in the 
light of the structure of the market and the economic and legal 
context within which it functions, there are real concrete 
possibilities for the undertakings concerned to compete among 
themselves or for a new competitor to penetrate the relevant 
market and compete with the undertakings already 
established.47 
Thus, potential competition is crucial to protect consumer 
welfare. This concept is of significant relevance in the 
pharmaceutical market sector. In the Sanofi-Aventis/Zentiva48 
case, the European Commission applied this concept 
successfully. Sanofi-Aventis was primarily an innovator firm, 
whereas Zentiva N.V. was active in the development, 
manufacturing and marketing of branded generic 
pharmaceutical products. The Commission investigated the 
effect of Zentiva‘s acquisition on the products in which 
Sanofi-Aventis had an important position in an originator 
                                                          
47  Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European 
Night Services v. Commission, ECR II-3141 (1998), para. 137. 
48  Case No. COMP/M.5253 – SANOFI-AVENTIS / ZENTIVA. 
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molecule, and Zentiva had an existing generic equivalent of 
another molecule with the same therapeutic indications, or a 
generic equivalent of the original molecule of Sanofi-Aventis 
in its pipeline.49 Thus, the Commission had to analyze future 
competition harm in this case.50 The Commission also 
considered whether the change of control over Zentiva would 
lead to less generic competition in the future, both for 
molecules whose patents were held by Sanofi-Aventis itself, 
and for originator molecules marketed by other 
pharmaceutical companies, i.e., generic competition in 
general.51 
There was also a possibility that the acquirer (Sanofi-Aventis) 
would use the target (Zentiva) to introduce its own generic 
version of the molecule (authorized generic). With respect to 
the last concern (authorized generic), the European 
Commission was of the view that the impugned strategy was 
not merger-specific, and also that it would be a successful 
strategy only if the regulation provided an incentive for the 
first generic entrant.52 If there are several generic 
manufacturers present in the market, then such a strategy by 
the acquirer is less likely to affect the consumer welfare. So 
far as the products where Zentiva already had a generic 
version of the Sanofi-Aventis drug in its pipeline, and the fear 
was that the acquirer would either cancel or launch them as an 
authorized generic, the European Commission allayed such 
fears as there were large numbers of alternative well-
established competitors planning to launch the same 
                                                          
49  The innovator drug and its generic copies are based on the same active 
compound. 
50 SANOFI-AVENTIS / ZENTIVA, supra n. 48, para. 194. 
51 Ibid.,para. 195. 
52 Ibid.,para. 507. 
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molecule.53 The European Commission‘s market investigation 
and econometric analysis also demonstrated that Zentiva did 
not exercise a unique competitive constraint on Sanofi-
Aventis. Thus, it is a matter of enquiry to assess the strength 
of competition in each relevant market. If there are serious 
concerns over increased market power, remedies such as 
divestiture may be adopted. Therefore, relying on the concept 
of potential competition, competition agencies in developing 
countries can ensure that the acquisition of a generics firm 
does not lead to consumer harm arising from a reduction in 
competition.  
The Hoechst/Marion Merrell Dow54 merger and the 
Baxter/Wayeth Corporation 55 acquisition in the US also 
witnessed the application of potential competition theory. In 
the former case, Hoechst was required to divest one of the two 
drugs in each market. In the latter, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) charged that the acquisition would reduce 
competition in the manufacture and sale of propofol (a general 
anesthetic). The consent order required divestiture in each of 
the pharmaceutical markets. In both of these transactions, as 
well as in the Zeneca/Astra merger, potential competition 
theory was employed to protect competition and consumer 
welfare.56 
                                                          
53 Ibid.,para. 509. 
54  Hoechst AG, C-3629, 120 FT.C. at 1010. 
55  Baxter Int‘l, Inc. & Wyeth, FTC Docket No. C-4068 (3 Feb. 2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210171/baxter-
international-inc-wyeth-matter (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
56  Zeneca Group PLC, C-3880 (7 Jun. 1999) (consent order). For a 
general discussion on the use of potential competition theory in 
mergers, see David A. Balto& James F. Mongoven, Antitrust 
Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 
255 (1999). 
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So far as M&A transactions between generics firms are 
concerned, a competitive assessment based on market share is 
generally used to analyze horizontally affected markets and 
assess possible effects on consumer welfare. The Teva/Barr 
case in the EU is one such case where two primarily generic 
firms decided to merge.57 The competitive analysis in an 
emerging market will be no different from the one used in EU. 
However, market realities are different in emerging markets 
and the entry barriers may be higher. Thus, such a merger may 
pose problems even if the joint market share post-merger is 
not very high. In the Sanofi-Aventis/Zentiva merger, the 
European Commission observed that the main entry barriers in 
the generic market are investment required to establish generic 
bioequivalence, obtaining a marketing authorization, building 
up an operation, registering for reimbursement, securing 
reimbursement approval, promoting and organizing the 
distribution of a generic drug, and gaining local knowledge.58 
Based on this observation, the European Commission was of 
the view that to enter a national market with a generic drug 
takes at least one to two years and may take significantly 
longer in many cases.59 The Commission thus was of the view 
that there were significant entry barriers in the generic market. 
In case of developing countries, there may be additional 
barriers, such as higher cost of capital and technological 
barriers. 
Drexl argues, ―protection of the local competitors against 
incoming international players should not be excluded from 
the ambit of domestic competition law (of developing 
                                                          
57  Case No COMP/M.5295 -TEVA / BARR. 
58 SANOFI-AVENTIS / ZENTIVA, supra n. 48, para. 213. 
59 Ibid.,para. 213. 
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countries).‖60 This proposition is problematic, as any such 
attempt would reduce the competition legislation to an 
industrial policy tool. Drexl adds that ―[i]n the Carribbean 
situation, competition law could also be used to protect small 
local tourism service providers against exclusionary practices 
and restrictive vertical agreements of larger tourism businesses 
from developed countries.‖61 Even though the end aim is to 
promote the interest of the economy of emerging markets, this 
is not the role of competition law. Going by this rationale, a 
competition agency would have to discriminate between local 
and multinational pharmaceutical companies in emerging 
markets. 
3. Efficiency defense in pharmaceutical mergers: an 
emerging market perspective 
There is a rich literature from legal, economics and 
management backgrounds that justifies the inclusion of 
efficiencies in merger analysis.62 A pharmaceutical merger can 
give rise to both horizontal and vertical concerns. If both the 
merging parties are active in the same formulation market, the 
merger can give rise to horizontal concerns. Whereas, if the 
parties are present in Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) 
and formulation markets respectively, the merger may give 
rise to vertical concerns, such as input foreclosure or customer 
foreclosure. Efficiencies can be pleaded as defense in both 
types of cases. 
The issue of innovation in mergers may arise in two cases. 
First, innovation itself may be at stake because of a proposed 
                                                          
60 Josef Drexl, supra n. 18. 
61 Ibid. 
62  For example, see Reinhilde Veugelers, Innovation in EU Merger 
Control: Walking the Talk, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 2012/04. 
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merger. For example, an originator drug company may seek to 
acquire another originator drug company that is actively 
pursuing the same drug. To assess the effect of such 
acquisitions on innovation, Gilbert and Sunshine in their 
influential article had proposed the adoption of an innovation 
market approach.63 Innovation markets were defined as ―the 
research and development directed to particular new or 
improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that 
research and development.‖64 After delineating such a market 
for R&D aimed towards the development of a new product, 
merger law is applied just like conventional cases. As Gilbert 
pointed out, until the mid-1990s, the DOJ and FTC rarely 
relied upon innovation considerations to challenge mergers.65 
The number of such challenges kept increasing until early 
2000. However, such challenges declined later.66 The 
relationship between market structure and innovation is not 
conclusive.67 Thus, reduction in R&D competition as a result 
                                                          
63  Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic 
Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: the Use of Innovation 
Markets, 63Antitrust Law Journal, 569–602 (1995). 
64 Dep‘t of Justice and Federal Trade Comm‘n, Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (―IP Guidelines‖) (6 Apr. 1995), 
§3.2.3. 
65  Richard J. Gilbert, ―Competition and Innovation,‖ Wayne Dale Collins 
(ed.), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, American Bar Association 
Antitrust Section (2006) http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/12/ 
(accessed 16 Mar. 2016). 
66 Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme 
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc.<https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-
genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-
inc./murisgenzymestmt.pdf>  (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
67  For a good review of literature on this issue, see Michael L. Katz & 
Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 Antitrust L.J. 
1 (2007). 
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of a merger may not necessarily have a detrimental effect on 
innovation. For this reason, some commentators find the 
―innovation market‖ concept ―inherently speculative.‖68 
Interestingly, in the US a point of departure from the 
conventional ―innovation markets‖ concept can be seen in the 
Novazyme/Genzyme merger—a merger to monopoly 
scenario—that was approved by the FTC for its potentially 
beneficial effects on innovation. In this case, a majority of the 
Commissioners did not follow the presumptions applicable in 
conventional merger analysis. Katz and Shelanski advocate for 
―fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries‖ of the mergers where 
innovation is at stake as opposed to a conventional 
presumption-based approach that favors competitive pressure 
in the R&D market in order to ensure innovation.69 The EU 
follows the ―future markets‖70 concept, or as mentioned in the 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines the ―competition in 
innovation‖ concept, in order to assess the effect of M&A on 
R&D in future markets.71 
                                                          
68 Dennis W Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6(3) J. 
Comp. Law & Economics 619–652 (2010); see also, Katz & Shelanski, 
supra n. 67. 
69 Katz & Shelanski, supra n. 67. The authors propose ―In summary, 
consolidation can cause harm [to innovation] depending on the 
particular facts of the case, and we think those facts should, therefore, 
become central to the merger analysis.‖ The authors, however, favor a 
presumption in favor of finding a reduction in innovation in merger to 
monopoly cases. See also, Dennis W. Carlton, supra n. 68. 
70  For example, see Case No. IV/M.737–Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz (1996) OJ L 
201/1 (1997). (para. 42 and 44). 
71 Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements, OJ C 3/2 (2001); to see how innovation is 
accounted for in mergers in EU see Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Restrictions 
on Innovation in EU Competition Law, Forthcoming, 41 European Law 
Rev. (2016). 
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The second case in which innovation acquires importance 
is, when innovation is alleged as an efficiency to counter 
the potential consumer harm resulting from rise in market 
power. This part scrutinizes the latter cases, in the context 
of emerging markets, when efficiency (including 
innovation) is claimed to redeem a merger or acquisition 
that may otherwise lead to high concentration in the 
pharmaceutical market. Competition law does not operate in 
vacuum. It cannot be oblivious of the underlying economic 
environment. Thus, a choice between static and dynamic 
efficiency may be totally based upon the prevailing 
economic environment in a specific sector. However, 
competition law has a normative aspect as well—that is to 
nudge the sector towards innovation, as innovation has the 
potential to foster more welfare than static efficiency.72 
Nevertheless, as argued in Part A, even while advancing 
normative propositions, the law cannot be completely 
divorced from the prevailing socio-economic reality of the 
sector and institutional reality of the jurisdiction. The 
following discussion, therefore, discusses only those issues 
pertaining to an efficiency defense that are influenced by 
socio-economic reality of the pharmaceutical sector and the 
institutional environment of competition enforcement in 
emerging markets. However, it is important first to see the 
changing treatment of efficiency claims in merger 
assessment. 
                                                          
72  R.M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function, 39(3) Rev of Economics and Statistics 312–320 (1957); G.M. 
Grossman & E. Helpman, Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of 
Growth, 8(1) J of Economic Perspectives 23–44 (1994); D.B. 
Audretsch, W.J. Baumol& A.E. Burke, Competition Policy in Dynamic 
Markets, 19(5) Int J of Industrial Organization 613–634 (2001). 
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3.1. Rising significance of efficiency claims 
The efficiency claim/defense has gradually started finding its 
formal place in the competition assessment of mergers, not 
only in mature jurisdictions but also in emerging markets. In 
EU, there was no formal recognition of efficiency before the 
revision of the Merger Regulation and the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in 2004.73 In US, efficiency claims in mergers have 
been formally recognized since the 1982 merger guidelines.74 
The US judiciary has gradually started taking efficiency into 
account in merger cases.75 In US, dynamic efficiency 
consideration played an important role in the FTC‘s analysis 
of the proposed Genzyme/Novazyme merger.76 In EU, a more 
―effect based‖ or ―more economic approach‖ test warrants due 
recognition of efficiency claims.77 Both EU and US have 
                                                          
73 See EU Horizontal merger guidelines, supra n. 46; Art 2(1)(b) of 
Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 Jan. 2004 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings (the ECMR) [2004] OJ L24/1. 
74 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982), 
reprinted in 71 CALIF. L. REv. 649 (1983). 
75  For example, see US–FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 
(11th Circuit 1991); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (6th 
Circuit 1997); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th 
Circuit 1999); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Circuit 2001). 
76  Federal Trade Commission, FTC Closes its Investigation of Genzyme 
Corporation’s 2001 Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Federal 
Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
2004/01/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-
2001 (accessed 7 Mar. 2016); see also D.L. Wald & D.L. Feinstein, 
Merger Enforcement in Innovation Markets: The Latest Chapter –
 Genzyme/Novazyme, The Antitrust Source, 1–11(2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_sour
ce/Jul04_Feinstein7_23.authcheckdam.pdf (accessed 16 Mar. 2016). 
77 See, ©OECD, The Role of  Efficiency  Claims in Antitrust Proceedings, 
2012, http://www.oecd.org/competition/EfficiencyClaims2012.pdf (accessed 
7 Mar. 2016). 
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come a long way since the time when efficiency was seen not 
as a justification for a merger, but rather as an offence.78 
Several emerging markets as well mention efficiencies in their 
competition legislation in the overall assessment of mergers.79 
Efficiency has been taken into consideration in the M&A 
analysis by the South African competition tribunal. In the 
merger between Trident Steel (Proprietary) Limited and 
Dorbyl Limited,80 the competition tribunal approved a merger 
relying on productive efficiency gains, even when the 
combined market share of the entities was around 70%. The 
tribunal had initially agreed that the merger would result in a 
substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market. 
Surprisingly the tribunal adopted an ―inverse sliding scale 
test.‖
81 This test means that the stronger the real efficiencies, 
the lesser the need will be for the parties to show that they will 
pass on to consumers the benefits of the efficiencies.82 
Efficiencies were alleged in the AMBEV case in Brazil; 
however, considering the speculative nature of the claimed 
                                                          
78  Efficiency was treated as an offence in US in Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 
370 U.S. 294 (1962). There have been several merger cases in EU 
where efficiencies were relied upon to prove anticompetitive effects, for 
example, see AT&T / NCR (Case IV/M.50). 
79  For example, s. 12A(1)(a)(i) of the South African Competition Act 
provides for efficiency defense in merger. Similarly s. 20(4) of the 
Indian Competition Act, 2002 mentions efficiency in evaluating the net 
effect of mergers. 
80  Trident Steel (Proprietary) Limited (―Trident Steel‖) and Dorbyl 
Limited (―Dorbyl‖), approval Decision of 30 Jan. 2001, case 
89/LM/Oct00 <http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Case-Documents/ 
89LMOCT00.pdf>  (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
81   See, Geoff Parr, The Treatment of Efficiencies in South African Merger 
Consideration, in , Economic Theory and Competition Law, 81 (Josef 
Drexl, Laurence Idot&JoëlMonéger (eds), Edward Elgar, 2009).  
82 Trident Steel and Dorbyl, supra n. 80 para. 81. 
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efficiencies they were not accepted.83 In the NESTLÉ/ 
GAROTO acquisition case84 in Brazil, out of the alleged 
twelve productive efficiencies, only three (reduction of costs 
with closing of deposits, reduction of costs with packing and 
gain with renegotiation of freight) were accepted. In this case, 
efficiencies were not enough to offset the possible harm to 
consumer welfare because of increase in market power. In the 
CVRD X Ferteco/Caemi/ Socoimex/Sa-mitri85 case, also in 
Brazil, efficiencies were recognized and the merger was 
approved with remedies. In all these cases, the efficiencies 
claimed were either allocative or productive. Further, in no 
case did alleged efficiencies alter the finding about 
anticompetitive effects of a merger and, accordingly, remedies 
were adopted.86 
3.2.What efficiencies to account for 
A merger can have several efficiencies including economies 
of scale, resource allocation, technological complementarities, 
specialization in product line, reduction in transportation costs, 
various kinds of transaction-cost economies, reduced capital 
                                                          
83  AC No. 08012.005846/99-12; for an analysis of this case, see Paulo 
Correa &FredericoAguiar, ―Merger Control in Developing Countries: 
Lessons from the Brazilian Experience,‖ UNCTAD/DITC/ 
CLP/Misc.24. 
84 AC no. 08012.001697/2002-89. Nestlé BrasilLtda e Chocolates Garoto 
S/A. See also, Marco Botta, Merger Control Regimes in Emerging 
Economies: A Case Study on Brazil and Argentina (Wolters Kluwer, 
2011), 217. 
85 AC no. 08012.000640/2000-09.Companhia Vale do Rio Doce – CVRD 
e MineraçãoSocoimex S/A.  
86 ©  OECD Roundtable on Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, 
Note by Brazil, DAF/COMP/WD(2007)83 <http://academico.direito-
rio.fgv.br/ccmw/images/e/ed/SEAE_Efficiencies_Brazil_Merger_Analy
sis.pdf> (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
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costs, product line specialization, the deployment of scarce 
managerial talent across a wider portfolio of assets, and better 
combination of R&D skills and resources for innovation, to 
name a few.87 These efficiencies may be allocative, productive 
and dynamic. Several antitrust scholars have argued in favor 
of dynamic efficiency.88 Dynamic efficiency is not a luxury 
that only developed nations can afford to pursue. Instead, even 
developing countries may pursue dynamic efficiency through 
competition policy.89 So far as promoting innovation through 
competition law is concerned, the nationality of the 
pharmaceutical firms does not matter, at least in the 
competition assessment. In case of a merger, what actually 
matters is the likelihood of consumer harm, both in the short 
run and long run. The issue here is to what extent the loss in 
                                                          
87  For a discussion on efficiencies, see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, 
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 
1580 (1983); OECD (2012), supra n. 72; see also, Vikas Kathuria, A 
Conceptual Framework to Identify Dynamic Efficiency, forthcoming, 
European Competition Journal (2015). 
88  J.F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 New York U Law Rev 1020–
1053(1987); Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A 
Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint 
Ventures, 46(4) Antitrust Bulletin, 919–958 (Winter 2001); P. Evans, In 
Search of the Marginal Consumer: The FIPRA Study, FIPRA Group 
(2008); D.B. Audretsch, W.J. Baumol& A.E. Burke, Competition 
Policy in Dynamic Markets, 19(5) Int J of Industrial Organization 613–
634 (2001); see also © OECD, Dynamic Efficiencies in 
Merger Analysis, DAF/COMP(2007)41, http://www.oecd.org/competiti
on/mergers/40623561.pdf (acc-essed 7 Mar. 2016). 
89 See,  A. Singh,  Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets International and Developmental Dimensions, G-24 Discussion 
Paper Series, No. 18  (September 2002), http://unctad.org/en/docs/ 
gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
Pharmaceutical Mergers...A Case of Emerging Markets 
 
 139 
short run welfare may be superseded by the long run gains 
through innovation.  
The 1999 merger between Hoechst Marion Roussel and 
Rhône-Poulenc Rorer in EU, which created Aventis, was 
successful in achieving productive efficiencies. Cost savings 
were realized by closing down several manufacturing plants 
and one R&D facility. R&D was outsourced to research 
organizations, biotechnology companies and other partners.90 
The 1995 acquisition of Burroughs Wellcome by Glaxo also 
experienced such efficiencies.91 In the Léčivaand 
Slovakofarma merger in the Czech Republic, the competition 
agency accepted that there would be dynamic efficiencies 
arising out of rationalization in the research and development 
of generic products.92 These are just a few examples of 
mergers that demonstrated various efficiencies. 
3.3.The correct welfare standard for developing countries 
There are several welfare standards ―that assign weights to the 
different groups of market participants.‖93 Simply put, welfare 
standards decide the distribution of wealth between consumers 
and producers.94 In a developing country, the right standard 
                                                          
90  Andrew D. James, The Strategic Management of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Developing a Resource-
based Perspective, 14(3) Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 299-313(2002). 
91 Ibid. 
92  For a discussion on this case, see OECD (2007) (n. 88), p. 126. 
93  Miguel De la Mano, For the customer’s sake: the competitive effects of 
efficiencies in European merger control, EC Enterprise Papers No. 11 
(2002); Some common welfare standards are– Price Standard, 
Consumer Surplus Standard, Total Surplus Standard, Hillsdown 
Standard and Weighted Surplus Standard. 
94  A discussion on these standards is beyond the scope of this article. The 
reader may refer to the OECD paper on Dynamic Efficiency, supra n. 
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for analyzing mergers is the consumer welfare standard, as 
there is little chance that the gains made by 
producers/manufacturers will be passed on to consumers 
through capital markets. Scherer argues that the total welfare 
standard as proposed by Williamson may not be good for 
developing countries for two reasons: (1) high unemployment 
rates, and (2) the Keynesian liquidity trap.95 As the incidence 
of unemployment is high in developing countries, it cannot be 
said with certainty that efficiencies would pass on from 
producers (here, those who are employed) to consumers. 
Another feature of emerging markets is that firm ownership is 
highly concentrated.96 Thus, gains made by producers may not 
be widely distributed in society. 
Alternatively, the Balancing Weights approach can also suit 
the socio-economic reality of emerging markets. The 
Balancing Weights approach allows discretion to the 
adjudicating authorities, to determine the effects of wealth 
transfer for the society in the particular circumstances of a 
                                                                                                                         
77; see also, An Renckens, Welfare Standards, Substantive Tests, and 
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Policy: Defining the Efficiency 
Defense, 3(2) J. Competition Law and Economics149–179 (2007). 
95 Merger Efficiencies and Competition Policy, note by Professor F.M. 
Scherer in OECD (2012), supra n. 77; Russell Pittman argues in favor 
of consumer welfare standard for all jurisdictions, See, Russell 
Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust 
Enforcement, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, EAG 07-9 
(June 2007). 
96  Ruth V. Aguilera, Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro, Jun Ho Lee &Jihae 
You, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, G. Morgan & R. 
Whitley (eds), Capitalisms and Capitalism in the twenty-first Century, 
319–344 (Oxford University Press 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1806525 (accessed 7 Mar. 2016) Their dataset is based on19, 969 firms, 
observed between 2004 to 2008 in six emerging markets. 
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merger.97 In application, this approach recognizes that if 
consumers are poor, the adjudicating body will have more 
reasons to see the wealth transfer from consumers to producers 
as anticompetitive.98 Since the Superior Propane case,99 the 
Balancing Weights approach is the standard for evaluating 
mergers in Canada. However, the case-by-case approach is 
quite difficult to apply and is highly costly in practice.100 
Adhering to the consumer welfare standard (and/or requiring 
that some of the gains should be passed on to the consumers) 
means that efficiency gains from fixed costs should be looked 
upon less favorably.101 This is so because fixed cost savings, 
for example resulting from lower duplication costs, are less 
likely to have effects on prices. Thus, they do not positively 
change the consumer welfare.102 Several commentators have 
criticized the less favorable treatment of fixed cost in 
competition law.103 
                                                          
97 The Commissioner of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 
Comp.Trib. 15, para. 431. 
98  See, Edward Iacobucci & Michael Trebilcock, The Competition Law 
System and the Country’s Norms, The Design of Competition Law 
Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices, 120 (Elanor M. Fox and 
Michael J. Trebilcock (eds.), Oxford, first edition 2013). 
99 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc. 
(C.A.), 2003 FCA 53, [2003] 3 F.C. 529. 
100 Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition 
Law, Daniel Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 9 (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012). 
101 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, 
241 (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
102 Ibid. 
103  Katz &Shelanski, supra n. 67; GS Cary, Efficiencies in Merger 
Analysis: From Both Sides Now Testimony to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, (17 Nov. 2005) Testimony to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/ 
commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Cary_final.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 
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3.4.Merger to monopoly 
Can a merger to monopoly be redeemed on the basis of 
efficiency claims in emerging markets? This question becomes 
important, as in emerging markets, concentration levels may 
be high in general, and in pharmaceutical sector in particular 
owing to high entry barriers because of very high R&D and 
marketing costs.104Pitofsky, in his remarks on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary of the EU merger regulation, observed 
that efficiencies should be taken into account in ―close 
cases.‖105 By ―close cases‖ he meant those mergers that do not 
lead to monopoly or near-monopoly. Going by the established 
precedents in the Continental Can,106GlaxoSmithKline107 and 
Intel108 cases, it may not be possible to do so in EU, as the 
existing case law still stresses ―maintenance of effective 
competition‖109to ensure that market structure is protected 
                                                                                                                         
2016); Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and 
Recommendations, (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_ 
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
104 AstraZeneca, supra n. 45, para. 565. 
105  Robert Pitofsky, EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers–
Views from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Remarks before EC 
Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference, The European 
Commission Directorate General for Competition, International Bar As
sociation, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2000/09/eu-and-us-
approaches-international-mergers-views-us-federal-trade  (accessed 7 
March 2016) 
106 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company Inc. v. Commission of the European Communities [1973] 
ECR 215, paras 24 and 25. 
107  Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P 
GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v. Commission and Others 
[2009] ECR I-9261. para. 63. 
108  Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. European Commission EU:T:2014:547, 
para. 105. 
109 Continental Can case, supra n. 106, para. 25. 
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without establishing whether actual consumer harm may occur 
or not. This has partly to do with the Ordoliberalism heritage 
of the past that still finds its traces in the Community 
legislation and cases.110 The EU horizontal merger guidelines 
express the same sentiments: 
It is highly unlikely that a merger leading to a market position 
approaching that of a monopoly, or leading to a similar level 
of market power, can be declared compatible with the 
common market on the ground that efficiency gains would be 
sufficient to counteract its potential anti-competitive effects.111 
Nevertheless, the Commission accepted efficiencies in a three 
to two merger in Korsnäs/AssidomänCartonboard.112 In the 
US, while there is no formal prohibition against merger to 
monopoly, in practice there is a strict view against authorizing 
any such merger to monopoly.113 
Recently, liberalized markets may also be influenced by a 
socialist overhang. Article 38(c) of the Indian constitution 
directs the State to ensure that ―the operation of the economic 
system does not result in the concentration of wealth and 
means of production to the common detriment.‖ Such a 
provision may be a motivation for a formalistic approach to 
competition law, resulting in protecting competitors rather 
than protecting competition. 
The relationship between market structure and innovation is 
unclear. Thus, it should not matter if the merger results in 
monopoly, so long as the parties can prove a strong possibility 
                                                          
110  For example Art 101(3) of TFEU. 
111 Horizontal mergers guidelines, supra n. 46, para. 84. 
112 Case COMP/M. 4057 Korsnäs/Assidomän Cartonboard (2006). 
113  Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition 
and Its Practice, 556 (Thomson Reuters, 2011, fourth edition). 
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to achieve efficiency. Especially in those sectors where the 
MES is very high, simply relying upon the number of 
competitors as a proxy for competition may not be the right 
strategy. In this regard, the Novazyme/Genzyme merger is 
extremely relevant.114 Even though the merger was leading to 
a monopoly, the FTC decided not to challenge the merger. 
Chairman Timothy Muris was of the view that there was no 
evidence of the effect of concentration on innovation. Thus, he 
opined, ―one must examine whether the merged firm was 
likely to have a reduced incentive to invest in R&D, and also 
whether it was likely to have the ability to conduct R&D more 
successfully.‖115 
South Africa allowed a merger between Trident Steel 
(Proprietary) Limited and Dorbyl Limited based on 
efficiencies, even though it was a merger to monopoly.116 
Also, the South-African Competition Appeal Court (CAC) 
approved a three to two merger between Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, a US-based seed company, and Pannar Seed 
Limited, a South African seed company, on the basis that the 
merger would foster innovation.117 
The analysis taken by the Commerce Commission of New 
Zealand in the Cavalier Wool Holdings case presents a good 
blueprint to deal with efficiencies properly in a merger to 
monopoly case.118 In this case, WSI (the acquired company) 
                                                          
114 Novazyme/Genzyme, supra n. 76. 
115 Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris, supra n. 66, p. 6. 
116  Case Number: 89/LM/Oct00. 
117 Pioneer Hi-bred International Inc and Another v. Competition 
Commission and Another (113/CAC/NOV11) [2012] ZACAC 3 (28 
May 2012). 
118  Cavalier Wool Holdings Limited and New Zealand Wool Services 
International Limited, Decision No. 725, 9 Jun. 2011. 
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would have been removed as an independent post-merger 
supplier of wool scouring services in each of the affected wool 
scouring markets, leaving Cavalier Wool (the acquirer) as the 
only provider. The Commission recognized that the Chinese 
scouring industry posed a significant long-term competitive 
threat to the domestic wool scouring industry in New 
Zealand.119 
So far as the possibility of a new entry was concerned, the 
authority employed a LET (Likelihood of entry, Extent of entry 
and Timeliness of entry) test, and was convinced that entry 
would not occur without at least a 5%–10% increase in scouring 
prices.120 The Commerce Commission was thus convinced about 
the possibility of consumer harm. However, the Commission also 
looked into whether efficiency gains from the merger could 
mitigate consumer harm, and found that the possible losses were 
very small.121 Further, the Commission found that the threat of 
competition from the Chinese scouring industry would reduce 
potential dynamic efficiency losses.122 Additionally, the 
Commission was satisfied that the merger would result in 
productive efficiency gains.123 The Commission then balanced 
the benefits and losses and, looking at the net result of the 
transaction, was of the view that the public benefits were likely to 
significantly outweigh the public losses.  
Thus, there should not be a straightjacket formula in cases of 
merger to monopoly. Transactions should be prohibited when 
there is a likely consumer harm that cannot be offset by 
efficiencies.  
                                                          
119 Ibid., para. 128. 
120 Ibid., 185. 
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3.5.When the consumer harm and efficiencies occur in 
different markets 
One very crucial issue related to efficiency claims is the 
treatment of efficiencies when consumer harm and efficiencies 
occur in different markets. Technically, in such a case there 
are two different groups of consumers. In EU, cross-market 
efficiencies or ―out-of-market‖ efficiencies can be accepted if 
the two markets are related and harm from competition 
restriction and efficiency gains occur to the same 
consumers.124 In US, courts have generally declined ―out-of-
market‖ efficiencies.125 However, there have been instances 
where ―out-of-market‖ efficiencies were recognized.126 The 
1997 and 2010 US Horizontal merger guidelines have taken a 
less strict view. 
―In some cases, however, the Agencies in their prosecutorial 
discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant 
market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial 
divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without 
sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s). Inextricably 
linked efficiencies are most likely to make a difference when 
                                                          
124 Guidelines on the application of Art.81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 
101/08), para. 43; see also CASE COMP/AT.39595 – 
Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada, paras 74–76. 
125 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370, 83 
S.Ct. 1715, 745 (1963); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,168 F. 
Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion 
Eng'g, 302 F. Supp. 539, 554–555 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
126 Gai‘s–United States Bakery (DOJ 1996), where in light of the specific 
facts of the case cross-market efficiencies were allowed. Once again in 
Genzyme–Ilex (FTC 2004) merger the FTC recognized ―out-of-market‖ 
efficiency and tailored remedy for the market where anticompetitive 
effects were a concern. 
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they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the 
relevant market(s) is small so the merger is likely to benefit 
customers overall.‖127 
In the case of a pharmaceutical merger, avoiding 
anticompetitive effect in the affected market may be possible 
through divestiture. However, divestiture may not be possible 
if two products (two different markets), showing 
anticompetitive effects and efficiency respectively, are 
manufactured in the same plant, or when they are 
complements (and possibly demonstrate economies of 
scope).128Hovenkamp suggests that there can be an exception 
in the case of cross-market efficiency, where the market in 
which efficiency results is significantly larger than the market 
in which competition is threatened.129 
Pitofsky highlights the difficulties in balancing cross-market 
efficiencies: 
I have come increasingly to the view that it is not practical in 
run-of-the-mill merger cases to trade off pro- and anti-
competitive effects across markets. Imagine the measurement 
problems of an increase in market shares from 20 to 30% in 
market A compared to a 5% decrease in marginal cost 
(assuming marginal cost were somehow knowable) in market 
B. There is not presently a practical formula available to 
                                                          
127  Footnote 14, US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 2010  <https://www.ftc. 
gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf> 
(accessed 7 Mar. 2016); see also, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice & Fed. Trade 
Comm‘n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 n. 36 (1992, rev. 1997) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf>  (accessed 7 Mar. 
2016). 
128  See, Herbert Hovenkamp, supra n. 113, 556. 
129 Ibid. 
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enforcement agencies or courts that would allow that kind of 
trade-off to be made.130 
Even if such a formula were available, it would be difficult to 
apply it in the special setting of pharmaceutical industry and 
emerging markets, as the consumer groups in both the markets 
may have difference in purchasing power. Pitofsky, however, 
accepts that in the closely related market, such as pen and ink, 
where the same consumer uses both products, cross-market 
efficiencies can be accepted.131 
The following example demonstrates the theoretical problems 
in considering cross-market efficiencies in two different 
pharmaceutical markets in emerging countries. Let us assume 
a hypothetical merger between two drug companies. The 
competition agency alleges anticompetitive effects in market 
A, where the joint market shares will be very high post-
merger. Also, this is a drug that has a very wide use. However, 
the firms claim efficiency in the market B, where the drug will 
have very limited use, owing to the smaller number of users 
affected by the concerned disease. In emerging markets, 
balancing such efficiency gains against the consumer harm 
will be extremely difficult. In such a scenario, basing the 
decision solely on aggregate welfare of the society may not be 
socially desirable, as there are widespread disparities in the 
society. Any such solution will raise doubts over the sanctity 
and rationale of competition law in emerging markets.  
  
                                                          
130  Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: 18 Months after, 
The George Mason Law Review Antitrust Symposium: The Changing 
Face of Efficiency Washington, D.C. (1998) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/10/efficiencies-defense-
mergers-18-months-after> (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
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3.6.Appropriate institutional environment 
Merger analysis is a sophisticated art. And efficiency claims 
make it even more complex and sophisticated. Most 
competition agencies are cautious in their evaluation of 
efficiency claims, as information about potential efficiency 
gains in mergers is solely in the merging firms‘ possession.132 
The standard of proof in order to appreciate efficiency 
concerns is very high. Further, R&D competition in general is 
more complicated than price competition with unpredictable 
incentives, path of progress and outcomes.133 Thus, naturally, 
the competition agencies are skeptical about efficiency claims 
in mergers. 
Criticizing the EU decision on the GE/Honeywell merger, 
Morgan and McGuire highlight the importance of institutional 
capacity by noting ―an under-resourced bureaucracy working 
to tight time scales and with a high level of autonomy can 
clearly face problems in trying to arrive at consistently well-
judged decisions and in being seen to do so.‖134 
Crane notes several reasons for asymmetric treatment of 
merger efficiencies as compared to merger harms.135He argues 
―[a]ntitrust regulators may react asymmetrically to potential 
losses and gains. It is well established in behavioral theory that 
decision makers, including regulators, sometimes weight 
potential losses more than potential gains of an equivalent 
                                                          
132 © OECD (2012), supra n. 77. 
133 Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market 
Approach to Merger Analysis, 64(1) Antitrust L.J. 19-47 (1995). 
134  Eleanor Morgan & Steven McGuire, Transatlantic Divergence: GE–
Honeywell and the EU's Merger Policy, 11(1) J. European Public 
Policy, 53, 39–56 (2004). 
135 Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110(3) Mich L. Rev. 
347-91 (2011). 




136Arguably a new antitrust body is more loss 
averse than the mature ones who have already proven their 
worth. 
Merger assessment in competition law is by and large 
predictive in nature. It leaves open gaps through which 
ideological interventions may subordinate pure economic 
reasons. Commenting upon merger control program in 
developing countries, Correa and Aguiar note, ―[b]ecause 
merger control activities affect market structure and firm 
behaviour in all industries, they also seem to be a propitious 
environment for the reintroduction of interventionist 
ideologies – from price controls to picking winners.‖137 
Against this backdrop in emerging markets, guidelines on 
merger review can be a good way to discourage ideological 
deviations and set out an analytical framework. The Public-
Choice literature also indicates that antitrust regulators may 
make sub-optimal decisions motivated by self-interest.138 An 
analytical framework in the form of guidelines may provide a 
check against such self-serving behavior. 
Judicial review is a crucial part of the antitrust institutional 
fabric. The US judiciary has played a very significant role in 
                                                          
136 Ibid., citing Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of 
Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747–
779 (1990). 
137  Paulo Correa & Frederico Aguiar, Merger Control in Developing 
Countries: Lessons From the Brazilian Experience, UNCTAD/ 
DITC/CLP/Misc.24,page1(2002) <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclpmis
c24_en.pdf>  (accessed 7 Mar. 2016). 
138  W.F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, F.S. 
McChesney& W.F. Shughart II (eds.), The Causes and Consequences 
of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, 7 (The University of 
Chicago Press 1995). 
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the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence.139Baye and Wright in 
their empirical analysis reach the conclusion that some 
antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist judges.140 
Rivera and Schatan also recognize that judges may not be 
prepared to handle cases of great technical complexity, which 
may cause problems for the effective resolution of competition 
cases.141 Assuming that the antitrust regulators in emerging 
markets have adequate financial and human resources, are free 
from political intervention and are committed to the cause of 
promoting consumer welfare, there can still be problems with 
the successful enforcement of competition law if the judiciary 
does not share the same commitment and appreciation for 
competition law. 
3.7.Cautions 
The above discussion has highlighted a few issues that are 
critical in the efficiency defense in emerging markets. Since 
the theoretical framework in this article argues that the 
application of competition principles is sector-specific, the 
pharmaceutical sector was chosen as an example. This section 
points out certain cautions in the efficiency defense that 
should be heeded in emerging markets. 
The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines define countervailing 
buyer power as ―the bargaining strength that the buyer has vis-
à-vis the seller in commercial negotiations due to its size, its 
commercial significance to the seller and its ability to switch 
                                                          
139  See, D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055 (2009–2010). 
140  Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for 
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial 
Training on Appeals, 54(1) J. Law & Economics, 1–24 (February 
2011). 
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to alternative suppliers.‖142 Powerful buyers can exercise 
countervailing power and thus may negotiate favorable terms 
from their suppliers. The antitrust literature recognizes buyer 
power as a mitigating factor in merger analysis.143 Most 
emerging markets do not have sophisticated health insurance 
systems. In India, for example, any form of social or voluntary 
health insurance covers only about 10% of the population.144  
Thus, insurers are not available to intervene on behalf of 
buyers to constrain pharmaceutical prices.145 Such intervention 
by the insurer would be very helpful as the health care sector 
suffers from information asymmetry. Since consumers in 
emerging markets have little or no buyer power so far as the 
pharmaceutical sector is concerned, efficiency must be 
analyzed in this context. Furthermore, where the pharmaceutical 
industry is concentrated because of high entry barriers and 
high economies of scale, to impress the competition agency, 
efficiencies should be big enough to negate any 
anticompetitive effect. 
Section VII of the EU Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers recognizes efficiencies only when the 
                                                          
142  EU Horizontal mergers guidelines supra n. 46, para. 64. 
143  U.S. Dep‘t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §8 (2010); 
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144  Y. Balarajan, S. Selvaraj& S.V. Subramanian, Health Care and Equity 
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following three cumulative criteria are met:  (1) efficiencies 
must benefit consumers; (2) efficiencies must be merger-
specific; and (3) efficiencies must be verifiable.146Here there 
are serious questions that arise from the efficiency claims in 
emerging markets. Will there be really a new product hitting 
the local market? Will there be a timely entry of the drug in 
the affected market? So far as availability of a new drug is 
concerned, it will depend upon the business model of the 
foreign multinational company. The foreign MNC may choose 
to introduce the product in other more profitable markets. In 
emerging markets what are the possibilities that the innovation 
will pass on to consumers? These questions depend a lot upon 
the nature of manufacturing, the drug type and the business 
model of the defendant firms. Therefore, the competition 
authorities should take such factors into account while dealing 
with efficiency claims. 
4. Conclusion 
Pharmaceutical M&As in emerging markets have given rise to 
concerns regarding the elimination of generics firms. 
Undoubtedly, such elimination would have detrimental effects 
on welfare, and thus might motivate competition agencies to 
use competition law as an industrial policy tool to deter the 
acquisition of generics firms. This issue was the first 
motivation behind this article. Relying upon the concept of 
potential competition, the article shows how competition law 
tools themselves can ensure consumer welfare, which is the 
cardinal goal of competition law. In doing so, the article has 
argued against tweaking competition law and reducing it to a 
mere industrial policy tool in emerging markets. The article 
has not attempted to outline the goals of competition law in 
developing countries. Even a mature jurisdiction such as EU 
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has multiple objectives, which may be often conflicting.147 
However, while analyzing the first issue, it has been argued 
that competition law should not be used as an industrial policy 
tool to protect local manufacturers.  
The second motivation was to see how efficiency 
claims/defenses in mergers would play out in the context of 
emerging markets. In this regard, this article has sought to 
make a contribution to the more positive treatment of 
efficiency claims in emerging markets. In order to analyze 
these issues, the article has taken the example of 
pharmaceutical mergers for two reasons.  First, there has been 
a rise in pharmaceutical M&As in emerging markets; and 
second, efficiency claims are more relevant in high technology 
sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry. To analyze these 
issues, it was important to develop a theoretical framework to 
see what changes are required in competition law enforcement 
in the peculiar context of emerging markets. The framework 
shows that the application of competition law is sector-
specific and is guided by the socio-economic realities of a 
sector and the institutional realities of a particular jurisdiction.
                                                          
147  See Laura Parret, The Multiple Personalities of EU Competition Law: 
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Competition Law and Compulsory Licenses in  
Emerging Markets: A Systems of Innovation Approach 
Compulsory licenses in competition law have been criticized 
primarily for their detrimental effect on incentives to innovate. 
Dynamic efficiency including innovation has the better 
potential to foster economic welfare as compared to static 
efficiency, thus it should be the preferred policy choice. For 
almost a century researchers from economics and 
management disciplines have attempted to explore the 
conditions that are conducive to technological innovation. 
Conventionally, adequate incentives to innovators are 
considered cardinal for supporting innovation. However, 
innovation is a complex process that goes beyond merely 
creating incentives for the private sector. This paper by 
relying on the Systems of Innovation (SI) approach 
investigates the Brazilian and Indian pharmaceutical sector 
and demonstrates the differences in innovative capability in 
these two jurisdictions. Whereas, the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry has moved up the R&D value chain, its Brazilian 
counterpart, by and large, is still in the phase of imitation. The 
paper uses this difference to draw a prescription for 
compulsory licenses under competition law in Brazil and 
India. 
Introduction 
A government grants compulsory license or non-voluntary 
license to a third party to use the patent without the 
permission of the right-holder.1 A compulsory license, be it 
                                                          
1  Robert C. Bird, ―Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: 
Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing 
Investment Side Effects‖ (2009) 37(2) The Journal of Law 
Medicine & Ethics 209-21.  
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under Intellectual Property (IP) law or competition law, 
presents a dilemma between short-term gains and long-
term losses. Common sense suggests that although in the 
short run, a compulsory license may ensure cheaper access, 
in the long run, however, it may have detrimental effects 
on incentives to innovate. It is noteworthy that most of the 
emerging markets have only recently adopted competition 
law.2 So far it is not clear as to what objectives competition 
law should pursue in emerging markets.3The peculiar 
socio-economic realities in developing countries have led 
some scholars to argue that competition law can also be 
employed to pursue social objectives.4Further, whereas in 
recent times considerable attention has been dedicated to 
the role that competition law can play in furthering 
technological innovation, the scholarship that explores the 
                                                          
2  This paper uses the terms ‗developing countries‘ and ‗emerging 
markets‘ interchangeably. 
3  Indeed, even in developed countries the goals of competition law 
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Objectives, Daniel Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 
61 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012) 
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Jurisdictions, in Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.) The Economic 
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Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 293; Eleanor Fox, 
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Countries (Edward Elgar 2012) 273-290; Mor Bakhoum, 'A Dual 
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versus Development Approach and Implications for Developing 
Countries' (2011) 34 (3) World Competition 495–522; M. S. Gal 
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jurisdictions: learning from experience, Michal S. Gal et al (eds.), 
The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their 
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viability of the long run efficiency objective in developing 
countries is scarce.5 
In theory, developing countries can also benefit from 
innovation, as it leads to development.6 Thus, the aim of 
the policies, even in emerging markets, should be to 
encourage investment in innovation. However, the general 
backwardness of the economy makes a political choice in 
favor of the long run objectives difficult. Therefore, the 
perennial dilemma between the short run and the long run 
that characterizes the application of competition law is 
more pronounced in emerging markets. Faced with this 
challenge, this paper investigates the extent to which 
developing countries can incentivize innovative activities 
within the framework of, relatively new, competition law. 
The paper argues that in the absence of any innovative 
capability in a particular sector, the short run objective of 
ensuring cheaper prices to the consumers is the optimal 
solution; however, if a sector has moved up to the level of 
innovation, competition law should support innovation by 
refraining from issuing compulsory licenses in that sector.  
                                                          
5  One notable example is A. Singh, ―Competition and Competition 
Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental 
Dimensions‖, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 (September 
2002)<http://unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf> (accessed 
3 October 2016). 
6  See in general, Jan Fagerberg, Martin Srholec and Bart Verspagen, 
―Innovation and Economic Development‖ (2009) UNU-MERIT, 
Working Paper Series, #2009-032. The authors observe: ―In fact, 
the evidence shows that innovation is quite widespread among 
developing country firms, is associated with higher productivity 
(e.g., development) and, as in the developed part of the world, is 
dependent on web of interactions with other private and public 
actors.‖; see also, © OECD (2012), "Innovation for Development: 
The Challenges Ahead", in OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI <http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_outlook-2012-7-en> (accessed 17 April 2016) 
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This research draws on the economic concept of consumer 
welfare. However, the main crux of the analysis is based 
on the Systems of Innovation (SI) approach. This 
approachsuggests that contrary to the traditional view of 
the economists, there has been recognition that innovation, 
which is a long run efficiency, requires much more than 
merely encouraging investment in R&D.7On one hand, the 
pharmaceutical sector is characterized by constant 
innovation, thus necessitating incentives to pursue R&D. 
On the other hand, for public policy reasons it is important 
to ensure affordable access to medicines. Thus, the 
pharmaceutical sector was the perfect candidate for 
analyzing compulsory licenses. Brazil and India were 
chosen for comparison as they have accumulated 
technological capabilities that facilitate the transition from 
production to innovation.8Further, none of these countries 
has so far issued compulsory license under competition 
law; thus, this research will assist them in making the 
optimal decision. The research is organized as follows. 
Part A of the paper is a general primer on innovation. It 
explains the meaning, definition, and microeconomics of 
innovation, and its effect on consumer welfare. Thereafter, 
the concept of Systems of Innovation (SI) is discussed. An 
understanding of how innovation materializes will have 
bearing on the application of competition law when 
innovation is an issue. Part B builds upon the previous 
section, and compares the innovative capability of the 
                                                          
7  For example see, Richard R. Nelson, Preface in Edurado 
Albuquerque et al. (eds.) Developing National System of 
Innovation: University–Industry Interactions in the Global South 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2015) ix. Nelson observes, 
―Traditionally, economists have focused on the investment needed. 
They saw the problem of mastering new ways of doing things as 
mostly involving ―technology transfer‖, a term that played down 
the difficult learning process involved.‖ 
8 RasmusLemaa, RuyQuadrosb and Hubert Schmitzc, ―Reorganising 
Global Value Chains and Building Innovation Capabilities in Brazil 
and India‖ (2015) 44(7) Research Policy 1376–1386. 
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Indian and the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector, as 
measured by ―international patents‖. It is crucial to note 
that the innovative capability may vary from sector to 
sector, regardless of the distinction between developed and 
developing countries.9. Part C uses the findings of the 
previous section to assess the viability of compulsory 
licensing in the Brazilian and the Indian pharmaceutical 
sector with respect to its effect on innovation. This part 
also shows that the latest jurisprudence on compulsory 
licensing in the EU and the US does not assist developing 
countries in making the optimal choice between the short 
run and the long run efficiency. 
1. The short run and the long run consumer welfare 
Let us begin with the oft-used phrase consumer welfare in 
competition law that is very often stated as its cardinal 
objective.10 In applied welfare economics, the concept of 
consumer surplus is used as a measure of consumer 
welfare. Simply put, consumer surplus is the amount a 
buyer is willing to pay (based on the utility) for a good 
                                                          
9  In fact, the OECD also notes that in very large countries such as 
China or India, certain areas of economy can be very advanced 
despite the average backwardness of the economy. See, ©OECD (2
012),―Innovation for Development‖ <http://www.oecd.org/innovati
on/inno/50586251.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2016); 
Technological heterogeneity in different sectors in developing 
countries has been acknowledged by other scholars as well, see 
among others Shamnad Basheer and Annalisa Primi, The WIPO 
Development Agenda: Factoring in the ―Technologically 
Proficient‖ Developing Countries‘ in Jeremy DeBeer (ed.) 
Implementing WIPO's Development Agenda  (Wilfred Laurier 
University Press, 2009) 100-117; see also, Vikas Kathuria, 
―Pharmaceutical Mergers and their Effect on Access and 
Efficiency: A Case of Emerging Markets‖(2016) 39 (3) World 
Competition Law and Economics Review 451-78. 
10  Sometimes, students and people new to competition law confuse 
consumer welfare with consumer interest as the goal of competition 
law. However, consumer interest can be best ensured through 
consumer protection legislations.  
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minus the amount the buyer actually pays for it.11 Thus, 
consumer welfare is understood as the area between the 
competitive price and demand curve (see Figure 1). As 
opposed to consumer welfare, producer welfare is the 
amount a seller is paid for a good minus the seller‘s cost of 
providing it.12 The area between the competitive price and 
the supply curve measures producer welfare (Figure 1). 
Another concept is total welfare, which is the sum total of 
consumer and producer surplus. 
 
Figure 1: Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus, and Deadweight Loss 
Most of the jurisdictions follow the consumer welfare 
standard while deciding the distribution of wealth between 
consumers and producers. Steven C. Salop, through 
various examples, demonstrates that the true standard 
followed by the US antitrust legislation and courts is the 
‗true consumer welfare‘ standard as opposed to the total 
                                                          
11  N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (6th edition, South-
Western, Cengage Learning, 2012) 137; ©OECD (1993), Glossary 
of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, R. S. 
Khemani and D. M. Shapiro (eds.) <https://stats.oecd.org/ 
glossary/detail.asp?ID=3176> (accessed 18 February 2016). 
12 ibid (Mankiw) 141. 
Emerging Markets and Innovation...Role of Competition Policy 
 
 161 
welfare standard.13 The EU as well proclaims consumer 
welfare as the objective of competition law, especially post 
Modernization.14 
If one begins with the starting point that consumer welfare 
is the primary objective of competition law, then the effort 
of antitrust intervention should be directed at maximizing 
consumer welfare, or as mentioned above in increasing the 
area of the triangle between demand curve and competitive 
price. This may be achieved either by removing the 
deadweight loss or by pushing the supply curve and/or 
demand curve out. There is a difference, however, between 
the short run and long run consumer welfare. The short run 
consumer welfare can be achieved by minimizing the 
deadweight loss.15 Allocative and productive efficiency 
(together termed as static efficiency) minimize the 
deadweight loss. The long run consumer welfare, however, 
is associated with dynamic efficiency that materializes in 
the future, and can be achieved by pushing the supply 
curve and/or demand curve out. Productive efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency both shift the supply curve out, and 
thus increase consumer welfare.16 However, only dynamic 
efficiency can push the demand curve out, as consumers 
                                                          
13  Steven C. Salop, ―Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust 
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard‖ 
(2010) 22 Loyola Consumer Law Review 336.  
14  Guidance on the Commission‘s Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Article 82 EC of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct 
by Dominant Undertakings‘ (9 February 2009) C/2009 864 final 
(Art 82 Guidance) para 19; Guidelines on the application of Article 
81 (3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/ 08 para 13. 
15 F. M. Sherer, ―Antitrust, Efficiency and Progress‖ (1987) 62 New 
York University Law Rev 998–1019. 
16  T.O. Barnett, ―Maximizing Welfare Through Technological 
Innovation‖ (2008) 15 George Mason Law Rev 1191–1204; see 
also, Vikas Kathuria, ―A Conceptual Framework to Identify 
Dynamic Efficiency‖ (2015) 11(2-3) European Competition Journal 
319-339. 
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ascribe more value to new products. Generally it is not 
possible to achieve allocative, productive, and dynamic 
efficiency together.17 The choice between static and 
dynamic efficiency is a perennial dilemma for competition 
agencies, more so because dynamic efficiency may achieve 
more welfare than static efficiency, but in the long run.18 
Dynamic efficiency is often equated with innovation; 
however, the former is a broader concept than the latter as 
evident from the following definition: 
“Dynamic efficiencies are related to the ability of a firm 
and its incentives to introduce new products or processes 
of production (or to improve existing ones) by adopting 
new technology or enhancing knowledge endogenously, i.e. 
to move the efficient frontier of production faster or further 
forward. Dynamic efficiencies are therefore linked to 
innovation, learning by doing and research and 
development activities; contrary to static efficiencies, then, 
they display their effects generally over time.”19 
1.1 Who is the consumer under the consumer welfare 
test? 
Whose welfare should be the objective for competition 
agencies? There are several definitions of consumer at the 
EU level. Each legislation has its own approach. However, 
at the core of all the definitions ―a consumer is a natural 
person, who is acting outside the scope of an economic 
                                                          
17  Miguel de la Mano, ―For the Customer‘s Sake: The Competitive 
Effects of Efficiencies in European Merger Control‖, (2002) 
Enterprise Papers No 11. 
18  R. M. Solow, ―Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function‖ (1957) 39(3) Rev of Economics and Statistics 312–320; 
GM Grossman and E Helpman, ―Endogenous Innovation in the 
Theory of Growth‖(1994) 8(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
23–44; DB Audretsch, WJ Baumol and AE Burke, ―Competition 
Policy in Dynamic Markets‖, (2001) 19(5) International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 613–634. 
19  Kathuria (n 16) 
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activity (trade, business, craft, liberal profession).‖20 Thus, 
consumer is a natural person who engages in a transaction 
in the municipal boundaries of a state or country. 
The merger guidelines in the EU, the UK and the US 
adhere to the consumer welfare standard.21These 
guidelines agree to take into account innovation, provided 
that benefits pass on to consumers.22 The national 
competition bodies take into account the consumer welfare 
of the people residing in that particular territory. For 
example, the text of Article 101 TFEU states ―The 
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market…which may affect trade between Member 
States which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market...‖ (Italics added). Consumer welfare, which is the 
                                                          
20 The notion of 'consumer' in EU law, Library of the European Parliament 
(2013) < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ bibliotheque/ 
briefing/2013/130477/LDM_BRI(2013)130477_REV1_EN.pdf> 
(accessed 18 February 2016); see also, Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 
October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 
93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC 
and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Article 2; So far as the natural person criterion is 
concerned, the ECJ has categorically stated that community law 
should not give it a wider interpretation, see ECJ judgment of 22 
November 2001, joined cases C-541/99 and C-542/99 - Cape Snc v 
IdealserviceSrl and Idealservice MN RE Sas v OMAI Srl [2001], 
ECR I-9049, para 16.   
21  See in general Gregory J. Werden, Consumer Welfare and 
Competition Policy, in Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber and 
Rupprecht Podszun (eds.) Competition Policy and the Economic 
Approach: Foundations and Limitations (Edward Elgar, 2011) 20.  
22  ibid, p18, Werden argues that the consumer welfare standard may 
account for innovation: ―The consumers‘ surplus test, however, can 
account for longer-term and non-price effects. A merger leading to 
higher prices in the short term could enhance ‗consumer welfare‘ 
by speeding the introduction of a new product‖. 
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stated objective of the EU competition law, is therefore 
measured at the level of the EU common market.  
On the other side of the Atlantic as well, the US Supreme 
Court prohibits the application of the Sherman Act ―where 
the plaintiff‘s claim rests solely on the independent foreign 
harm‖.23 This means the Sherman Act cannot be pressed 
when there is no harm to the US consumers. Similarly, the 
competition statutes of other jurisdictions as well take into 
account the consumer welfare of their own people. In this 
respect the extraterritoriality doctrine too is a tool to check 
harm to consumer welfare in a specific jurisdiction, 
resulting from practices that arise elsewhere.24 The focus 
on municipal consumer under antitrust laws is regardless 
of the distinction between intermediate consumer 
(customers) and final consumers.25 Therefore, the concept 
of consumer welfare is jurisdiction specific.  
Mainstream economics shows that innovation is a key 
factor for economic development; thus, it should be the 
policy focus. However, so far as the consumer welfare 
standard in competition law is concerned, any gains from 
dynamic efficiency are required to increase the welfare of 
municipal consumers who reside within the territorial 
boundaries of that jurisdiction. Consequently, faced with a 
                                                          
23 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 524 U.S. 155 
(2004). 
24  The US follows the ‗effect doctrine‘ to prohibit the conduct that 
arises in another jurisdiction but has a direct, substantial and 
reasonably foreseeable effect in the US. See, Alison Jones and 
Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (Oxford, fifth edition) 1259-
71; The EU relies on single economic doctrine and implementation 
doctrine. See, Damien Geradin, Marc Reysen and David Henry, 
Extraterritoriality, Comity and Cooperation in EC Competition 
Law, in Andrew T. Guzman (ed.) Cooperation, Comity and 
Competition Policy (Oxford University Press, 2010) 21-44.  
25  The General Court in GlaxoSmithKline case had distinguished 
between intermediate and final consumer, Case T-168/01, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission [2006] ECR II-
2969, para118. 
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tradeoff between the short run and the long run consumer 
welfare, an antitrust agency in an emerging market will 
choose the latter, if the defendant firm, local or 
multinational, could show a net benefit arising out of the 
possible innovation to the local consumers.  
1.2 The meaning and microeconomics of innovation 
Before an argument in favor of incentivizing innovation is 
made, it is crucial to understand what innovation is. More 
important, however, is to know how innovation occurs. 
Schumpeter had suggested five different types of 
innovation– (i) the introduction of a new good or a new 
quality of a good (product innovation); (ii) the introduction 
of a new method of production, including a new way of 
handling a commodity commercially (process innovation); 
(iii) the opening of a new market (market innovation); (iv) 
the conquest of a new source of supply of raw material or 
intermediate input (input innovation); and (v) the carrying 
out of a new organization of industry (organizational 
innovation).26 Aside these, there can be social innovation 
as well. This paper, however, just focuses on technological 
product and process (TPP) innovation. The OSLO manual 
defines TPP as:  
A technological product innovation is the implementation/ 
commercialisation of a product with improved performance 
characteristics such as to deliver objectively new or 
improved services to the consumer. A technological 
process innovation is the implementation/adoption of new 
or significantly improved production or delivery methods. 
It may involve changes in equipment, human resources, 
working methods or a combination of these.27 
                                                          
26  Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An 
Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1934) 66. 
27  ©OECD (2005), Oslo Manual (3rd edition) 9. 
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Generally, product innovation pushes the demand curve 
out by increasing a consumer‘s willingness-to-pay 
(WTP)28 (Figure 2); whereas, process innovation reduces 
the price by pushing the supply curve out (Figure 3). In 
some cases, however, process innovation may also push 
the demand curve out. For example, e-commerce has made 
shopping easier and more lucrative. Process innovation 
may give a firm cost advantage over its rivals by reducing 
the price of a product.29 
 
Figure 2: A product innovation represented by a shift in the existing 
demand curve. Source (Christine Greenhalgh and Mark Rogers, 
Innovation, Intellectual property, and Economic Growth (Princeton 
University Press, 2010) p 14) 
                                                          
28  See the discussion in G.M. Peter Swann, The Economics of 
Innovation: An Introduction (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009) 50-
54. 
29 Oslo Manual (n 27) 16. 




Figure 3: Comparison between product and process innovation 
(Source: G.M. Peter Swann, The Economics of Innovation: An 
Introduction (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009) 53) A cost-saving 
process innovation relocates B to B1,bringing the price close to 
inferior product A while the quality remains the same. A product 
innovation with no additional costs shifts B to B2, bringing the 
quality closer to a superior product C while the price remains the 
same. 
Earlier it was the prevailing view that product and process 
innovation happen in succession.30 However, several 
scholars have shown that innovation is not a linear 
phenomenon, and product and process innovation take 
                                                          
30  William J. Abernathy, The productivity dilemma: Roadblock to 
Innovation in the Automobile Industry (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978); James M. Utterback and William 
J. Abernathy, ―A Dynamic Model of Process and Product 
Innovation‖ (1975) 3(6) Omega 639-56; See also, M.E. Porter, The 
technological dimension of competitive strategy in Richard S. 
Rosenbloom (ed.) Research on Technological Innovation, 
Management and Policy, Vol 1. (JAI Press Inc., 1983) 1–33.  
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place simultaneously.31 The ―chain-link model‖ developed 
by Kline and Rosenberg stresses the importance of 
marketing and invention/design stages for innovation.32 
Nowadays it is almost the unanimous view that there does 
not exist a linear relationship between R&D investment 
and innovation. In fact, a complex system of factors shapes 
innovation at the firm level and may involve a series of 
scientific, technological, organizational, financial and 
commercial activities– this, is referred to as ―innovation 
dynamo‖.33 
1.3. Systems of innovation 
As innovation (more broadly dynamic efficiency) increases 
the long run consumer welfare by pushing the supply 
and/or demand curve out, the question arises how to 
achieve this result. Innovation is a complex process that 
requires a whole eco-system. On a national level the eco-
system that consists of interrelated sub-system/actors is 
popularly known as the National Innovation System (NIS). 
Beginning with Freeman34, several scholars from the  
Neo-Shumpetarian35 tradition such as Lundval36 and 
                                                          
31  See for example, Christine Greenhalgh and Mark Rogers, 
Innovation, Intellectual property, and Economic Growth (Princeton 
University Press, 2010) 7. The authors note, ―It is also vital to 
understand that there is a feedback between the various stages: 
innovation is rarely a linear progression…There is also feedback 
between diffusion and innovation stages.‖ 
32  S.J. Kline and N. Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, in R. 
Landau and N. Rosenberg (eds.) The Positive Sum Strategy: 
Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth (National Academy 
Press, Washington, DC, 1986) 275-306. 
33 Oslo Manual (n 27) 31. 
34  C. Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: 
Lessons from Japan (Pinter: London, 1987).   
35  See in general, Horst Hanusch and Andreas Pyka,―Principles of 
Neo-Schumpeterian Economics‖ (2007) 31 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 275–289. 
36 Bengt-ÅkeLundvall, National Innovation Systems: Towards a 
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning (Pinter, London, 
1992). 
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Nelson37 attempted to explain and define NIS. The 
common ground in all the definitions is that the interaction 
between public and private institutions, which constitute 
the NIS, leads to innovation.38 
NIS serves as a conceptual framework to analyze technological 
changes in a particular country. The institutions39 forming the 
NIS may be private and public firms (either large or small), 
universities, government agencies, and government policies 
with the aim to produce science and technology (S&T) within 
national borders.40Greenhalgh and Rogers note that R&D is 
central to innovation, and may happen at any or all of these 
institutions.41 The authors also show that the percentage of 
R&D taken up by these institutions may vary across 
                                                          
37  Richard R. Nelson, National Innovation Systems: A Comparative 
Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
38  For a review of the literature on NIS see Luc Soete, Bart Verspagen 
and Bas terWeel, ―Systems of Innovation‖ UNU–MERIT,2009-
062<http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/working-
papers/abstract/?id=3863> (accessed 19 February 2016) ; See also, 
© OECD (1997), ―National Innovation System‖< http://www.oecd. 
org/science/inno/2101733.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2016).  
39 Edquist defines Institutions as ―set of common habits, routines, 
established practices, rules or laws that regulate the relations and 
interactions between individuals, groups and organisations. They 
are the rules of the games‖. See Charles Edquist, ―The Systems of 
Innovation Approach and Innovation Policy: An account of the 
state of the art‖, Lead paper presented at the DRUID Conference, 
Aalborg, June 12-15, 2001, under theme F: ‗National Systems of 
Innovation, Institutions and Public Policies‘. 
40 PatarapongIntarakumnerd, Pun-arjChairatana and Tipawan 
Tangchitpiboon, ―National Innovation System in Less Successful 
Developing Countries: the Case of Thailand‖ Research Policy 31 
(2002) 1445–1457; Akira Goto, ―Japan‘s National Innovation 
System: Current Status and Problems‖ (2000) 16(2) Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 103-13; See also, LoetLeydesdorff and Martin 
Meyer, ―Triple Helix Indicators of Knowledge-based Innovation 
Systems: Introduction to Special Issue‖ (2006) 35(10) Research 
Policy 1441-49. 
41 Greenhalgh and Rogers (n 31) 89-90. 
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countries. Thus, while assessing the potential of emerging 
markets to take up innovation, a scrutiny of all the relevant 
institutions and actors forming the NIS is important.  
In addition to the actors and institutions forming part of 
NIS, every sector has different set of actors, networks and 
institutions that characterize innovation in that particular 
sector. As a result, a separate conceptual framework was 
devised to understand different trajectories of innovation in 
different sector. This framework is known as Sectoral 
System of Innovation (SSI).42 
[A] sectoral system of innovation and production is a set of 
new and established products for specific uses and the set 
of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions 
for the creation, production and sale of those products. 
Sectoral systems have a knowledge base, technologies, 
inputs and demand. The agents are individuals and 
organizations at various levels of aggregation, with 
specific learning processes, competencies, organizational 
structure, beliefs, objectives and behaviors.43 
The concept of SSI complements the concept of NIS in 
understanding the trajectory of innovation.44 However, at the 
same time since learning and knowledge are specific to a 
sector, the SSI concept is better geared at explaining 
innovation specific to sectors. For instance, the strong link 
between universities and firms existing in the pharmaceutical 
sector may not be present in the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector.45 Moreover, some 
sectors may be more innovative as compared to others.46 
                                                          
42  Franco Malerba, ―Sectoral Systems of Innovation and Production‖ 
(2002) 31 Research Policy 247–264. 
43  ibid 
44  ibid 
45  For the links between universities and pharmaceutical firms see, 
F.M. Sherer, Pharmaceutical Innovation, in Bronwyn H. Hall and 
Nathan Rosenberg (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 
(Elsevier, 2010) 540-74. 
46  See footnote 9. 
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Against this backdrop, the actors and institutions in the 
pharmaceutical sectors are specific and are referred to as 
Pharmaceutical Innovation System (PIS). This paper does not, 
however, look into the PIS in India and Brazil to trace the 
causality between institutions and innovation. Instead, it looks 
at the outcome of the respective PIS i.e., the level of innovation, 
as measured by ―international patents‖, and then uses the results 
in suggesting suitable competition law application.  
2. Level of innovation in the Brazilian and the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector 
To measure the innovative strength in the Brazilian and the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector, this paper relies on 
―international patents‖. Patent statistics are very often 
relied upon as a measure of innovation. However, relying 
on patents as a measure of innovation has drawbacks too: 
not all patents result in innovation. Also, not all 
innovations are patented. Further, the economic value of 
patents may differ substantially.47 However, despite the 
drawbacks Furman and Hayes regard ―international 
patents‖48 as ―the most useful measure available for 
comparing innovative output across countries and over 
time.‖49 Following the same approach, this paper uses 
                                                          
47  See, Sadao Nagaoka, Kazuyuki Motohashi and Akira Goto, Patent 
Statistics as an Innovation Indicator, in Bronwyn H. Hall and 
Nathan Rosenberg (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 
(Elsevier, 2010) 1083–1127; see also, © OECD, ―The 
Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Using 
Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators Patent manual 
1994, OCDE/GD(94)114. 
48  ―International patents are defined as those patents which are 
granted by the USPTO to a non-US inventor (or in the case of the 
US, by a major foreign patent granting agency).‖ See, J.L. Furman, 
M.E. Porter and S. Stern, ―The Determinants of National 
Innovative Capacity‖ (2002) 31Research Policy 899–933. 
49  J.L. Furman and R. Hayes, ―Catching Up or Standing Still? National 
Innovative Productivity Among ‗follower‘ Countries‖ (2004) 33 
Research Policy 1329-1354; see also Furman et al (2002) (n 48). 
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―international patents‖ granted by the United States Patent 
and Trade Mark Office (USPTO) to the Indian and 
Brazilian pharmaceutical firms from 1999 to 2014 as the 
indicator of innovative strength in the pharmaceutical 
sector.50 
Fagerberg et al. have criticized relying solely on patents 
for measuring country‘s innovation system.51 They argue 
that patents are used much more intensively in some 
industries than others. Also, minor innovation/adaptations 
will not be taken into account in view of global novelty 
requirement. Further, since the domestic IP system may 
not function very well in developing countries, inventors in 
these countries may not use patents frequently. For these 
reasons, they note that most of the innovative activities in 
countries below the technology frontier and developing 
countries would get unrecognized by this approach. 
However, pharmaceutical sector is a peculiar one– patents 
are used much more intensively in this sector, because 
while the cost to innovate a new drug is enormous, it takes 
very little investment to copy a drug. For this reason patent 
propensity in this sector is very high.52 Further, relying on 
―international patents‖ as opposed to domestic patents 
                                                          
50   This approach is consistent with Furman & Hayes (2004) (n 49), 
who also used patents granted by USPTO as a measure of national 
innovative output. Some other researchers as well have used patent 
data as a proxy of national innovative capacity. See, A Hidalgo, G 
Penas, I Belda, A Alonso and D Marquina,  ―The Use of Patents to 
Assess National Innovation Systems: Evidences from Spanish 
Biotechnology‖(2014) 2(4) Intellectual Properties Rights. Intel 
Prop Rights <http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/the-use-of-
patents-to-assess-national-innovation-systems-evidences-from-
spanish-biotechnology-ipr.1000122.php?aid=29840>  (accessed 18 
February 2016). 
51 Fagerberg et al. (n 6) 
52  Arundel and Kabla found patent propensity for product innovation 
very high (79.2%) for European firms. Anthony Arundel and 
Isabelle Kabla, ―What Percentage of Innovations are Patented? 
Empirical Estimates for European Firms‖ (1998) 27(2) Research 
Policy 127-141. 
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provides a uniform benchmark against which two different 
jurisdictions can be compared, based on new-to-the-world 
innovations.  
At the time of India‘s independence in 1947, Western 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) held about 80% of the 
Indian market and drug prices were among the highest in 
the world.53 Brazil had a comparatively better position with 
47.1% of the market dominated by MNCs. Subsequently, 
by 1970, the share of MNCs increased to 77.7% in 
Brazil.54 
The year 1970 marked a watershed event in the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector, as India started granting only 
process patent. Around the same time (1969) Brazil also 
started granting only process patent. In contrast with 
Brazil, the share of MNCs in the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector fell from 68% in 1970 to 50% by 
1980.55 Subsequently, in compliance with the TRIPS 
agreement both Brazil (since 1997) and India (since 2005) 
started granting product patents as well. 
Salient features of the 
catching-up process 
India Brazil 
Size of pharmaceutical 
market in terms of local 
sales in 2005 
10.8$ billion 5.3$ billion 
Trade balance in 
pharmaceuticals in 2005 








                                                          
53  Samira Guennif and Shyama V. Ramani, ―Explaining Divergence 
in Catching-up in Pharma Between India and Brazil using the NSI 
framework‖(2012) 41Research Policy 430–441.  
54  ibid 
55  ibid 














Less than 20% in 
2005–2006, but 
over 40% in 2011 
with mergers and 
acquisitions 
70% of the 
market held by 
foreign firms 
Figure 4: A snapshot of the present state of affairs in the Indian and 
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry. (Source: Adapted from Samira 
Guennif and Shyama V. Ramani, ―Explaining divergence in catching-
up in pharma between India and Brazil using the NSI framework‖ 
(2012) 41Research Policy 430–441) 
 
As has been seen above, the Systems of Innovation 
approach provides a useful framework to answer why 
different countries had different trajectories in 
accumulation of industrial capabilities. Guennif and 
Ramani in their paper, using the NIS framework, draw a 
comprehensive comparison between the Indian and the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sector.56 The authors note ―as a 
result of their divergent capabilities accumulation, today 
Indian firms produce most generics, making the 
corresponding API [Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient] by 
themselves; while Brazilian firms have to count on 
imported API to formulate the drugs.‖57 On the basis of 
their analysis they hold that ―the primary objective of 
Indian firms is to accumulate innovation capabilities, 
whereas Brazilian firms need to expand their production 
capabilities to include API, while accumulating new drug 
discovery capabilities.‖58 
Based on the number of patents granted by the USPTO, the 
following graph shows that the innovative capabilities of 
                                                          
56  ibid 
57  ibid 
58  ibid 
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the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry substantially lag 
behind its Indian counterpart.  
 
Figure 5: Comparison between the innovative capabilities of the 
Brazilian and Indian pharmaceutical firms (Source: Author‘s 
elaboration, based on the OECD data.59) 
 
The above figure leads to the inference that the 
Pharmaceutical Innovation System (PIS) in India is 
stronger than its Brazilian counterpart, engendering more 
innovative drugs. 
                                                          
59 © OECD.Stat <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
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Figure 6: Pharmaceutical patent application in Brazil (Shares): 
Based on the percentage of patent applications filed, this graph shows 
that Brazilian firms have not shown signs of increasing innovative 
capacity vis-à-vis foreign firms. (Source: Kenneth C. Shadlen, ‗The 
Political Contradictions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from 
Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil‘ (2011) 39(2) Politics & 
Society 143–174) 
 
There are other researchers as well who support the claim 
about India‘s increasing innovative capability in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Angeli shows that post-TRIPS 
Indian pharmaceutical firms have become more innovative 
based upon an increased number of patents filed, and 
higher R&D investment. She notes that this phenomenon 
―highlights that crossborder alliances may have been 
crucial in providing the necessary financial resources, 
scientific knowledge and managerial and procedural 
expertise to do so.‖60 Mahajan corroborates this finding.61 
He shows that ever since 2005, when India started granting 
product patent as well, Indian firms have been actively 
participating in the development of New Chemical Entity 
                                                          
60  Federica Angeli, ―With the Help of a Foreign Ally: 
Biopharmaceutical Innovation in India After TRIPS‖ (2014) 29(3) 
Health Policy and Planning 280-91. 
61  M. M. Mahajan, ―The Emergence of New R&D Paradigms in the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Post TRIPS Period‖ (2011) 16 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 321–329. 
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(NCE), which is an advanced level capability in research. 
It is quite remarkable that the Indian pharmaceutical firms 
have the highest number of Drug Master File (DMF) 
amongst all key competing economies.62 
 
Figure 7: Total number (and percentage) of innovative drug and 
vaccine candidates within indigenous companies in China, India and 
Brazil grouped by stage of development shows a stark difference 
between India and Brazil. (Source: Rahim Rezaie, Anita M 
McGahan, Abdallah S Daar and Peter A Singer, ―Innovative drugs and 
vaccines in China, India and Brazil‖ (2012) 30(10) Nature 
Biotechnology 923-26.) 
 
Morel et al. recognize that all developing countries can 
take up health innovation. However, there are some 
developing countries that are more scientifically advanced 
than others. They refer to those countries as Innovative 
                                                          
62  ibid. ―A Drug Master File (DMF) is a submission to the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) that may be used to provide 
confidential detailed information about facilities, processes, or 
articles used in the manufacturing, processing, packaging, and 
storing of one or more human drugs.‖ See, Drug Master Files: 
Guidelines, U.S. Food and Drug Administration <http://www. 
fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm122886.htm>(accessed 12 October 2016). 
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Developing Countries (IDC).63 Several researchers have 
noted that the Indian pharmaceutical industry has recently 
been showing signs of from ‗imitation to innovation‘.64  In 
contrast with India, Brazilian pharmaceutical sector has not 
shown such signs of increased innovative capability, as 
evident from the above discussion. Moreover, the Indian 
PIS is strongly integrated to the global markets, whereas 
the Brazilian PIS is largely driven by domestic demand.65 
To sum up, it can be said that the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry has come a long way since the time when only 
process patents were granted. At that time the policy focus 
was to reduce prices by facilitating easy entry of local 
generic firms– short-term consumer welfare. However, 
now the India pharmaceutical is increasingly turning to 
innovation. 66Thus, to a certain extent, the policy aim in 
India could be to pursue the longrun consumer welfare. To 
this end, law should play a constructive role towards 
                                                          
63  C.M. Morel et al., ―Health Innovation Networks to Help 
Developing Countries Address Neglected Diseases,‖ Science 309, 
no. 5733 (July 2005): 401–404. 
64  Joanna Chataway, Joyce Tait and David Wield ―Frameworks for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation in Developing Countries—The Case of 
Indian Pharma‖(2007) 19(5) Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 697-708; see also, Dinar Kale and Steve Little, ―From 
Imitation to Innovation: The Evolution of R&D Capabilities and 
Learning Processes in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry‖, (2007) 
19(5) Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 589-609. 
65 Verena Sch ren, ―What a Difference a State Makes: 
Pharmaceutical Innovation After the TRIPs Agreement‖, (2013) 15 
(2) Business and Politics 217–243. 
66  Some researchers attribute the transition from ‗imitation to 
innovation‘ to India‘s acceptance of the product patents as per the 
TRIPS agreement in the year 2005. See, Dominique Bouet, ―A 
Study of Intellectual Property Protection Policies and Innovation in 
the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and Beyond‖ (2015) 38 
Technovation 31-41; NeenaBedi, P.M.S. Bedi and Balwinder S. 
Sooch, ―Patenting and R&D in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: 
Post TRIPS Scenario‖ (2013) 18 Journal of Intellectual Property 
Rights 105-110. 
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innovation. On the other hand, the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical sector has not reached this 
stage. Consequently, prima facie, the policy aim in Brazil 
should be to pursue the shortrun consumer welfare. The 
following section will illustrate this point by discussing 
compulsory licenses under competition law. 
3. Implication for competition law: a case of 
compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical sector 
This part of the paper builds upon the previous two 
sections and argues for customizing the application of 
competition law, as per the innovative capability of the 
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil and India. As has been 
seen in the previous section, the Brazilian pharmaceutical 
firms are not as innovative as their Indian counterparts. 
This part argues for factoring this reality in the application 
of competition law so far as compulsory licensing is 
concerned. 
Aside IP rights, competition law as well has bearing on 
innovation.67 The use of competition law to grant 
compulsory IP licenses has been hugely debated. The 
principal argument against compulsory licensing is that it 
has a chilling effect on innovation.68 In principle, in such 
cases it is crucial to balance short-term benefits of granting 
access against long-term goals of investment and 
innovation. However, even before this exercise is carried 
out, the competition agencies in developing countries need 
to be sure that the Agreement on the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) places no 
                                                          
67  See, © OECD (2006), ―Competition, Patents and Innovation‖, 
DAF/COMP(2007)40. 
68   It is the general perception that compelling the patent-holder to 
license her product reduces her incentive to innovate. However, 
there is empirical evidence to counter this perception. See, Colleen 
Chien, ―Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?‖ 
(2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 853. 
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restrictions on granting compulsory license under the 
competition law of the Member state. 
3.1.The legality of compulsory license under competition 
law as per the TRIPS agreement 
The TRIPS agreement provides a legal framework that 
allows competition agencies to issue compulsory licenses. 
This framework is present in the following articles. 
Art. 8(2) of the TRIPS states that: ―Appropriate measures, 
provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to 
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology.‖(Italics 
added) The term ‗abuse‘ as mentioned in Art 8(2) TRIPS is 
specific to a jurisdiction. What may be an abuse in 
developing countries may not be an abuse in a developed 
country.69 
Article 31(b) of the TRIPS agreement authorizes the 
Members to issue compulsory license ―to remedy a 
practice determined after judicial or administrative process 
to be anti-competitive.‖70 
Article 40 (2) states that ―Nothing in this Agreement shall 
prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular 
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights 
                                                          
69 Cottier also holds that the Member States to the TRIPS agreement 
should apply a competition law that suits their domestic conditions. 
He notes ―[m]embers of the WTO shape principles and rules in 
accordance with varying socioeconomic needs.‖ Thomas Cottier, 
The Doha Waiver and its Effects on the Nature of the TRIPS 
System and on Competition Law – the Impact of Human Rights, in 
IngeGovaere, HannsUllrich (eds.) Intellectual Property, Public 
Policy and International Trade (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2007) 173-
99.  
70  In fact, Section 90 (1) (ix) of the Indian Patent Act has a provision 
corresponding to Art 31 (b) of the TRIPS.  
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having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market.‖ (Italics added) 
Thus, the only pre-condition this framework attaches is the 
requirement that the impugned practice has to be held anti-
competitive after judicial or administrative process. This was 
further confirmed by the agreement reached between the US 
and Argentina under the aegis of the WTO, after the former 
questioned the provisions of the Argentine patent law No. 
24.481 that had the provision on compulsory license to 
remedy anti-competitive practices.71 Further, the Court of 
First Instance (CFI, now renamed as the General Court) in its 
Microsoft ruling asserted in clear terms that abuse of 
intellectual property rights could be checked by the 
competition authorities of the Member states in accordance 
with the power granted under the TRIPS agreement.72 
Aside the theoretical possibility, there have been actual 
cases as well where the competition agency did not shy 
away from issuing compulsory license. For instance, the 
Italian Competition Authority (ICA) issued its first 
compulsory license when a multinational company Merck 
refused to license imipenem/cilastatina (an active 
ingredient) to Dobfar, an Italian undertaking.73 
The Italian Competition Authority once again relied on 
essential facility doctrine in the Bayer74 case. However, in 
                                                          
71  WTO documents WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4, IP/D/18/Add.1, 
IP/D/22/Add.1.20 June, 2002 
72   Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-
3601 (Ct. First Instance) paras 798, 801 and 1189. 
73 ICA decision on 15 June 2005, A364 Merck—PrincipiAttivi in 
Boll. 23/2005 
74  Decision of the IAA of 28 June 2011, Case A415—Sapec 
Agro/Bayer-Helm, Bulletin No. 26/2011, p. 5. See also, Gianni De 
Stefano, ―Tough Enforcement of Unilateral Conduct at the National 
Level: Italian Antitrust Authority Sanctions Bayer and Pfizer for 
Abuse of Dominant Position (aka AstraZeneca Ruling and Essential 
Facility Doctrine in Italian Sauce)‖ (2012) 3(4) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 396-403. 
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this case no compulsory license was issued, only penalty 
was imposed. Both the Merck and Bayer case have been 
criticized on substantive grounds.75 However, no action 
was brought against the Italian government for violating 
the TRIPS agreement. 
Scholars as well have argued that competition law can be 
successfully used in order to correct the anomalies (the 
social cost of exclusion) created by the IPR system.76Some 
others have gone to the extent of lamenting that developing 
countries have not successfully used competition policy, as 
provided within the framework of the TRIPS agreement, to 
ensure distributional needs.77 
                                                          
75  See, Pablo Ibanez Colomo, ―Article 82 EC as a ―built-in‖ remedy 
in the system of Intellectual Property: the example of 
supplementary protection for pharmaceuticals in Italy‖, in Inge 
Govaere and Hanns Ullrich (eds.) Intellectual Property, Market 
Power and the Public Interest (Peter Lang, 2008) 119-142. Colomo 
argues that ―[t]he mechanism put in place by Law No. 112/02 most 
likely intended to achieve industrial policy objectives, in that 
generic manufacturers, and not consumers, were the companies 
truly benefiting from the measure.‖ 
76  See, Josef Drexl, ―The Critical Role of Competition Law in 
Preserving Public Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property 
Rights‖ In K. Maskus and J. H. Reichman (eds.), International 
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized 
Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) 709-
725; Jerome H. Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, ―Non-
voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions Historical Perspective, 
Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in 
Canada and the USA‖, (June 2003) UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on 
IPRs and Sustainable Development <http://www.ictsd.org/ 
downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf>  (accessed 18 
February 2016); HannsUllrich, ―Expansionist intellectual property 
protection and reductionist competition rules: A TRIPS 
perspective‖(2004) 7(2) Journal of International Economic Law 
401-430. 
77 Cottier (n 69); Jonathan Berger ―Advancing Public Health by Other 
Means: Using Competition Policy‖ in P Roffe, G Tansey and D 
Vivas-Eugui (eds.) Negotiating health: intellectual property and 
access to medicines (Earthscan, London, 2006) 181-203. 
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3.2. Abuse of dominance and compulsory licensing 
The concept of abuse by a dominant undertaking in 
competition law has given rise to several controversies.78 
Broadly speaking, an abuse may engender exclusionary or 
exploitative effects.79 Compulsory license can be issued under 
competition law for two different abuses. First is the case when 
a dominant pharmaceutical firm refuses to supply/share its 
patented Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) to generic 
firms. This action falls under the category of exclusionary 
practices. In the second type of case, a dominant patentee firm 
may charge excessive prices for its pharmaceutical product. 
Such abuse is an example of exploitative conduct. 
There have been precedents with respect to issuing 
compulsory licenses in both exclusionary and exploitative 
cases. So far as the former is concerned, the above 
example of Italy issuing compulsory license in the 
Merck, and the Bayer case is illustrative. In the EU, the 
case law accepts that ―charging a price which is excessive 
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value 
of the product supplied is . . . an abuse.‖80 So far EU has 
not granted compulsory license because of excessive 
prices. However, there are other jurisdictions that 
considered excessive pricing as abuse and issued 
compulsory license to remedy it. The Hazel Tau case81 in 
South Africa demonstrates that competition law can be 
successfully employed in case of excessive pricing by the 
right-holder pharmaceutical company. In this case South 
                                                          
78  See in general, Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU 
Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (Hart 
Publishing, 2012). 
79 Art 82 Guidance (n 14) para 1 and para 7. 
80  Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207 at [250]. 
81 Hazel Tau et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. 
& Aids Healthcare Foundation et al v. GlaxoSmithKline, 
Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. Case Numbers: 2002sep226 & 
2002jan357. 
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Africa‘s Competition Commission found that the 
defendants, GlaxoSmithKilne (GSK) and Boehringer 
Ingelheim (BI), had abused their dominant position by 
denying a competitor access to an essential facility, 
charging excessive prices, and engaging in exclusionary 
activities in the market for Anti-Retroviral (ARV) drugs. 
The South African Competition Commission 
recommended a compulsory license as a measure of 
penalty. Later, the Competition Commission entered into a 
settlement agreement with the defendant firms, whereby 
the latter agreed to issue several voluntary licenses.82 
While this agreement provided a speedy remedy to the 
complainants, it took away the opportunity from the 
appellate tribunal to set out the jurisprudence on such 
matters. A very interesting lesson from this case is that 
civil society organizations can take the lead to use 
competition law against the dominant originator 
multinational companies, in case the government shows 
reluctance in view of the political or diplomatic pressure.83 
3.3.The primary argument against compulsory 
licensing–Intervention adversely affects investment 
and innovation 
So far as incentivizing innovation is concerned, the 
analysis presented in Section 2, by comparing the Brazilian 
and the Indian pharmaceutical sector, showed that the PIS 
of some countries may be underdeveloped. Such countries 
may not have the requisite conditions to push the supply 
and/or the demand curve out. Thus, the short run welfare 
becomes more important than the long run gains. 
Therefore, the choice between the long run and the short 
run consumer welfare depends on the strength of the 
innovation capability in a particular sector. For example, as 
                                                          
82 See the competition commission settlement agreement <http:// 
www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_12_2003.htm>  (accessed 19 
February 2016) 
83  Berger (n 77) 
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shown in part two of this paper, Brazilian PIS is weak and 
the firms are still in the phase of imitating foreign 
technology. Consequently, competition law can aim for the 
short run gains by way of compulsory licensing in the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. On the other hand, Indian 
PIS looks vibrant, with several innovative firms. 
Therefore, the role of law should be to support 
innovation. Consequently, compulsory licensing is not the 
correct strategy in the Indian pharmaceutical sector. 
Law is only one of the institutions and actors constituting 
PIS. One nuanced observation about patents is that 
―patents magnify the incentives to innovate, but do not 
create them, in the absence of the competencies that make 
innovation possible in the first place.‖84 For instance, 
strong patent protection did not lead to innovation in the 
Italian pharmaceutical industry.85 Furthermore, the link 
between strong patents and innovation, in general, is 
highly debatable.86 One strand of research shows that 
strong IP rights foster innovation only in those countries 
that have ―initial above-average level of development and 
complexity‖.87 This observation about patents is true for 
                                                          
84  Maureen McKelvey, Orsenigo and Fabio Pammolli, 
Pharmaceuticals Analyzed Through the Lens of a Sectoral 
Innovation System, in Franco Malerba (ed.) Sectoral Systems of 
Innovation:  Concepts, Issues and Analyses of Six Major Sectors in 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 80. 
85  F. M. Scherer and S. Weisburst, ―Economic Effects of 
Strengthening Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Italy‖ (1995) 
26 (6) International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright 
Law 1009–1024. 
86  One view is that patents hardly encourage any innovation. For a 
general review see, ‗A Question of Utility‘ The Economist (August 
8th 2015) <http://www.economist.com/node/21660559> (accessed 
11 October 2016). 
87 Cassandra Mehlig Sweet and Dalibor Sacha Eterovic Maggio, ―Do 
Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase Innovation?‖ (2015) 66 
World Development 665-677. In fact the authors observe that 
―[f]ordeveloping countries, our results show that IPR has at besta non-
Competition Law and Compulsory Licenses...Innovation Approach 
 186 
competition law as well. In the absence of supporting 
actors and institutions, reliance on competition law, in 
itself, to foster innovation will be detrimental to consumer 
welfare. Consequently, the evolution of law should be in 
sync with the rest of the institutions forming part of the 
PIS. The following observation of Reichman about the 
stimulating effects of IP on innovation in different sectors 
holds equally good for competition law. 
In China, India, and Brazil, moreover, knowledge economy 
skills and capacities have apparently reached the point 
where the stimulating effects of IPRs will influence 
different sectors and stakeholders quite differently, 
depending on the extent to which they are still driven by 
imitation-related innovation or investments in basic, or at 
least relatively original, R&D.88 
Another argument against strong intellectual property 
rights in developing countries is that the multinational 
pharmaceutical companies spend very little amount on 
research on diseases that are relevant to developing 
countries. Instead, they choose to spend where there is a 
large market in developed countries.89 However, the 
                                                                                                                   
significant effect on economic complexity and most often has a 
negative effect.‖ While supporting the fundamental premise of this 
paper, the present research disagrees on the same recommendation 
made for developing countries in general.; see also, John Hudson and 
Alexandru Minea, ―Innovation, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
Economic Development: A Unified Empirical Investigation‖ (2013) 46 
World Development 66-78; see also, Yee Kyoung Kim, Keun Lee, 
Walter G. Park and Kineung Choo, ―Appropriate intellectual property 
protection and economic growth in countries at different levels of 
development‖ (2012) 41(2) Research Policy 358-375. 
88  Jerome H. Reichman, ―Intellectual Property in the Twenty-first 
Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?‖(2009) 
46(4) Houston Law Review 1115-1185 at 1124. 
89  Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy,Report 
of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights (London, 2002) 
<http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.p
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pharmaceutical industry is a peculiar sector. Every API is 
aimed at treating a particular disorder, and in certain cases 
even the formulations may be separate markets depending 
on their substitutability with each other. There are diseases 
that are specific to emerging markets or tropical areas, 
such as dengue, malaria and tuberculosis. Some 
multinational firms are investing in diseases specific to 
emerging markets.90 For instance Pfizer Asia Research was 
established in 2006 to ―seed, seek, source, and spark‖ 
innovation in Asia using a virtual biotech model across the 
region with therapeutic focus on emerging market diseases 
such as liver disease and tuberculosis.91 In such a case, 
incentivizing investment would ensure more welfare. 
In the absence of legal and economic reasons for not 
issuing compulsory license under competition law, the 
only reason for not doing so is the fear that any such 
intervention will have adverse effect on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). However, by giving the example of 
China, Reichman allays this fear. China managed to attract 
massive FDI despite ―woefully inadequate intellectual 
property protection‖, as it had a large market; on the other 
hand some small countries, despite having strong IP 
regime attracted little FDI, as their market provided less 
economic opportunities.92 It cannot be denied that a 
                                                                                                                   
df> (accessed 19 February 2016); for a discussion on this issue see 
―Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic 
Development‖, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, WHO, 
(Geneva, 2001) 79 <http://apps.who.int/iris/ bitstream/10665/42435/ 
1/924154550X.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2016). As per this report the 
expenditure on the ‗diseases of the poor‘ (Type II and especially Type 
III diseases) is between 5 percent of the total R&D.  
90 Evolving R&D for emerging markets, Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery 9, 417-420 (June 2010). 
91  ibid  
92  Jerome H. Reichman, ‗Compulsory Licensing of Patented 
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options‘, (2009) 37(2) 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 247-263 at 256.  
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country that issues compulsory license on patented 
pharmaceuticals will face stiff opposition. However, 
interestingly, if such countries ―stand up‖ for their legal 
rights, they would find protection under the WTO rules, as 
compulsory licensing is in complete conformity with the 
TRIPS agreement.93 
3.4. Other arguments against compulsory licensing 
Even if the above analysis presents a convincing case for 
issuing compulsory licenses in order to ensure consumer 
welfare, it cannot be denied that the concerned country 
may not have the firms that can prepare generics of 
branded medicines. Most of the emerging economies lack 
the capacity to manufacture generic copy of the drugs in 
question, or cannot procure the key active ingredients, thus 
rendering the grant of compulsory license a vain exercise.94 
In such cases, these countries can benefit from the newly 
inserted Article 31bis of the TRIPS agreement that allows 
another country with technological capacity to export the 
drug to the country issuing compulsory license.95 
It has also been suggested that instead of issuing 
compulsory license, competition agency can ask the patent 
holder to reduce the prices, as such an option is ―easier to 
apply and less controversial than a mandatory 
obligation‖.96 There are practical problems with this 
                                                          
93 Ibid at 258. Reichman by giving the example of USTR Section 301 
listing of Thailand, states that a country may take recourse to 
Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), if 
it believes that the issued compulsory license is in violation of the 
TRIPS agreement. However, a country cannot unilaterally impose 
sanctions against a country that issues compulsory license.  
94  ibid 
95 See WTO, ―Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement‖ (Decision of 
6 December 2005)<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/w
tl641_e.htm> (accessed 20 February 2016); see also, Reichman (n 
92). 
96  R O' Donoghue and AJ Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 
102 TFEU, (Hart Publishing, Second Edition, 2013) 517. 
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suggestion. The competition agencies in emerging markets, 
with their scant resources, cannot watch over the 
negotiation process. The difficulty to regulate prices, in 
fact, makes a strong case for structural remedies or similar 
remedies such as compulsory licenses that could reduce the 
barrier to entry or re-entry.97 One commentator, therefore, 
argues ―[u]nfair pricing should be dealt with by attacking 
the cause of the defendant‘s market power, of which high 
prices are a symptom.‖98 
3.5. The need to contextualize competition law 
The young competition regimes in developing world have 
a last-mover advantage, in that they can benefit from the 
rich competition law jurisprudence of more mature 
jurisdictions such as the EU and the US. On one hand this 
approach allows developing countries to learn the nuances 
of competition law enforcement, on the other, a blind 
imitation can have detrimental effects for consumers and 
economy. 99 Compulsory licensing in competition law is 
one such issue where emerging markets need to base their 
decision on the prevailing economic realities of a sector, as 
                                                          
97 ibid 736. 
98  M Siragusa, ―Excessive Prices In Energy Markets: Some 
Unorthodox Thoughts‖ in C-D Ehlerman and M Marquis (eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC, (Hart Publishing, 2007) 643-649. 
99  On the benefits of the competition law transplant from developed to 
developing countries, see Michal S. Gal and Eleanor M. Fox, 
―Drafting competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning 
from experience‖ (2014) New York University Law and Economics 
Working Papers. Paper 374< http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1378&context=nyu_lewp>(accessed 3 October 2016). 
The authors note that, ―The challenge is to identify those instances 
in which the unique characteristics lead in a different direction and 
outweigh the motivation to follow established competition law 
regimes, and to design rules accordingly.‖; see also,  E. Fox, 
‗Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path‘ 
(2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law 211. 
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the contemporary EU and the US jurisprudence on 
compulsory licensing echoes their stage of economic and 
technological development.  
The European Commission has recognized the increasing 
significance of innovation in its policy documents. In 
particular, the guidance paper on the application of Article 
102 (ex Article 82) asserts that refusal to deal will result in 
consumer harm when the competitors are prevented from 
―bringing innovative goods or services to market and/or 
where follow-on innovation is likely to be stifled.‖100 Thus, 
in the EU there has been an attempt to align competition 
law with innovation. The EU case law on refusal to deal 
has developed ‗exceptional circumstances‘ test, where the 
right-holder can be mandated to provide access to its 
facility.101 One of the exceptional circumstances is that the 
refusal prevents the appearance of a new product on the 
market. The ‗new product‘ test was first devised in the 
Magill case and further developed in the IMS and 
Microsoft102 cases. 
The European Commission applied the ‗incentive balance 
test‘ in the Microsoft case.103 As per this test, ―the possible 
negative impact of an order to supply on …[incumbent‘s] 
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact 
on the level of innovation of the whole industry‖. 104 It is 
submitted that the Commission‘s ‗incentive balance‘ test is 
not suited for developing countries (more importantly 
those sectors) that do not exhibit any signs of innovation, 
                                                          
100  Art 82 Guidance (n 14) para 87 
101 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v 
Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743,para.50; IMS Health [2004] 
ECR I-5039, para.35; Volvo v. Veng[1988] ECR 6211, para. 9.  
102  Microsoft COMP/C-3/37.792 
103 On this test, see in general Simonetta Vezzoso, ―The Incentives 
Balance Test in the EU Microsoft Case: a Pro-innovation 
‗Economics-based‘ Approach‖ (2006) 27 (7) European 
Competition Law Review 382-390. 
104  Microsoft COMP/C-3/37.792. para 783. 
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as possible negative effects on incumbent‘s incentive to 
innovate will always be higher than the level of innovation 
of the whole industry. 
The US takes a similar approach to compulsory licensing 
as that of the EU. Even though some lower courts used the 
term ‗essential facility‘ categorically in their judgments, 
the US Supreme Court, however, has always refrained 
from using this terminology. The latest jurisprudence on 
this concept, evident from the Trinko105case, indicates the 
reluctance of the Supreme Court in granting access to 
plaintiff, as such intervention disincentivizes innovation. 
The US Supreme Court famously observed that: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not 
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at 
least for a short period is what attracts 'business acumen' 
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the 
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power 
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct.106 
The relationship between IP and Competition law is 
complex, and arguably varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. In the EU, the Microsoft case on refusal to 
supply harmonized IP and competition law by ensuring 
that compulsory license under competition law can be 
issued only when innovation is at stake. Thus,  
                                                          
105 Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, 
LLP 540 US 398 (2004). 
106  Ibid. The Supreme Court also observed: ―Compelling such firms to 
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the 
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the 
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities.‖ 
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competition law and IP have the same objective– 
innovation.107 However, as seen in Part II of this paper, 
some sectors in emerging markets, may not have the 
innovative capability. Consequently, innovation cannot be 
the criterion for antitrust intervention in such sectors in 
emerging markets.  
Drexl argues in favor of contextualizing competition law 
and policy so that it can take into account different 
cultural, socio-economic and political background of 
developing countries.108 He observes that ―[n]eoclassical 
competition economics has a tendency to ignore the 
general economic context of markets in a given 
jurisdiction‖ and adds ―[h]ence, contextualization is key 
for assisting developing jurisdictions to make the most 
appropriate policy choices in structuring their competition 
law system‖.109The research presented in this paper has 
attempted to contextualize competition law not only as per 
the technological reality of a particular sector in a 
developing country. 
It is accepted that the goals of antitrust are fluid in nature and 
change according to the stage of economic development.110 
The WIPO development agenda as well recognizes 
that ‗[n]orm-setting activities shall take into account different 
                                                          
107  See also, Ariel Ezrachi and Mariateresa Maggiolino, ―European 
Competition Law, Compulsory Licensing, and Innovation‖ (2012) 
8(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 595–614. 
108  Josef Drexl, Consumer Welfare and Consumer Harm: Adjusting 
Competition Law and Policies to the Needs of Developing 
Jurisdictions, in Michal S. Gal et al. (eds.), The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for 
Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 283. 
109  ibid at 285 
110 American Bar Association, ―Report on Antitrust Policy Objectives‖ 
(2003) Section of Antitrust Law <http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/report_policyobjectiv
es.authcheckdam.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2016). 
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levels of development‘.111 Indeed, the balance between IP and 
antitrust has not been uniform always, even in the most 
developed jurisdictions. For instance, in the US patent laws 
made way for competition until 1982, when competition law 
was applied aggressively against IP.112 Balancing the positive 
and negative effects of compulsory license is not an exact 
science, even with the most sophisticated economic tools.113 
Therefore, in principle, a competition agency has to rely upon 
probability of benefit or harm arising from the intervention. 
As shown in Part 2 of this paper, the innovative capability of 
sectors varies in different emerging markets. Consequently, in 
case of compulsory license, capacity to innovate should factor 
in the balance of probabilities exercise. Flowing from the 
research is the proposition that so far as the balance between IP 
and anti-trust is concerned, not only does it vary from sector to 
sector, it also changes through time. The shifting of balance 
from anti-trust to IP in the US demonstrates this successfully.114 
                                                          
111 WIPO, ―The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO 
Development Agenda‖ (2007) Cluster B, Recommendation No. 15 
< http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ recommendations. 
html> (accessed 20 February 2016). 
112 Reichman (n 88) 
113 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 96) 523; To see how the competition 
agencies have to balance the short run losses against the long run 
gains, see © OECD, The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust 
Proceedings 2012 DAF/COMP (2012) 23. 
114  See, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust 
Interface, in3 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 1979 (ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law 2008), Chapter 79, Available at SSRN 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287628> 
(accessed 20 February 2016) Hovenkamp argues ―[e]ver since the 
antitrust laws were passed, antitrust and IP have had to 
accommodate one another, but they have done so in different ways 
in different periods. The early twentieth century was an era of IP 
expansion and antitrust accommodation. During this period even 
when the Supreme Court saw fit to make IP yield, it frequently did 
so on ―misuse‖ rather than antitrust grounds. By contrast, beginning 
during the New Deal and extending through the Warren era, the 
Supreme Court was more inclined to view patents as inherently 
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Law interacts with market in very interesting ways. On one 
hand, it is shaped by the underlying technologies and 
economics115; on the other, it also influences the 
development of sectors. For example, loose IP rights in 
India (until 2005) strengthened the pharmaceutical 
industry. Thus, law has both positive and normative 
features. The analysis presented in the paper is positive in 
nature, inasmuch as it looked into the present state of 
innovation capabilities, captured by the conceptual 
framework of Sectoral System of Innovation (SSI), and 
accordingly made prescriptions for competition law in 
Brazil and India. However, being mindful that the 
normative objective of law should be to maximize welfare, 
the stress should be on nudging the sector towards 
innovation. Consequently, even in emerging markets resort 
to compulsory license should be made only in exceptional 
circumstances.  
4. Conclusion 
Compulsory licensing in competition law have always 
been a controversial issue. Scholars have criticized 
compulsory licensing as it disincentivizes innovation. 
Especially, in sectors where innovation occupies the center 
stage, such as the pharmaceutical sector, issuing 
compulsory license may have far reaching adverse effects 
on welfare. Aside this, there are other reasons as well that 
have prevented the emerging markets from using 
compulsory license as a potent competition law tool. On 
the other hand, welfare in the short run is important too, 
                                                                                                                   
anticompetitive and to interpret the antitrust laws expansively. The 
result was overly aggressive and sometimes even silly antitrust 
rules, such as those for patent ties, that found antitrust violations 
when the defendant had no real power and there was no realistic 
prospect of economic harm.‖  
115  For example, whether law and regulation should provide for Local 
Loop Unbundling (LLU) depends upon the technologies (copper, 
fiber or broadband) that are available in the last mile. A country‘s 
laws are many a times path dependent.  
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especially when merely ensuring incentives to innovate 
may not bring about the desired results, in the absence of 
other supporting institutions and actors. 
This paper has taken a novel approach to assist competition 
agencies in making the optimal choice between the short 
run and the long run consumer welfare, faced with the 
trade-off. After explaining what innovation is, this paper 
investigated the Sectoral System of Innovation (SSI) in the 
pharmaceutical sectors of India and Brazil. Innovation is a 
complex process and results from the interaction among 
several institutions and actors specific to a sector. The 
comparison between India and Brazil showed that whereas 
the Indian firms have started moving up the R&D value 
chain, the Brazilian firms have little innovative capability. 
A legal analysis showed that issuing compulsory licenses 
under competition law is in perfect harmony with the 
TRIPS agreement. Building upon the sectoral enquiry and 
legal analysis, the paper made the prescription that 
compulsory licensing can be a valid and effective policy 
tool to ensure welfare in the Brazilian pharmaceutical 
sector; however, with better innovative capability the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry would be adversely 
affected by compulsory licenses. The approach employed 
here has more immediate policy implications for the 
countries with few or no innovative capability, such as 
countries in the sub-Saharan Africa.  
The paper is addressed to policy makers and competition 
agencies in emerging markets. It has been witnessed that a 
mere threat to use compulsory license can compel the 
monopolist pharmaceutical company to reduce prices. In 
this regard, the example of Brazil is worth emulating for 
developing countries. Brazil successfully used the threat of 
compulsory licenses to promote its National STD/AIDS 
Programme. Therefore, compulsory licensing under 
competition law gives more negotiating strength to 







That great, growling engine of change…technology.1 
Innovation is a key driver of development. In developing 
countries innovation also helps deal with socio-economic 
issues. Therefore, innovation should figure in the policy 
sphere in emerging markets. This thesis is an effort to 
stress innovation in the competition analysis in developing 
countries. The research here, however, does not undermine 
the importance of the short run objectives. In the absence 
of any innovative capabilities it makes little sense to 
achieve innovation through legal provisions– after all, law 
is just one of the institutions that can augment innovation. 
The research here is mindful of this limitation, and 
scientifically enunciates this argument.2 This thesis, 
however, challenges the predominant understanding that 
the role of competition law in developing countries should 
be to ensure only the short run benefits.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, innovation is not just 
a „first world‟ prerogative. It is true that the nature of 
innovation in emerging markets is different.3 For example, 
in early stages of development incremental innovation is 
the dominant form of innovation. Arguably, high-technology 
innovation matters at a later stage of development.4 
                                                          
1  Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, 1970. (Harper, S&S). 
2  Especially the fourth paper, Competition Law and Compulsory 
Licenses in Emerging Markets: A Systems of Innovation Approach. 
3 Jan Fagerberg, Martin Srholec and Bart Verspagen, “Innovation 
and Economic Development”(2009) UNU-MERIT, Working Paper 
Series, NO. 2009-032. 
4  OECD (2012), “Innovation for development: The challenges ahead”, 
in OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012, OECD 
Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_outlook-2012-7-en> 




However, there are a few companies in developing world 
that pursue radical R&D as well. For instance, Embraer in 
Brazil (the world-wide third largest supplier of midrange 
aircraft), Huawei (a leading telecommunications firm from 
China), and Infosys (a global IT services provider in India) 
conduct cutting-edge R&D activities.5 Regardless of the 
nature of innovation that developing countries pursue, 
innovation needs to be safeguarded and promoted through 
the supporting legal and regulatory framework.  
Discussing innovation in the context of emerging markets 
is important for one more reason: the new „digital age‟ has 
brought the issue of innovation more prominently in the 
regulatory policy sphere in developing countries. The 
advancement in the ICT technology has given rise to a new 
form of business model that is popularly known as „sharing 
economy‟, where market players share products and 
services with consumers instead of owning them. Uber taxi 
service is one of the examples of „sharing economy‟.6 This 
form of business model presents challenges not only for 
the traditional brick-and-mortar businesses, but also for the 
regulatory regimes both in the developed and developing 
world. The following example illustrates this phenomenon. 
Kenya in the recent past witnessed violent protests against 
Uber taxi sharing service by regular taxi operators.7 Such 
                                                          
5  Maximilian von Zedtwitz, “International R & D Strategies in 
Companies from  Developing  Countries  –  the  Case  of  China ” 
 UNCTAD  (2005)  <http://unctad.org/Sections/meetings/docs/ 
zedtwitz_paper_en.pdf> (accessed 23 May 2016) 
6  The other examples can be Airbnb, a popular accommodation 
providing service; and Fon, a start-up that enables people to share 
their home Wi-Fi service in exchange for getting Wi-Fi from other 
users of the same service. 
7  Erica  Taschler, “A Crumbling Monopoly: The Rise of Uber and 
the Taxi Industry‟s Struggle to Survive”, Institute for Consumer 
Antitrust Studies <http:// www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/ 
antitrust/pdfs/ publications/ newsviews/Erica%20Taschler%20New 
%20%20Views%20With%20Edits%20%20Footnotes.pdf> 
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protests against Uber are not new. In the past Uber 
witnessed similar protests in Europe as well. Like other 
parts of the world, the business model of Uber in Kenya 
has led to disruption of the entrenched regulated monopoly 
of traditional taxi services, which has benefited the 
consumers eventually. In Kenya, Uber drivers charge half 
of what regular Taxi drivers charge.8At the heart of the 
protest is the allegation that Uber does not have to comply 
with the onerous regulations that regular taxi services have 
to comply with, which makes Uber services substantially 
cheaper than regular taxis. Thus, Uber has been accused of 
unfair competition. Such allegations led some countries 
such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Spain to put severe 
restrictions on Uber. Further, a class action suit was also 
filed against Uber in US, alleging that the company 
facilitates a horizontal price fixing cartel amongst the 
drivers.9 This may trigger antitrust scrutiny against Uber in 
other parts of the world as well. 
All of us who know or have used Uber would agree that it 
is a revolutionary innovation that has benefited the 
consumers immensely. It is very convenient to book a cab, 
that too at very cheap prices, through the Uber website or 
App. The cases such as Uber are new for the regulators, as 
such technological issues conventionally did not figure in 
                                                                                                                   
(accessed 23 May 2016); see also, African Antitrust & Competition 
Law News & Analysis, “Uber Africa: Increased Competitiveness 
Not a Boon For Entrenched Monopolies” <https://africanantitrust. 
com/2016/02/03/kenyan-cabbies-complain-the-uber-competition-
saga-reaches-east-africa/ > (accessed 23 May 2016). 
8„ Nairobi Taxi Drivers Launch Own Battle Against Uber‟, Nairobi 
News, 25 January 2016 <http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/jobs/ 
nairobi-taxi-drivers-launch-own-battle-against-uber/> (accessed 23 
May 2016). 
9 Spencer Meyer, individually and on behalf of those similarly 
situated v Travis Kalanick, in United States District Court Southern 
District of New York <http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/ 




regulatory analysis. It has been observed that very often 
the existing regulations are outdated, and cannot 
completely accommodate technological issues.10 Any 
regulatory scrutiny, including antitrust, therefore, must 
protect innovation while determining allegations against 
firms. Since the new technology and business models are 
spreading to developing world, the regulators there as well 
should prepare to accommodate innovation in the 
conventional regulatory analysis.  
The internationalization of R&D as well is increasingly 
bringing innovative activities to developing countries. 
Back in the 1980s and 1990s the R&D internationalization 
process was restricted to the triad region [North America, 
Western Europe, and Japan] of developed economies; 
however, now the MNC R&D is shifting to developing 
countries such as China and India.11 Developing countries 
are becoming lucrative off-shoring R&D destinations for 
several reasons such as cheap local expertise, good talent 
resources and more permissive regulatory environment to 
conduct research. Often MNCs choose the merger way to 
disperse R&D activity in developing countries.12 In such 
cases, antitrust regulator should weigh rise in the market 
power of merged firm against alleged efficiency gains 
from increased R&D and innovation. 
                                                          
10 Desirée van Welsum, “Sharing is Caring? Not Quite. Some 
Observations About „the Sharing Economy‟” (2016)  Background 
Paper, World Bank <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/ 
publicdoc/ 2016/1/308161452529903561/WDR16-BP-Sharing-is-
caring-DWELSUM.pdf> (accessed 23 May 2016) 
11 Gert Bruche, “The Emergence of China and India as New 
Competitors in MNCs‟ Innovation Networks” (2009) 11 (3) 
Competition & Change 267-288; Lee Branstetter, Guangwei Li and 
Francisco Veloso, The Rise of International Convention, in (Adam 
Jaffe and Benjamin Jones, eds.)  The Changing Frontier: 
Rethinking Science and Innovation Policy (2015, University of 
Chicago Press) 135-168. 
12 ibid; see also Maximilian von Zedtwitz (n 5) 
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The issue of innovation may arise in cases other than 
mergers as well– for instance, in R&D joint ventures and 
co-development agreements. Some multinational 
pharmaceutical companies have established such joint 
ventures with research labs in developing countries.13In 
these cases, cooperation in innovation may result in 
collusion in other markets where the parties to the 
agreement would otherwise compete with each other. 
However, this form of cooperation is important for a solid 
innovation system. Thus, antitrust regulator should take 
due account of innovation gains while determining any 
alleged anticompetitive behavior.  
For the reasons discussed above, therefore, this thesis is an 
attempt to assist developing countries in understanding the 
importance of innovation and accommodate the same in 
antitrust scrutiny. One may question why competition law 
has been chosen as a regulatory means to support 
innovation. Innovation requires incentives, and IP rights 
are one of the means to ensure those incentives by 
conferring legal monopoly over a product or process for 
certain duration. However, the concomitant market power 
that is manifested in the form of high prices may go against 
the public policy objective of ensuring cheap prices in 
emerging market. To this end, competition law can be a 
source to encourage price competition and reduce the 
market power of market players. However, in this process, 
competition law intervention may disincentivize innovative 
                                                          
13  For example: “A first-of-its-kind initiative, Hilleman Laboratories 
is an equal joint-venture partnership formed between Merck & Co., 
a global research-driven pharmaceutical company and Wellcome 
Trust, a global charitable foundation dedicated to human and 
animal health. Headquartered in India, Hilleman Laboratories is a 
not-for-profit organization leveraging a cadre of talented scientists 
from around the globe.” <http://www.hillemanlabs.org/about-





activity. Further, mergers as well can lead to rise in market 
power. However, in some cases rise in market power and 
anticipated anticompetitive short run losses may be off set 
or more than off set by increased capability to innovate. In 
such cases the dilemma is between keeping the prices low 
and incentivizing innovation by accepting the market 
power of the innovative firm. As innovation is important 
for emerging markets as well, the optimal role of 
competition law needs to be decided to support innovation 
against the socio-economic, political, and institutional 
environment. For these reasons, this thesis has investigated 
the role that competition law and policy can play to 
support innovation by discussing the examples of the ICT 
and pharmaceutical sectors in developing countries. The 
research, however, may prove helpful in understanding the 
role that competition law can play in fostering innovation 
in other sectors as well. 
The thesis comprises of four papers. Each paper has its 
own set of research questions and methodology. However, 
the collective contribution of the four papers is to highlight 
the importance of innovation and diffusion of new 
technology within the context of developing countries, and 
then suggest a supportive antitrust framework to promote 
innovation in the ICT and pharmaceutical sectors, against 
the socio-economic, and institutional background in 
developing countries.  
In addition, the research also throws light on the nature of 
competition law in emerging markets. In fact, determining 
the nature of competition law is the starting point before 
innovation can be accommodated in competition law 
analysis. The thesis underscores that the mainstream tools 
of competition law can account for different economic 
circumstances prevailing in developing countries–thus, 
there is no need to tweak the substantive competition law 
tools. However, the thesis agrees that the institutional 
environment in emerging markets is different, and thus 
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enforcement should be mindful of the institutional 
limitations.  
1. Reflection on the main issues 
As the thesis is predominantly about innovation, it starts 
with answering what dynamic efficiency, of which 
innovation is a part, means. In fact, the first paper, A 
Conceptual Framework to Identify Dynamic Efficiency, 
does not focus only on emerging markets. The paper 
pointed out that there was no unanimously agreed upon 
definition of dynamic efficiency in the literature. Whereas, 
economists, in general, are concerned with the concept of 
efficiency without stressing much on the type, legal 
scholars too have not devoted any attention to define 
dynamic efficiency. This may cause problems with respect 
to legal enforcement, as without a legally accepted 
definition, identification of claims based on dynamic 
efficiency may not stand legal scrutiny before competition 
agencies and courts. After analyzing and finding 
limitations of several definitions of dynamic efficiency, the 
paper proposed the following definition of dynamic 
efficiency. 
Dynamic efficiencies are related to the ability of a firm and 
its incentives to introduce new products or processes of 
production (or to improve existing ones) by adopting new 
technology or enhancing knowledge endogenously, i.e. to 
move the efficient frontier of production faster or further 
forward. Dynamic efficiencies are therefore linked to 
innovation, learning by doing and research and 
development activities; contrary to static efficiencies, then, 
they display their effects generally over time.14 
The investigation in the ICT sector, in paper two, Access 
and Investment in the ICT Sector for Developing 
                                                          
14 A Conceptual Framework to Identify Dynamic Efficiency (2015) 




Countries, revealed that the new ICT technology has better 
potential to foster inclusive development, better 
governance including reducing corruption, and improving 
health and education. Additionally, ICT acts as a platform 
sector and enables further innovation. In fact, ICT is a key 
part of National Innovation System (NIS).15 Also, state-of-
the-art ICT technology is essential to overcome the „digital 
divide‟ between developed and developing countries. 
Consequently, in the catch-up process ICT is a critical 
factor.16 But, the latest ICT technology has high price to 
support innovation and diffusion. Thus, most of the people 
in developing countries, including small businesses, would 
not be able to access new technology if the prices are 
prohibitively high. Therefore, the ICT has to be efficient 
and affordable at the same time. The second paper of the 
thesis was an effort in this direction, in that it treaded a 
middle path and suggested ways to ensure investment in 
new technology without jeopardizing the cardinal aim of 
ensuring cheap access to the latest ICT technology. The 
paper discussed two regulatory policies, Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU) and Universal Service Obligation 
(USO) that may disincentivize diffusion of the latest ICT 
in developing countries.  
The paper investigated the substitutability between 
wireless and wireline telephony, as the changes in 
technology affect regulatory policies. The paper looked at 
the qualitative differences along with changing usage 
pattern in developing countries to gauge substitutability, 
and found that basically for economic reasons (as wireless 
is cheaper than fixed telephony) wireless is a substitute for 
wireline in local loop, especially after the advent of new 
                                                          
15  See for example Alexander W. Wiseman, “ICT-integrated 
education and national innovation systems in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries” (2012) 59 (2) Computers & Education 
607-618. 
16  Jan Fagerberg et al. (n 3) 
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technologies such as 4G. Also, a disruptive innovation 
analysis suggested that wireless has started disrupting the 
wireline telephony. This finding has a bearing on the LLU 
policy– developing countries may leapfrog to using high 
capacity wireless services in local loop. Thus, there is no 
requirement of unbundling local loops. Moreover, LLU 
disincentivizes rolling out new fiber optic. The paper, 
therefore, concludes against LLU in developing countries. 
The rationale behind providing universal service is 
preventing exclusion, both geographic and social. USO 
was traditionally financed through cross subsidies: low-
cost and high-income consumers pay prices above cost to 
subsidize high-cost and low-income consumers. USO, 
however, acts as disincentive for telecom service 
providers. Especially when the market is competitive, USO 
may discourage investment. On the other hand, universal 
service leads to positive social externalities, network 
effects, boost in productivity, supports economic growth, 
reduces energy consumption, and increases quality of life. 
Thus, to strike a balance between incentivizing the private 
sector for spreading latest technology and ensuring telecom 
access to the poor, the paper suggests the mechanism of the 
Universal Service Fund (USF) – a fund generated by 
taxing existing telecom services. Telecom service 
providers bid for the subsidies out of the USF. The 
company that bids for the lowest subsidy wins the bid. 
There are several benefits of the USF–USF does not distort 
the market, mimics the market outcome at the least cost 
and thus provides sufficient incentives for efficient entry 
and investment. The USF mechanism is also transparent 
and technology neutral. 
Overall the paper showed that there are regulatory choices 
available that incentivize innovation and diffusion of latest 





The focus of enquiry shifted from the ICT sector to the 
pharmaceutical sector in the third and fourth paper. 
Pharmaceutical just like the ICT is a high-technology 
sector, where innovation may demand monitory incentives. 
However, high prices of drugs may go against the public 
policy objective of ensuring cheap access to healthcare. 
This may be a motivation to use competition law as a tool 
to ensure cheap prices, for example by blocking the 
acquisition of local generic pharmaceutical firms by 
foreign branded firms. There may also be fears that in the 
absence of any local generic drug producers, any 
compulsory license issued on a foreign drug would be 
practically meaningless. In some cases, however, such 
cross-border M&As may be a source of efficiency gains 
including innovation. For these reasons, the third paper, 
Pharmaceutical Mergers and their Effect on Access and 
Efficiency: A Case of Emerging Markets, investigated the 
issue of cross-border M&As in the pharmaceutical sector 
in emerging markets. The paper showed that even by 
relying on the traditional competition law tools, welfare 
loss as a result of mergers could be accounted for. Relying 
upon the concept of potential competition, the research 
demonstrated that for emerging markets it is possible to 
address any welfare losses arising from the foreign 
takeover of substitutable generic drugs that are in the 
pipeline of local firms. 
The research, thereafter, looked into the alleged efficiency 
claims arising out of M&As in developing countries. While 
analyzing these issues, the research took account of socio-
economic, and institutional environment in emerging markets. 
Specifically the research dealt with the following issues. 
A. The correct welfare standard for developing countries-
Welfare standards decide the distribution of wealth 
between consumers and producers. The paper advocated 
the consumer welfare standard–that gives priority to 
consumer surplus over producer surplus– for developing 
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countries, as the incidence of unemployment is high and 
firm ownership is concentrated in emerging markets. 
B. Merger to monopoly cases- The research chose to 
answer this question, as in emerging markets concentration 
levels may be high in general, and in the pharmaceutical 
sector in particular, owing to high entry barriers in the 
form of exorbitant R&D and marketing costs. After 
looking at the treatment of merger to monopoly cases in 
EU and US, the paper argued that there should not be a 
blanket prohibition in the cases of merger to monopoly. 
Transactions should be prohibited only when there is a 
likely consumer harm that cannot be offset by efficiencies. 
The prime reason for advocating this view is that the 
relationship between market structure and innovation is 
unclear. Thus, it should not matter if the merger results in 
monopoly, so long as the parties can prove a strong 
possibility to achieve efficiency. 
C. When the consumer harm and efficiencies occur in 
different markets- Emerging markets suffer from wide 
socio-economic disparities. Sometimes efficiencies are 
argued in a market that is different from the market that 
experiences harm. Thus, technically, there are two 
different groups of consumers. In such a scenario basing 
the decision solely on aggregate welfare is not socially 
desirable. Thus, the paperargued against recognizing cross-
market efficiencies in developing countries. 
Further, in view of the general institutional environment in 
emerging markets– new and immature regulator, self-
serving behavior and lack of established competition law 
jurisprudence- the paper advocated adoption of merger 
guidelines. Merger review guidelines can be a good way to 
discourage ideological deviations and set out an analytical 
framework. 
This research was a starting point and by no means 




stress the importance of efficiencies in merger analysis and 
provide a workable framework in the peculiar socio-
economic settings of emerging markets. Although a case-
by-case approach is warranted when the choice is hard 
between the short run and the long run, the research has 
aimed to instill confidence in competition agencies when 
efficiencies are at stake.  
The third paper also discussed the nature of competition 
law in developing markets. The paper argued that the 
general characteristics of a jurisdiction do not make a case 
for separate substantive standards in competition law. The 
paper showed that the competition assessment in 
developing countries depends on the socio-economic 
realities of a sector, and institutional realities of that 
jurisdiction. This theoretical framework guided the 
analysis of issues of access to generics and efficiencies of 
production.  
Even though innovation, or dynamic efficiency has 
positive effects on overall development, what is the 
possibility that incentivizing the long run efficiency would 
benefit a sector in a developing country? It is quite 
possible that a particular sector shows no signs of 
innovation. Intuitively, in such cases it is prudent to ensure 
the short run benefits by keeping the prices low. 
Furthermore, many believe that developing countries are 
still in the phase of imitating foreign technology. At the 
most they make incremental changes/improvements in 
order to adapt foreign innovation to local circumstances. 
However, intuition is a weak ground for policy making; 
especially, in those sectors that are climbing the value 
chain and showing signs of innovation. In such cases the 
role of law should be to provide a supportive institution for 
innovation. The research in the fourth paper, Competition 
Law and Compulsory Licenses in Emerging Markets: A 
Systems of Innovation Approach, was based on this issue. 
This paper argued that innovation in competition law 
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should be seen from the perspective of particular 
sectors. Further, the standard for intervention in 
competition law, consumer welfare, is geared at taking into 
account the welfare of local consumers both in the short 
run and the long run, depending upon the innovative 
capability of a particular sector.  
The paper relied on the Systems of Innovation (SI) 
approach and argued that innovation is a complex process 
that depends on the interaction between several institutions 
and actors, such as public and private universities, 
government organizations, firms, and government policies. 
Every sector has different set of actors, networks and 
institutions that characterize innovation in that particular 
sector. Law (including competition law) is just one of the 
institutions, and in the absence of an overall robust 
innovation system cannot, in itself, foster innovation. The 
paper illustrated this by comparing the innovation 
capability of the Indian and Brazilian pharmaceutical 
sector.  
To compare the innovative capabilities of the Indian and 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sectors, the paper relied upon 
„international patents‟ granted to the Indian and Brazilian 
firms by the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office 
(USPTO). The investigation revealed that while the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector is showing signs of innovation, the 
Brazilian firms, by and large, are still in the phase of 
imitation. Consequently, any competition intervention that 
has to make a choice between the short run and long run 
consumer welfare, must take account of the sectoral reality 
in these countries. The paper demonstrated this by 
discussing compulsory licenses in competition law. In fact, 
the paper, in the absence of any innovative capability in a 
sector, has argued for supporting public policy objective of 
ensuring the short run consumer welfare, i.e. cheap prices. 




agreement puts no embargo in using competition law to 
issue compulsory licenses. 
The approach taken in the fourth paper is also helpful in 
determining the optimum balance between Intellectual 
Property (IP) and Competition Law. In those sectors that 
experience rapid innovations, competition law should show 
deference to IP created monopoly, as incentivizing the 
innovative firm may achieve the long run consumer 
welfare. Whereas, the sectors where innovation is absent or 
minimal, competition intervention, prima facie, may be 
used to break IP created monopolies to achieve the short 
run consumer welfare. 
2. Contribution to the scholarship 
In the recent decades more and more developing countries 
have adopted open markets. The deregulation of markets 
promises better allocation of resources. However, the 
market power of firms may lead to market failure in the 
form of higher prices and bad quality. In order to check the 
ill effects of market power, competition law provides a 
framework that ensures rivalry in the market with the end 
aim to achieve consumer welfare both in the short run and 
the long run.17 Thus, entry barriers and such market 
behavior that are aimed at dampening competition are 
antithesis of competition rules. The role of competition 
law, therefore, is to offer a soft-touch regulation in neo-
liberal economies.18 This process of competition, in turn, 
increases productivity and reduces prices. Developing 
countries, therefore, can successfully employ competition 
law to sectors such as food and retail in order to benefit 
consumers. 
                                                          
17  However, very often there are trade-offs between the short run and 
long run consumer welfare. See paper four for a detailed 
discussion. 
18  As there is no direct intervention to keep the prices low, maintain 
or improve the quality, or to innovate. 
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In addition to the mentioned short run objectives, 
competition law can also be used to support innovation. 
The economic theory suggests that the long run gain of 
competition, i.e., innovation, outweighs the short run gains, 
i.e., lower prices, so far as their effect on economic growth 
is concerned. As argued in this thesis (especially the 
second paper) very often innovation can also help deal 
with social challenges such as health, education, and 
poverty reduction. However, the short run and the long run 
objectives are very often conflicting. The pursuit of 
innovation, that requires incentives, may lead to high 
prices for the generally less well-off consumers in 
developing countries. For these reasons this thesis has 
attempted at employing competition law to support 
innovation, to the extent permitted by the socio-economic 
realities prevailing in specific sectors in developing 
countries. This way the thesis can be seen as an effort to 
make innovation a part of development policy by 
suggesting a suitable competition law framework. 
The relationship between law and development has been 
well researched, and has shaped the evolution of law in 
several developing countries. Indeed, law is a potent policy 
tool that can be effectively utilized to pursue development. 
As innovation is a key to development, the research focus 
should be directed at those laws that can augment 
innovation. To a certain extent, within the context of 
emerging markets, laws such as IP that present a choice 
between the short run and the long run objective have 
attracted scholarly attention both from the economists and 
legal scholars. So far, however, little attention has been 
paid to the relationship between competition law, 
innovation, and development in developing countries, as 
the scholars still grapple to determine the nature of 
competition law in emerging markets. Consequently, this 




play in fostering innovation and thereby development in 
emerging markets.  
The concept of development is broad, that goes beyond a 
mere increase in GNP and includes poverty alleviation and 
reduction in inequality. This led Sen to argue that means 
and aim of development is to facilitate various freedoms 
that can enhance human capability.19 Even while adopting 
the law and economics approach to the investigation, the 
research in this thesis has attempted to follow the broad 
notion of development. This approach manifested in 
stressing easy access to the ICT for the poor while arguing 
for incentivizing diffusion of the latest technology (second 
paper), dismissing aggregate welfare while determining 
efficiency standard fit for developing countries (third 
paper), and encouraging short run consumer welfare when 
little or no innovative capability is present in a particular 
sector (fourth paper).  
Ideas are the starting point for any innovation. However, 
any scientific discovery needs to be made commercially 
available in order to be regarded as innovation. The role of 
law and regulation is crucial in transforming the scientific 
discovery into innovation. To this end, law has an 
interesting role to play– it should ensure optimal incentives 
to reward and support innovative activities. However, this 
thesis has argued that the optimal incentives are context 
driven, and are not independent of socio-economic 
realities. Thus, the research is also an attempt to find a 
balance between equity and efficiency. 
This thesis has argued for a more permissive antitrust 
treatment of innovation in emerging markets. This research 
                                                          
19 Amartya Sen, “Development as Freedom” (Oxford University 
Press, 1999, first published OUP paper back in 2001) p 3. Sen 
advocates five different freedoms: (1) political freedom  (2) 
economic facilities (3) social opportunities (4) transparency 
guarantees (5) protective security. 
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is a starting point, in order to create a competition law 
framework in developing countries that is capable of 
recognizing dynamic efficiency gains. More generally, 
jurisprudential underpinnings of this thesis may serve as a 
good framework to analyze complex issues pertaining to 
law and regulation. For example issues such as net 
neutrality, and disruptive innovation in the sharing 
economy that is increasingly rendering the old business 
models redundant, require a nuanced economic approach 
to competition law with dynamic efficiency at its core. 
Thus, the thesis is also an endeavor to bring competition 
law in emerging markets closer to the economic 
characteristics of the „new economy‟, where innovation 
and technical changes are the core features.  
3. The path ahead 
This research is just a starting point in advocating a more 
permissive competition law regime that could 
accommodate dynamic efficiency gains in emerging 
markets. In general, developing countries do not consider 
innovation as a policy goal. Therefore, any such attempt to 
value dynamic efficiency gains including innovation, 
should also focus on educating the policy makers in 
understanding the benefits of innovation in developing 
countries. 
The research here has investigated the role that 
competition law can play in fostering innovation in the 
peculiar socio-economic context of developing countries. 
A meaningful legal and regulatory environment that is 
conducive for innovation in emerging markets, also 
requires investigating and determining the role that other 
laws such as taxation can play in fostering innovation. 
Aside redistribution, tax laws can also be used to 
incentivize R&D–thus, there is a need to balance equity 




The inclusion of dynamic efficiency in the existing 
competition law framework in developing countries opens 
up new questions. For example, dynamic efficiency claims 
are recognized in the EU and the US, only if it is shown 
that the gains from dynamic efficiency will be passed on to 
consumers. As the general consumers in developing 
countries are less well off, does it warrant a stronger pass 
on requirement in developing countries? Further, the LET 
(Likelihood of entry, Extent of entry and Timeliness of 
entry) test with respect to dynamic efficiency needs to be 
adapted in the specific context of emerging markets.  
Additionally, antitrust institutions, both regulators and 
courts, play critical role in the assessment of dynamic 
efficiency concerns in antitrust. Even in mature 
jurisdiction, courts have struggled to incorporate dynamic 
efficiency concerns. This is because dynamic efficiency 
analysis is inherently predictive in nature, engendering 
uncertainty, and diminishing the predictability of law.20 
Further, at present the economic and legal tools are not 
advance enough to perfectly assist a dynamic efficiency 
analysis of antitrust issues. 21 The industrial organization 
dominant antitrust analysis is predominantly static in 
nature, primarily because of the lack of predictable and 
defensible economic tools that can assist the agencies and 
court to make informed decisions about dynamic issues. 
This problem is more acute in new competition law 
jurisdictions where the antitrust institutions are under-
funded and have little experience even of the static 
competition law analysis. 
Only an independent and capable regulatory body can 
carry out objective competitive assessment where 
innovation is given due weightage. The antitrust 
                                                          
20 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, “Dynamic Analysis 
and The Limits of AntitrustInstitutions” (2012) 78 (1) Antitrust law 
Journal 12-48. 
21  ibid 
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institutions in the new competition regimes are largely 
immature and suffer from pre-liberalization institutional 
memory.22 A young antitrust institution requires guidance 
with respect to recruiting competent staff, and to know 
how best to assign work to different teams comprising of 
lawyers and economists. Also, a regulator is in perennial 
competition with the private sector in order to choose and 
retain the best talent. Bureaucratic traditions and 
administrative procedures in every country are also 
different. Therefore, it is also important to see to what 
extent the lessons from the mature jurisdictions can be 
transplanted within the administrative law set up of 
developing countries. The future research, therefore, 
should be directed at shifting the focus of scrutiny from 
substantive competition law rules to the institutional 
enquiry in the emerging market context. 
 
                                                          
22  The author spoke to several competition law experts and 
practitioners both at the Competition Commission of India and 
outside about the competition law enforcement in India. There is a 
startling pattern in the cases that have been overruled/reversed/ 
modified by the appelate bodies– most of the cases were heard and 
decided on the grounds of procedural fairness rather than the merits 
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It is widely accepted that innovation is a key factor to growth and 
development. Consequently, a sustained effort has been made in the Western 
scholarship to promote innovation through various means, including 
law. As part of jurisdiction specific public policy, law strikes a balance 
between incentives to innovators that undertake risky R&D, and ensuring 
easy access for the ones who cannot pay high prices for innovative goods. 
This dilemma also arises in competition law. In developing countries, 
where competition law is relatively new, not much research has been 
done to determine the optimum role of competition law that can ensures 
cheap prices, while also fostering innovative activities through adequate 
incentives, to the extent it is possible in the peculiar socio-economic 
environment. This research is aimed at bridging this gap. This work makes 
an investigation into the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
and the Pharmaceutical sector– both are characterized with rapid innovation 
and have huge implication for social welfare– and shows that how, even while 
ensuring price competition and cheap access, developing countries can 
still successfully support innovative activities through competition policy.
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